Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

5,155 detections

Detects DNS queries containing high-entropy domain labels that exhibit patterns common to Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). The rule triggers when a threshold of such suspicious queries is exceeded from a single source within a 60-second window, which is a common indicator of malware beaconing or C2 communication.
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Emiliano Mema@Nosalva
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
915
This rule detects user interaction with potentially malicious URLs from known Dynamic DNS (DDNS) providers or URLs containing suspicious keywords frequently associated with phishing lures (e.g., login, auth, verify, mfa). It filters out known legitimate Microsoft domains to reduce noise.
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Montaser Ismail@M0nt3x
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
10011
Detects periodic (beaconing) HTTP POST requests directed to '/api/beacon' from endpoints. The detection logic monitors for consecutive connections occurring within a 3-second interval, specifically searching for JSON payloads containing identification fields (id, user, host, pid) characteristic of C2Looper backdoor traffic.
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Emiliano Mema@Nosalva
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
007
This rule detects browser-based runtime evaluations that utilize WebRTC's RTCPeerConnection and createDataChannel APIs, often indicative of an adversary attempting to establish a covert command-and-control (C2) channel directly from a compromised browser session.
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Emiliano Mema@Nosalva
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
005
This rule detects a multi-stage attack pattern associated with Akira ransomware, including AD enumeration using PowerShell, data staging with WinRAR, S3 exfiltration via s5cmd, AnyDesk service installation, registry manipulation for persistence via Safe Mode, and boot configuration changes to facilitate EDR bypass. It also incorporates detection for specific IOCs like attacker jump host RDP connections and malicious file hashes.
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Aamir Muhammad@Aamir
CrowdStrike Logscale
2 months ago
406
Detects instances where a host that is not identified as a Domain Controller performs a DRSUAPI 'DRSGetNCChanges' request against another Domain Controller. This pattern is commonly associated with DCSync attacks, where an adversary mimics the Active Directory replication process to extract password hashes.
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Collin Lairamore@Bollinmore
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XQL Threat Forge
2 months ago
407
Detects instances where a host that is not identified as a Domain Controller performs a DRSUAPI 'DRSGetNCChanges' request against another Domain Controller. This pattern is commonly associated with DCSync attacks, where an adversary mimics the Active Directory replication process to extract password hashes.
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Collin Lairamore@Bollinmore
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
207
Detects malicious JavaScript injection attempts by msaRAT that leverage the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) Runtime.evaluate method. The malware attempts to execute specific code snippets to facilitate flow-controlled data transfers over WebRTC DataChannels using Base64ToArrayBuffer conversions and a 24KB buffer threshold.
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Emiliano Mema@Nosalva
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
104
This rule detects the use of raw sockets by 'ERAAgent.exe' by monitoring for socket I/O control (Ioctl) operations involving 'SIO_RCVALL'. This configuration, often associated with promiscuous mode, allows an application to capture all network traffic received by the network interface, a behavior commonly used by network sniffing tools or malicious implants to intercept sensitive data.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
000
Detects network traffic identified by FortiGate as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) that has been explicitly permitted (Accept action) by the firewall policy. This rule monitors for successful packet flow through the firewall, providing visibility into potential lateral movement paths via RDP.
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Lucas Pinho@lucaslapinho
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
007
Detects network traffic indicating potential Command and Control (C2) tasking communication via Microsoft SharePoint. The rule monitors for requests to specific SharePoint paths associated with the TWINLOOT campaign, which leverages legitimate cloud infrastructure for malicious command delivery.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
003
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the msaRAT remote access trojan (RAT) as it initializes WebRTC communication. It identifies the initial POST request to a token service and the subsequent response containing Twilio TURN and Google STUN relay server configurations, which are used by the malware to establish peer-to-peer tunnels for command-and-control communication.
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Emiliano Mema@Nosalva
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
003
This rule detects successful SSH logins that follow a burst of at least 10 failed SSH authentication attempts from the same remote IP address to the same device within a 10-minute window, followed by a successful login within 15 minutes. This pattern is indicative of a successful credential brute-force attack, frequently associated with botnet propagation efforts.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
3 months ago
306
Detects anomalous access attempts to Netskope Private Access applications, specifically identifying connections from unmanaged devices, access occurring outside of typical business hours, or access from unusual/unexpected geographic locations.
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KQL Cowboy@KQLCowboy
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Netskope Detection Engineering
2 months ago
104
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known malicious IP addresses associated with AdaptixC2 infrastructure. This rule identifies both general TCP connections and HTTP beaconing activity to these C2 servers, which are used for command and control purposes.
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Emiliano Mema@Nosalva
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
004
Detects anomalous, non-browser process activity interacting with Microsoft Teams APIs associated with the TWINLOOT threat campaign. The rules identify suspicious token retrieval requests and unauthorized authentication headers from processes that do not identify as legitimate browser or Teams application agents, indicating potential abuse of application access tokens and authentication flows.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects data exfiltration by the Kynx Stealer ChunkSender module which uses HTTP POST requests to a specific ingestion path.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
5013
Detects DNS queries for suspicious subdomains on known Mirage2FA phishing kit domains ('cheacker.store' and 'volatilesour.store'). The rule identifies queries where the subdomain is Base64-encoded and decodes into an email-like format, which is a technique used by this phishing kit to track or validate victim-specific session tokens or email addresses.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
1203
Detects HTTP POST requests characteristic of the Kynx Stealer's ChunkSender module. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns used during the exfiltration phase, where stolen data categories like passwords, cookies, and system information are sent to a remote C2 panel.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
1011
This rule detects the use of the Frida dynamic instrumentation toolkit and the objection framework, specifically searching for command-line arguments and process names associated with their installation or use, as well as network activity on the default Frida server port (27042). It monitors for activities like SSL pinning bypass, mobile application patching, and remote agent deployment.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
3 months ago
7028
This rule detects successful connection events to Palo Alto GlobalProtect gateways originating from known malicious source IP addresses associated with the exploitation of CVE-2026-0257, or connections initiated by hosts using suspicious or default placeholder device names/host IDs. It effectively identifies potential exploitation attempts or unauthorized access to corporate VPN gateways.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
10215
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