Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of netsh.exe to establish a port proxy, specifically conditioned on the execution context of the Impacket atexec tool (indicated by specific naming patterns and parent processes). This activity often follows the lateral movement or execution of a remote service by a tool like Impacket.
Detects the use of netsh.exe to establish a port proxy, specifically conditioned on the execution context of the Impacket atexec tool (indicated by specific naming patterns and parent processes). This activity often follows the lateral movement or execution of a remote service by a tool like Impacket.
Detects command-line execution of tools (route, netsh, sysctl) intended to modify host routing tables or enable IP forwarding. Such activity on workstation endpoints may indicate an attempt to bridge network segments, bypass network security boundaries, or facilitate lateral movement/C2 communications.
Detects command-line execution of tools (route, netsh, sysctl) intended to modify host routing tables or enable IP forwarding. Such activity on workstation endpoints may indicate an attempt to bridge network segments, bypass network security boundaries, or facilitate lateral movement/C2 communications.
Detects command-line execution of tools (route, netsh, sysctl) intended to modify host routing tables or enable IP forwarding. Such activity on workstation endpoints may indicate an attempt to bridge network segments, bypass network security boundaries, or facilitate lateral movement/C2 communications.
Detects command-line execution of tools (route, netsh, sysctl) intended to modify host routing tables or enable IP forwarding. Such activity on workstation endpoints may indicate an attempt to bridge network segments, bypass network security boundaries, or facilitate lateral movement/C2 communications.
Detects command-line execution of tools (route, netsh, sysctl) intended to modify host routing tables or enable IP forwarding. Such activity on workstation endpoints may indicate an attempt to bridge network segments, bypass network security boundaries, or facilitate lateral movement/C2 communications.
Detects the execution of the SSH client (ssh.exe) with remote port forwarding arguments (-R). This technique is commonly used by adversaries to establish a reverse SSH tunnel, allowing them to proxy Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic from an internal victim machine to an external attacker-controlled server, effectively bypassing perimeter firewall restrictions. This behavior has been observed in various ransomware and C2 campaigns, including Bumblebee and Akira.
This rule detects when a user's network connection originates from an Autonomous System Number (ASN) that differs from their previously established baseline using Zscaler Digital Experience (ZDX) telemetry. This can indicate anomalous network behavior, such as a user connecting from an unexpected location or a potentially compromised VPN/proxy session.
This rule detects when a user's network connection originates from an Autonomous System Number (ASN) that differs from their previously established baseline using Zscaler Digital Experience (ZDX) telemetry. This can indicate anomalous network behavior, such as a user connecting from an unexpected location or a potentially compromised VPN/proxy session.
This rule monitors GCP Audit logs for the creation or deletion of VPN tunnels. It classifies the actor (human vs. service account) and validates the source of the action against expected patterns such as the use of Terraform and authorized network sources. It highlights activity that deviates from standard infrastructure-as-code deployments or originates from unusual network sources, aiding in the detection of unauthorized or suspicious network configuration changes.
This rule monitors Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Audit Logs for changes to VPC network routes, specifically tracking 'insert' and 'delete' operations. It classifies actors as either human or service account, flags non-Terraform service account modifications, and identifies service accounts originating from unexpected network sources to detect potentially unauthorized infrastructure changes.
This rule detects changes to VPC Network Peering configurations in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). VPC peering allows internal IP address connectivity across different VPC networks. Unauthorized modifications, such as adding or updating peering connections, could indicate an adversary attempting to establish lateral movement paths between network environments, facilitate data exfiltration, or modify network architecture to bypass security perimeters.
This rule detects modifications to Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Cloud Routers by monitoring audit logs for non-read operations. It flags changes made by human users, service accounts not utilizing Terraform, or service accounts originating from unexpected network sources as high-priority, while tracking general router creations and deletions.
Detects telemetry consistent with GigaWiper's command 8 'route manager' function, which binds or unbinds targeted routing keys against a RabbitMQ 'Topic' exchange using a mode of operation (1/2/3) to enable non-broadcast, targeted command delivery over AMQP C2 channels.
Detects telemetry consistent with GigaWiper's command 8 'route manager' function, which binds or unbinds targeted routing keys against a RabbitMQ 'Topic' exchange using a mode of operation (1/2/3) to enable non-broadcast, targeted command delivery over AMQP C2 channels.
Detects telemetry consistent with GigaWiper's command 8 'route manager' function, which binds or unbinds targeted routing keys against a RabbitMQ 'Topic' exchange using a mode of operation (1/2/3) to enable non-broadcast, targeted command delivery over AMQP C2 channels.
Detects the unauthorized addition or peering of rogue devices within a Cisco SD-WAN fabric. This rule monitors vManage and vBond logs for successful peering or registration events that correlate with known rogue indicators, such as certificate validation failures, mismatching system information, or untrusted peer identities. This activity is often indicative of attackers attempting to gain persistent control over the SD-WAN infrastructure, potentially using authentication bypass vulnerabilities or stolen credentials.
Detects the use of the Windows 'netsh.exe' utility to perform network port proxying or tracing configurations, initiated by common command-line shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe). Attackers may use these capabilities for lateral movement, persistence, or to sniff network traffic.
Detects anomalous lateral movement or network pivoting activity originating from an internet-facing Nginx server. The detection identifies an incoming HTTP POST request from an external IP address followed immediately by an outbound network connection from that same Nginx server to an internal RFC1918 host on the FastCGI port (9000). This behavior is consistent with the 'Velvet Ant' operation's technique of abusing proxy_pass configurations to relay traffic into isolated internal network segments via FastCGI request-chaining.
This rule detects potential tunnel creation using PowerShell. It identifies network connections from PowerShell processes to common SSH (22) or Tor (9001, 9050) ports, as well as PowerShell script block activity involving socket connections directed at .onion domains, SSH keys, or authorized keys files, which may indicate remote access tunneling or command-and-control communication.
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