Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of the initial fingerprinting PowerShell script utilized by the PhantomRelay RAT. PhantomRelay is a custom Remote Access Trojan associated with the Russia-nexus threat group GREYVIBE. The script gathers system information such as computer name, username, and PID, using a hardcoded User-Agent string before connecting to the C2 server.
Detects the execution of the LegionRelay client script, a PowerShell RAT utilized by the Russia-nexus threat group GREYVIBE. LegionRelay communicates with its command-and-control server via REST API methods and relies on operator-staged scripts for post-compromise activity. The detection matches on specific REST API paths and PowerShell artifacts found within the script block.
Detects the execution of the Restart-Computer cmdlet with the -Force flag via PowerShell, a technique used by a recent malware dropper to disrupt sandbox analysis.
Detects PowerShell script block contents indicating the manual bypassing of SSL certificate validation. This defense evasion technique is notably used by the Gamaredon GammaLoad third stage (which executes via an encoded command) to ensure successful connection to potentially untrusted or self-signed C2 infrastructure.
Detects suspicious command-line executions involving PowerShell or WMI, combined with network-related keywords (http, https, encodedcommand, FromBase64String), originating from common user applications like Microsoft Word (winword.exe) or Windows Explorer (explorer.exe). This pattern can indicate malicious activity such as script execution, download of payloads, or obfuscated command execution.
This rule detects a high volume of PowerShell or Command Prompt executions from a single computer by a single account within a one-hour window. This behavior can be indicative of an APT-style multi-stage attack pattern where an adversary is executing numerous commands in quick succession, potentially for discovery, execution, or privilege escalation. The rule specifically looks for command lines containing 'powershell' and '-enc' (encoded command) or 'cmd' and '/c' (execute command and terminate).
Detects suspicious process execution patterns involving PowerShell with encoded commands or CMD with command execution flags. The rule looks for multiple occurrences of these patterns from the same computer and account within a one-hour window, which could indicate malicious activity such as script execution or obfuscated command execution.
Detects PowerShell commands attempting to add Windows Defender exclusion paths for directories associated with the 10FXRAT malware. This rule specifically looks for the use of 'Add-MpPreference' with '-ExclusionPath' in the command line, combined with the presence of 'AppNetSvc' or 'WinDiagTrack', which are known directories used by 10FXRAT for staging and persistence.
This rule detects HTTP C2 traffic attempting to store a fileless payload in the Windows Registry. It specifically looks for HTTP responses (flow:to_client) containing the strings 'HKCU' (likely indicating a registry key path), 'powershell', and 'IEX' (Invoke-Expression), which are common indicators of PowerShell-based fileless malware using the registry for persistence or execution.
This rule detects attempts to load a PowerShell assembly reflectively in memory. It specifically looks for the string "[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load(" within HTTP response data flowing to a client. This technique is often used by malware to execute malicious code without writing it to disk, making it a common defense evasion tactic.
This rule detects multiple instances of PowerShell executing commands that include 'DownloadString' within a one-hour window on the same computer and by the same account. This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to download and execute malicious scripts or files from remote sources.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts containing strings associated with the DAYLIGHT obfuscator. This obfuscator is utilized by the Russia-nexus threat group GREYVIBE to hide post-compromise payloads and PhantomRelay implants.
Detects PowerShell commands attempting to disable Microsoft Defender real-time monitoring or adding broad path exclusions, indicating defensive tampering.
Detects PowerShell script execution utilizing WMI event subscription (Register-WmiEvent) explicitly targeting the creation of logical disks with DriveType 2 (USB drives). This technique is known to be used by the GammaSteel threat group to monitor and potentially steal data from physical media.
Detects PowerShell script logic associated with GammaSteel's fileless registry staging encryption, specifically the use of the DPAPI cmdlet ConvertTo-SecureString alongside the HKCU:\Printers path. This technique binds the encryption to the active user session to hinder forensic analysis.
Detects PowerShell reading image files and loading their contents directly into memory as .NET assemblies, a stealth technique used to hide malicious payloads inside benign-looking files.
This rule detects a high volume of PowerShell or Command Prompt executions from a single computer by a single account within a one-hour window. This behavior can be indicative of an APT-style multi-stage attack pattern where an adversary is executing numerous commands in quick succession, potentially for discovery, execution, or privilege escalation. The rule specifically looks for command lines containing 'powershell' and '-enc' (encoded command) or 'cmd' and '/c' (execute command and terminate).
This rule detects PowerShell execution that combines 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) or 'Invoke-RestMethod' with 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) or 'Invoke-Expression'. This pattern is commonly used as a download cradle to fetch and execute malicious scripts or stage-2 infostealers, as observed in campaigns like the fake Gemini CLI installation script.
Detects the initiation of a FileSystemWatcher object in PowerShell configured to monitor the 'Changed' event. This technique is used by GammaSteel to actively monitor user operations in real time and steal documents the moment they are modified.
Detects the initiation of a FileSystemWatcher object in PowerShell configured to monitor the 'Changed' event. This technique is used by GammaSteel for real-time document surveillance to steal files the moment they are modified.
This rule detects HTTP requests where the URI contains the string "-EncodedCommand" case-insensitively. This pattern is commonly associated with PowerShell commands that are base64 encoded, often used by attackers to obfuscate malicious scripts. The rule specifically looks for this string in the HTTP URI, indicating an attempt to download or execute an encoded PowerShell command.
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