Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
532 detections
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Detects potential vulnerability scanning, enumeration, or bulk data extraction against Request Tracker (RT) web paths by monitoring high request volumes, distinct URI counts, or large response byte sizes within CommonSecurityLog data.
Detects a process with no prior AI API activity in the past 14 days suddenly generating a high volume (200+ calls) of network connections to public AI inference endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Grok, OpenRouter). This behavior is consistent with stolen API keys being used to drain resources or exfiltrate data from a newly compromised host.
Detects high-volume Microsoft Graph API activity using attacker-associated user agents, such as python-requests, curl, or httpx, which may indicate automated token sweeping or data collection associated with supply-chain attacks.
Detects non-browser processes contacting multiple distinct cloud storage APIs within a one-hour timeframe, a pattern indicative of potential multi-service command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects a substantial outbound transfer from a Meraki-protected site. Branch
locations have predictable, modest traffic profiles, which makes a sustained upload
unusually visible against that baseline compared with the same transfer leaving a
datacentre.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='SESSION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, txlen
locations have predictable, modest traffic profiles, which makes a sustained upload
unusually visible against that baseline compared with the same transfer leaving a
datacentre.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='SESSION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, txlen
This rule monitors network traffic from CommonSecurityLog data to detect bidirectional communication between NetScaler appliances and known malicious infrastructure associated with the CVE-2026-88772 campaign, which is indicative of command-and-control activity.
Detects outbound network traffic associated with the Azazel operation, including connections to identified C2 infrastructure, open directory/upload listeners, domain-specific staging servers, and exfiltration attempts to MEGA cloud storage endpoints.
Detects outbound network traffic associated with the Azazel operation, including connections to identified C2 infrastructure, open directory/upload listeners, domain-specific staging servers, and exfiltration attempts to MEGA cloud storage endpoints.
This rule monitors network traffic from CommonSecurityLog data to detect bidirectional communication between NetScaler appliances and known malicious infrastructure associated with the CVE-2026-88772 campaign, which is indicative of command-and-control activity.
Detects outbound network traffic associated with the Azazel operation, including connections to identified C2 infrastructure, open directory/upload listeners, domain-specific staging servers, and exfiltration attempts to MEGA cloud storage endpoints.
This rule monitors network traffic from CommonSecurityLog data to detect bidirectional communication between NetScaler appliances and known malicious infrastructure associated with the CVE-2026-88772 campaign, which is indicative of command-and-control activity.
The following analytic detects file transfers flagged as malware that occurred over non-standard ports (other than 80 and 443). Adversaries may attempt to bypass protocol-based detection or use alternate ports to blend in with other traffic. This analytic identifies these non-conventional flows and surfaces potential evasion techniques. If confirmed malicious this indicate potential malware delivery or other nefarious activity.
This rule detects anomalous activity involving cloud-based shell services (AWS CloudShell, Azure Cloud Shell, GCP Cloud Shell). It triggers on two main conditions: (1) First-time usage of these shell environments by a principal within the detection window, and (2) The execution of commands associated with data staging, ingress tool transfer, or exfiltration (e.g., curl, wget, storage copy commands).
This rule monitors for sustained, repeated network connections from specific processes (often legitimate binaries used by the NeedyMantis group for loader activities) to known NeedyMantis-associated C2 domains. It triggers when an initiating process, associated with known loader activity, maintains a persistent communication pattern consistent with an active WebSocket C2 session.
Detects high-frequency outbound network connections to known large language model (LLM) API providers (OpenAI, xAI, Anthropic) originating from a single endpoint within a short timeframe. This activity is indicative of potential API key theft, where an attacker uses a compromised legitimate key to exhaust credit quotas or exfiltrate data via unauthorized API calls, bypassing the intended application.
Detects potential DNS tunneling or Command and Control (C2) activity by analyzing DNS query patterns. The rule identifies anomalous behavior based on high query volume, excessive unique subdomain fanout to a single parent domain, and unusually long average query lengths. This combination is often indicative of data exfiltration or communication with a C2 server over the DNS protocol.
Detects outbound network traffic associated with the Azazel operation, including connections to identified C2 infrastructure, open directory/upload listeners, domain-specific staging servers, and exfiltration attempts to MEGA cloud storage endpoints.
Detects recurring Microsoft Graph mailbox activity featuring 'command_req_' or 'command_res_' substrings within message subjects or filter queries. This pattern is indicative of attackers using email-based infrastructure for Command and Control (C2) communication, characterized by periodic polling of mailbox items.
Detects the BotHelper RAT performing live screen surveillance by identifying repeated high-frequency JPEG frame uploads to the '/api/v1/screen_live.php' endpoint, initiated by the 'msedge_proxy.exe' process.
Detects suspicious processes frequently polling Hugging Face repository endpoints (discussions, raw files, commits). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using public code/dataset hosting services as a covert command-and-control (C2) channel to fetch instructions or exfiltrate data, bypassing traditional network filters by blending in with legitimate developer traffic.
The following analytic detects file downloads involving executable, archive, or scripting-related file types that are commonly used in malware delivery.
These file types include formats like PE executables, shell scripts, autorun files, installers, and known testing samples such as EICAR.
This detection leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and enriches the results using a filetype lookup to provide context.
If confirmed malicious, these downloads could indicate the initial infection vector, malware staging, or scripting abuse.
These file types include formats like PE executables, shell scripts, autorun files, installers, and known testing samples such as EICAR.
This detection leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and enriches the results using a filetype lookup to provide context.
If confirmed malicious, these downloads could indicate the initial infection vector, malware staging, or scripting abuse.
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