Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the use of PowerShell to enumerate successful logon events (Event ID 4624) from the security event log on a Windows host. It specifically looks for command-line executions containing 'Get-EventLog', 'security', and '-instanceid 4624'. This activity is often performed during the reconnaissance phase by adversaries to understand user activity on a system.
Detects suspicious encoded character syntax often used in PowerShell for defense evasion, specifically looking for '[char]0x' or '(WCHAR)0x' in command lines, which are common methods to obfuscate commands.
Detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Get-StorageDiagnosticInfo' with the '-IncludeLiveDump' parameter to dump the live memory of a Windows machine. This technique can be used by adversaries to extract sensitive information, including credentials, from memory.
Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`). The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.
This rule detects the creation of a domain group named "ESX Admins" using either `net.exe` or PowerShell cmdlets like `New-ADGroup`. This activity is highly suspicious and indicates a potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2024-37085. This vulnerability allows an attacker to elevate privileges to full administrative access on a domain-joined ESXi hypervisor, as VMware ESXi hypervisors grant full administrative access by default to members of a domain group named "ESX Admins".
PowerShell Web Download
YARA-L
Detects suspicious ways to download files or content using PowerShell
Detects usage of the \"FromBase64String\" function in the commandline which is used to decode a base64 encoded string
Detects usage of the \"ConvertTo-SecureString\" cmdlet via the commandline. Which is fairly uncommon and could indicate potential suspicious activity
Detects a copy command or a copy utility execution to or from an Admin share or remote
PowerShell DownloadFile
YARA-L
Detects the execution of powershell, a WebClient object creation and the invocation of DownloadFile in a single command line
Detects a suspicious call to Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet where the and output is located in a suspicious location
Detects the use of powershell to enumerate successful logins on a specific host
Detects usage of a PowerShell command to dump the live memory of a Windows machine
Detects the installation and configuration of PowerShell Web Access, which could be used for remote access and potential abuse
This rule detects attempts to delete Windows Volume Shadow Copies using PowerShell commands that interact with WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation). Specifically, it looks for PowerShell scripts containing `Get-WmiObject`, `gwmi`, `Get-CimInstance`, or `gcim` in conjunction with `Win32_ShadowCopy` and a deletion method like `.Delete()`, `Remove-WmiObject`, `rwmi`, `Remove-CimInstance`, or `rcim`. This technique is commonly employed by ransomware families, such as Sodinokibi/REvil, to prevent system recovery.
Detects encoded powershell commands
This rule detects the execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. DSInternals is a powerful tool that exposes internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory, enabling actions such as dumping DPAPI backup keys, manipulating NTDS.DIT files, auditing FIDO2 and NGC keys, performing password auditing, and recovering Domain Controllers from IFM backups. The rule specifically looks for a wide range of DSInternals cmdlets being executed via the command line.
Detects the execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. This module can be used to perform suspicious activities such as dumping DPAPI backup keys, manipulating NTDS.DIT files, auditing FIDO2 and NGC keys, performing password auditing, recovering domain controllers from IFM backups, and calculating password hashes. The rule specifically looks for a wide range of cmdlets associated with the DSInternals module within PowerShell script block logs.
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters indicative of obfuscated or malicious activity, including base64 encoded commands, use of `IEX` (Invoke-Expression) with `New-Object`, encoded commands, attempts to establish persistence via Registry Run keys, and web client downloads.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell invocations characterized by specific command parameters often used in malicious activities. It looks for combinations of parameters like '-nop', '-w hidden', '-c', and '[Convert]::FromBase64String' for base64 encoded commands; '-w hidden', '-noni', '-nop', '-c', 'iex', and 'New-Object' for obfuscated execution; '-w hidden', '-ep bypass', and '-Enc' for encoded command execution; PowerShell commands interacting with 'reg add' to modify 'Run' keys for persistence; and PowerShell using 'New-Object System.Net.WebClient' with '.Download' for downloading content from the internet, often with 'bypass' and 'hidden' window styles. These patterns are commonly associated with malware, post-exploitation frameworks, and adversary tradecraft.
The analytic detects the use of .NET classes in PowerShell to download a URL payload directly into memory, a common fileless malware staging technique. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell commands involving `system.net.webclient`, `system.net.webrequest`, and `IO.MemoryStream`. This activity is significant as it indicates potential fileless malware execution, which is harder to detect and can bypass traditional file-based defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute code in memory, evade detection, and maintain persistence in the environment.
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