Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,155 detections
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Detects script-driven (curl, wget, python) outbound connections to
AI/LLM API endpoints. The campaign uses legitimate AI platform APIs as covert
command, control, and exfiltration channels, blending malicious traffic with
approved web services to evade network-based detection.
AI/LLM API endpoints. The campaign uses legitimate AI platform APIs as covert
command, control, and exfiltration channels, blending malicious traffic with
approved web services to evade network-based detection.
Detects malicious behaviors involving the Chisel tunneling tool, including reverse SOCKS proxy connections with TLS verification skipped, cron-based persistence referencing watchdog scripts in hidden /var/tmp directories, and associated tool staging activities.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Detects behavioral indicators of an SSH or autossh reverse tunnel (-R) executed with no remote command (-N) and host-key checking disabled, combined with network connections to a known command and control IP address.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
The following analytic detects HTTP POST requests containing heavily encoded data in the post body, specifically looking for sequences of hex-encoded bytes or base64-encoded strings.
It leverages Zeek HTTP logs to identify POST requests where the body contains eight or more consecutive hex escape sequences or sixteen or more consecutive base64 character groups.
This activity is significant as adversaries commonly use hex or base64 encoding to obfuscate C2 communication, exfiltrate data, or deliver encoded payloads.
It leverages Zeek HTTP logs to identify POST requests where the body contains eight or more consecutive hex escape sequences or sixteen or more consecutive base64 character groups.
This activity is significant as adversaries commonly use hex or base64 encoding to obfuscate C2 communication, exfiltrate data, or deliver encoded payloads.
Detects PowerShell using System.Net.WebClient DownloadFile or related commands to fetch tool dependencies (such as 7z, MSTSCLib, ffmpeg) from GitHub repositories associated with the 'websalat' naming convention, indicative of Salat Stealer or similar tool-loading activity.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of mscoree.dll outside of standard system and .NET paths, followed closely by network activity connecting to GitHub from the same process within a one-hour window.
Detects the execution of Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools followed closely (within 1 day) by potential data exfiltration activity using tools like WinSCP or Rclone, or connections to cloud storage providers (OneDrive, Google Drive) from the same device.
Detects instances where a web browser accesses a domain listed in the 'AdFection_Domains' watchlist, followed closely by the browser spawning a script interpreter (such as PowerShell, wscript, cscript, mshta) or dropping an executable/script file in user profile or temporary directories.
Detects googleupdate.exe loading an unsigned DLL from a non-standard path, followed by network communication to a known Command and Control (C2) domain or IP address.
Detects a Python process spawning msiexec.exe followed by a high volume of LDAP connections (burst) from the same device within a 30-minute window, potentially indicating post-exploitation activity such as domain enumeration.
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
Detects rundll32.exe creating a named pipe and subsequently establishing an SMB (port 445) connection to a private IP address within a 10-minute window, indicative of potential lateral movement or internal reconnaissance.
Correlates an IDE or extension host process querying api.ipify.org with a subsequent git command configuring the global user email on the same device within a 5-minute window. This behavior can be indicative of malicious setup or automated post-compromise activity.
Detects behavioral indicators of an SSH or autossh reverse tunnel (-R) executed with no remote command (-N) and host-key checking disabled, combined with network connections to a known command and control IP address.
Detects outbound network connections to known ClickFix campaign domains or the execution of the finger utility connecting to public IP addresses.
Detects endpoint network connections made to known staging IP addresses often associated with data exfiltration or staging activities.
Detects repeated Ollama warning-level network errors, such as DNS lookup failures, TCP connection issues, or host resolution problems. These events can indicate a connectivity issue and warrant investigation, but do not by themselves establish unauthorized access or reconnaissance.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
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