Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects successful outbound network connections to the domain 'gapidriver.com' targeting the URI path '/api/get.php'. This pattern is associated with command and control (C2) activity. Due to the lack of specific HTTP header validation in this telemetry source, the signal may require additional validation, such as analyzing the initiating process lineage.
Detects the creation of compressed archive files (zip, rar, 7z, dat) followed by a significant network upload (exceeding 5MB) on the same host within a 30-minute window, which is indicative of staging and exfiltrating collected data.
Detects instances where the outbound byte count to external (non-private) IP addresses for a source host significantly exceeds its historical hourly baseline. This detection is designed to identify potential data exfiltration stages occurring after system or network compromise.
Detects outbound network traffic consistent with the Chisel proxy/tunneling tool establishing a connection to an external VPS associated with the Miku threat actor. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific remote IP address on port 443, utilizing a threshold to reduce noise by ensuring multiple connection attempts occur.
Detects outbound network traffic consistent with the Chisel proxy/tunneling tool establishing a connection to an external VPS associated with the Miku threat actor. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific remote IP address on port 443, utilizing a threshold to reduce noise by ensuring multiple connection attempts occur.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections from server-role assets to 'devtunnels.ms', a service that facilitates temporary public tunnels to internal services. This behavior is flagged as a potential indicator of unauthorized command-and-control (C2) tunneling, particularly when originating from critical infrastructure like Domain Controllers or Exchange OWA servers.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections from server-role assets to 'devtunnels.ms', a service that facilitates temporary public tunnels to internal services. This behavior is flagged as a potential indicator of unauthorized command-and-control (C2) tunneling, particularly when originating from critical infrastructure like Domain Controllers or Exchange OWA servers.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections from server-role assets to 'devtunnels.ms', a service that facilitates temporary public tunnels to internal services. This behavior is flagged as a potential indicator of unauthorized command-and-control (C2) tunneling, particularly when originating from critical infrastructure like Domain Controllers or Exchange OWA servers.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
This rule detects high-frequency network activity directed toward the Microsoft Graph API (graph.microsoft.com) utilizing the 'python-httpx' user agent. This pattern matches known exfiltration activity associated with Storm-3121/Storm-3032 threat groups, where automated scripts are used to move data out of the environment via legitimate cloud service APIs.
Detects instances where a large volume of data (greater than 5GB) is transferred through an anonymous proxy using specific cloud application IDs. This pattern is indicative of potential data exfiltration via third-party or obscured network channels.
Detects high-volume file download or data access events across SharePoint, OneDrive, and Exchange Online. This rule monitors for requests from Python-based HTTP libraries (httpx, requests, urllib) targeting Microsoft Graph API endpoints, which is a pattern indicative of automated bulk data collection or exfiltration, often observed in campaigns like Storm-3121 or Storm-3032.
Detects instances where the outbound byte count to external (non-private) IP addresses for a source host significantly exceeds its historical hourly baseline. This detection is designed to identify potential data exfiltration stages occurring after system or network compromise.
This rule detects potential command-and-control beaconing activity associated with the Go RAT used in the GapiUpdate campaign. It monitors for outbound network connections over TCP port 5556 to a known malicious C2 IP address, or alternatively, detects persistent outbound activity to other external (non-RFC1918) IP addresses characterized by multiple successive connections within a 10-minute window, which mimics the behavior of persistent beaconing.
This rule detects potential command-and-control beaconing activity associated with the Go RAT used in the GapiUpdate campaign. It monitors for outbound network connections over TCP port 5556 to a known malicious C2 IP address, or alternatively, detects persistent outbound activity to other external (non-RFC1918) IP addresses characterized by multiple successive connections within a 10-minute window, which mimics the behavior of persistent beaconing.
This rule detects potential command-and-control beaconing activity associated with the Go RAT used in the GapiUpdate campaign. It monitors for outbound network connections over TCP port 5556 to a known malicious C2 IP address, or alternatively, detects persistent outbound activity to other external (non-RFC1918) IP addresses characterized by multiple successive connections within a 10-minute window, which mimics the behavior of persistent beaconing.
This rule detects successful outbound network connections to the domain 'gapidriver.com' targeting the URI path '/api/get.php'. This pattern is associated with command and control (C2) activity. Due to the lack of specific HTTP header validation in this telemetry source, the signal may require additional validation, such as analyzing the initiating process lineage.
This rule detects successful outbound network connections to the domain 'gapidriver.com' targeting the URI path '/api/get.php'. This pattern is associated with command and control (C2) activity. Due to the lack of specific HTTP header validation in this telemetry source, the signal may require additional validation, such as analyzing the initiating process lineage.
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