Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of tooling routed through a reverse SOCKS5 pivot via wrappers such as via_socks.sh, proxychains4 with a SOCKS5 configuration, or LD_PRELOAD injection of libproxychains.so.
Detects when a device connects to a wireless network SSID that has not been observed in the baseline over the previous 14 days.
The following analytic identifies the use of netsh.exe to configure a connection proxy, which can be leveraged for persistence by executing a helper DLL. It detects this activity by analyzing process creation events from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "portproxy" and "v4tov4" parameters. This activity is significant because it indicates potential unauthorized network configuration changes, which could be used to maintain persistence or redirect network traffic. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain covert access or manipulate network communications, posing a significant security risk.
Detects configuration changes to AAA/TACACS+ settings or the creation of local administrative accounts on network devices executed over SSH or Telnet sessions. This behavior is associated with malicious activity by groups such as Salt Typhoon, involving the compromise of telecommunications infrastructure.
Detects the creation or modification of Network Address Translation (NAT) rules, port forwarding settings, or virtual IP configurations across various enterprise firewall vendors. This could indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistent inbound access to an internal network segment, bypass network egress controls, or perform reconnaissance on accessible services.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious configuration changes on Cisco IOS XR devices, specifically targeting the creation of SPAN/mirroring sessions, ACL modifications to bypass traffic filtering, and changes to AAA or local user authentication settings. These patterns are consistent with post-compromise activities by adversaries seeking persistence and traffic interception.
Detects unauthorized changes to network appliance configurations, specifically the installation of new software packages using opkg or the modification of network address translation (NAT) rules via iptables or nftables. These actions can be used to maintain persistent access or establish covert command and control infrastructure.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
This rule detects the execution of the Cloudflare 'cloudflared' utility from non-standard directory locations. Cloudflared is often abused by threat actors to establish reverse tunnels (e.g., TryCloudflare) to gain unauthorized, persistent, and encrypted external access to a compromised host, effectively bypassing standard perimeter network security controls.
This rule detects suspicious usage of certutil.exe for file downloading or the execution of the Chisel proxy tool, specifically targeting connections or authentication towards the suspicious IP address 69.48.228.86. This behavior is indicative of C2 communication or ingress tool transfer.
This rule detects suspicious usage of certutil.exe for file downloading or the execution of the Chisel proxy tool, specifically targeting connections or authentication towards the suspicious IP address 69.48.228.86. This behavior is indicative of C2 communication or ingress tool transfer.
This rule detects suspicious usage of certutil.exe for file downloading or the execution of the Chisel proxy tool, specifically targeting connections or authentication towards the suspicious IP address 69.48.228.86. This behavior is indicative of C2 communication or ingress tool transfer.
This rule detects suspicious usage of certutil.exe for file downloading or the execution of the Chisel proxy tool, specifically targeting connections or authentication towards the suspicious IP address 69.48.228.86. This behavior is indicative of C2 communication or ingress tool transfer.
This rule detects suspicious usage of certutil.exe for file downloading or the execution of the Chisel proxy tool, specifically targeting connections or authentication towards the suspicious IP address 69.48.228.86. This behavior is indicative of C2 communication or ingress tool transfer.
Detects the use of netsh.exe to establish a port proxy, specifically conditioned on the execution context of the Impacket atexec tool (indicated by specific naming patterns and parent processes). This activity often follows the lateral movement or execution of a remote service by a tool like Impacket.
Detects the use of netsh.exe to establish a port proxy, specifically conditioned on the execution context of the Impacket atexec tool (indicated by specific naming patterns and parent processes). This activity often follows the lateral movement or execution of a remote service by a tool like Impacket.
Detects the use of netsh.exe to establish a port proxy, specifically conditioned on the execution context of the Impacket atexec tool (indicated by specific naming patterns and parent processes). This activity often follows the lateral movement or execution of a remote service by a tool like Impacket.
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