Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential exfiltration of sensitive files, specifically 'cert.pem' and 'private.key', via HTTP POST requests to the '/api/adbk/upload' endpoint. This pattern is characteristic of the RatHat malware attempting to exfiltrate device credentials to a Command and Control (C2) server.
Detects HTTP POST requests from Android devices identified as RatHat malware, specifically targeting exfiltration of sensitive data including credentials, cipher keys, and ADB certificate/key uploads via the malware's C2 API.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
Detects anomalous, high-volume activity directed at SharePoint and OneDrive Graph API endpoints (e.g., /sites, /drives, /search, /children). The activity pattern, characterized by multiple distinct path requests and the usage of pagination tokens within a short timeframe, strongly indicates an adversary attempting to map the file structure and contents of a repository prior to data collection or exfiltration.
Detects anomalous, repeated 512KB multipart POST requests sent to a 'relay.php' endpoint, indicative of bulk data exfiltration performed by the CRPx0 ransomware prior to file encryption.
Detects instances where the outbound byte count to external (non-private) IP addresses for a source host significantly exceeds its historical hourly baseline. This detection is designed to identify potential data exfiltration stages occurring after system or network compromise.
Detects instances where the outbound byte count to external (non-private) IP addresses for a source host significantly exceeds its historical hourly baseline. This detection is designed to identify potential data exfiltration stages occurring after system or network compromise.
Detects instances where the outbound byte count to external (non-private) IP addresses for a source host significantly exceeds its historical hourly baseline. This detection is designed to identify potential data exfiltration stages occurring after system or network compromise.
Detects outbound network traffic (HTTPS and TLS) directed at the specific S3-compatible object storage host 'ams1.vultrobjects.com'. This pattern is associated with 'HEAVYGRAM', a threat actor or toolkit using Vultr S3 buckets for potential data exfiltration.
This rule detects successful outbound network connections to the domain 'gapidriver.com' targeting the URI path '/api/get.php'. This pattern is associated with command and control (C2) activity. Due to the lack of specific HTTP header validation in this telemetry source, the signal may require additional validation, such as analyzing the initiating process lineage.
This rule detects potential automated web scraping activity by identifying high-volume, repetitive network requests directed towards domains identified as government (.gov) or military (.mil). It correlates these network patterns with the execution of common browser automation frameworks (e.g., Puppeteer, Playwright) or headless browsers, indicating a likely coordinated scraping operation or bot activity.
This rule detects potential automated web scraping activity by identifying high-volume, repetitive network requests directed towards domains identified as government (.gov) or military (.mil). It correlates these network patterns with the execution of common browser automation frameworks (e.g., Puppeteer, Playwright) or headless browsers, indicating a likely coordinated scraping operation or bot activity.
This rule detects potential automated web scraping activity by identifying high-volume, repetitive network requests directed towards domains identified as government (.gov) or military (.mil). It correlates these network patterns with the execution of common browser automation frameworks (e.g., Puppeteer, Playwright) or headless browsers, indicating a likely coordinated scraping operation or bot activity.
This rule detects potential automated web scraping activity by identifying high-volume, repetitive network requests directed towards domains identified as government (.gov) or military (.mil). It correlates these network patterns with the execution of common browser automation frameworks (e.g., Puppeteer, Playwright) or headless browsers, indicating a likely coordinated scraping operation or bot activity.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
Detects the specific C2 handshake pattern associated with HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) remote access trojans. The rule monitors for a unique sequence of markers, specifically CLIENT_ID, COMPUTER, IDENTIFIER_CHANNEL, and a version string, indicating a malware-specific communication protocol.
This rule detects potential automated web scraping activity by identifying high-volume, repetitive network requests directed towards domains identified as government (.gov) or military (.mil). It correlates these network patterns with the execution of common browser automation frameworks (e.g., Puppeteer, Playwright) or headless browsers, indicating a likely coordinated scraping operation or bot activity.
Detects the FTP STOR command uploading a file with a .pcap extension to an external host on port 21 or 20 — consolidated from three overlapping detections (generic server, router-specific, and capture-file variants). Indicates an adversary (e.g. Fire Ant/UNC3886) exfiltrating captured network traffic from a compromised network device via FTP.
Detects a multi-stage browser-based web skimming attack. The rule identifies a specific sequence of network activity: a device fetching an obfuscated loader script from 'paste.sh', followed by retrieving payload fragments from the 'Google Sheets Visualization API', and concluding with network interactions with crypto-transaction services 'SwapZone.io' or 'SimpleSwap.io', characteristic of a browser-based wallet-drainer campaign.
Detects a multi-stage browser-based web skimming attack. The rule identifies a specific sequence of network activity: a device fetching an obfuscated loader script from 'paste.sh', followed by retrieving payload fragments from the 'Google Sheets Visualization API', and concluding with network interactions with crypto-transaction services 'SwapZone.io' or 'SimpleSwap.io', characteristic of a browser-based wallet-drainer campaign.
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