Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-32631
This query searches for multiple indicators associated with the STAC4713 and STAC3725 campaigns (often linked to PayoutsKing/GOLD ENCOUNTER). It utilizes a fast free-text pre-filter followed by a case statement to categorize specific TTPs, including QEMU abuse, rogue scheduled tasks, suspicious services/accounts, covert tunneling, and credential access.
Detects AdaptixC2 framework behaviors by correlating DNS over HTTPS (DoH) lookups to known providers (dns.google, dns.quad9) with subsequent Beacon Object File (BOF) activities. It specifically looks for the same process performing the DoH lookup and subsequently executing LSASS dumping commands, spawning sacrificial BOF processes, or initiating SMB/WinRM lateral movement.
Detects AdaptixC2 framework behaviors by correlating DNS over HTTPS (DoH) lookups to known providers (dns.google, dns.quad9) with subsequent Beacon Object File (BOF) activities. It specifically looks for the same process performing the DoH lookup and subsequently executing LSASS dumping commands, spawning sacrificial BOF processes, or initiating SMB/WinRM lateral movement.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to a specific IP address (142.11.206.73) in network connections, or a specific domain (sfrclak.com) in DNS requests or process command lines. This could indicate communication with known malicious infrastructure or the execution of malware.
Detects network connections to the known command and control (C2) server and port associated with the compromised axios package payload. This rule specifically looks for network connections or DNS requests to 'sfrclak.com' or connections to IP address '142.11.206.73' on port 8000.
Detects AdaptixC2 framework behaviors by correlating DNS over HTTPS (DoH) lookups to known providers (dns.google, dns.quad9) with subsequent Beacon Object File (BOF) activities. It specifically looks for the same process performing the DoH lookup and subsequently executing LSASS dumping commands, spawning sacrificial BOF processes, or initiating SMB/WinRM lateral movement.
Detects network requests to known malicious domains associated with the fake RedAlert Android malware campaign used by pro-Iranian actors, acting as a payload host or C2 endpoint.
Detects curl commands using user-agent strings that Sapphire Sleet uses as campaign tracking identifiers in their macOS intrusion chain. Each stage of the cascading payload delivery uses a distinct UA (mac-cur1 through mac-cur5) to route requests to different server paths serving AppleScript payloads or ZIP archives containing malicious .app bundles.
Detects suspicious execution of `wget` or `curl` attempting to retrieve a payload named exactly `/.shell`. This activity is indicative of the Masjesu botnet's C2 download pattern, where it attempts to download a bash shell file after exploiting a target to initiate device infection and propagation routines.
https://github.com/blackarrowsec/redteam-research/tree/master/CVE-2026-33829
This rule detects an unusually high volume of network share access attempts from a single IP address and account within a short time frame (5 minutes). This could indicate an adversary attempting to discover or access network shares, potentially for data exfiltration or lateral movement.
This rule detects potential internal network scanning activity by identifying a single source IP address that communicates with 15 or more distinct internal destination IP addresses within a 5-minute time window. This behavior is often indicative of reconnaissance efforts by an attacker attempting to map out the internal network.
This rule detects potential network port scanning activity by identifying a single source IP address attempting to connect to 10 or more distinct destination ports on a single destination IP address within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to discover open services on a target host.
This rule detects DNS requests to domains known to be associated with malicious browser extensions. These extensions often perform command and control (C2) or data exfiltration activities by communicating with these domains. The rule uses a regex to match both the primary domains and their subdomains, aggregating results by host and domain to identify repetitive beaconing.
This rule detects a suspicious attack chain, potentially related to 'ClickFix' or similar social engineering campaigns. It correlates multiple events within a 5-minute window: a browser being launched from an email client, a file download from a browser into the Downloads directory, and a command prompt being launched from explorer.exe executing a command that references the Downloads directory. Additionally, it looks for network connections initiated by common document types, which could indicate malicious document activity.
This rule analyzes historical logon, process, and network activity for a specified device over a configurable lookback period. It aims to validate whether a device, potentially flagged as decommissioned or stale, exhibits a pattern of sporadic, legitimate use (e.g., executive laptops, break-glass machines) rather than continuous or unauthorized activity. The output provides a daily timeline of activity, helping to differentiate between truly dormant assets and those with intermittent, legitimate usage.
Detects network connections to Masjesu's hardcoded fallback command and control IP addresses over port 443. This rule is critical for detecting mature infections where Masjesu actively falls back to a set of hardcoded IP addresses if domain resolution fails.
Detects command-line activity indicative of mounting a remote WebDAV share, a technique used to bypass browser security controls and deliver malware. This rule looks for specific keywords used to force a connection to a remote WebDAV server.
Detects network connections to the primary staging server IP address (195.3.222.251) used to host the intermediate PowerShell script and the PhantomPull loader associated with the REF6598 campaign and the PhantomPulse RAT.
Detects a "winlogon.exe" process that initiate network communications with public IP addresses
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