Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-AzureHound` command-line argument, commonly used by the AzureHound tool. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because AzureHound is often used for reconnaissance in Azure environments, potentially exposing sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out Azure Active Directory structures, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.
This analytic detects attempts to create an "ESX Admins" group using PowerShell commands. This activity may indicate an attempt to exploit the VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication Bypass vulnerability (CVE-2024-37085). Attackers can use this method to gain unauthorized access to ESXi hosts by recreating the 'ESX Admins' group after its deletion from Active Directory.
The analytic detects suspicious PowerShell processes attempting to inject code into critical Windows processes using CreateRemoteThread. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 8 to identify instances where PowerShell spawns threads in processes like svchost.exe, csrss.exe, and others. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware such as TrickBot and offensive tools like Cobalt Strike to execute malicious payloads, establish reverse shells, or download additional malware. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment.
The following analytic detects the creation of shadow copies using "wmic" or "Powershell" commands. It leverages the Endpoint.Processes data model in Splunk to identify processes where the command includes "shadowcopy" and "create". This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to manipulate or access data in an unauthorized manner, potentially leading to data theft or manipulation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to backup and exfiltrate sensitive data or hide their tracks by restoring files to a previous state after an attack.
The analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for domain users. It identifies script blocks containing `[adsisearcher]`, `objectcategory=user`, and `.findAll()` from PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This activity may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery, potentially leading to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell commands that modify firewall rules to allow inbound traffic to a specific local port. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to establish remote access by modifying firewall rules, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further exploitation.
This analytic detects the use of PowerShell to delete shadow copies, a common tactic used by ransomware to prevent data recovery. It specifically looks for PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) events containing keywords like "ShadowCopy" along with "Delete" or "Remove" in the ScriptBlockText. Successful execution of such commands can lead to irreversible data loss and hinder recovery efforts.
The following analytic detects the use of a PowerShell commandlet to import an AppLocker XML policy. This behavior is identified by monitoring processes that execute the "Import-Module Applocker" and "Set-AppLockerPolicy" commands with the "-XMLPolicy" parameter. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to disable or bypass security controls, as seen in the Azorult malware. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to disable antivirus products, leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of known MailSniper PowerShell functions on a machine. It leverages PowerShell logs (EventCode 4104) to identify specific script block text associated with MailSniper activities. This behavior is significant as MailSniper is often used by attackers to harvest sensitive emails from compromised Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive email data, credential theft, and further compromise of the email infrastructure.
This analytic detects the use of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet with parameters indicating a search for Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this specific activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to identify high-value targets for further exploitation, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
This analytic identifies the execution of the `Get-DomainTrust` command, often associated with PowerView, via PowerShell. This activity is indicative of reconnaissance efforts by an adversary to map out domain trust relationships, which can be crucial for planning lateral movement. Detecting this can help identify early stages of an attack where adversaries are gathering information to compromise additional systems within the domain.
This analytic detects attempts to stop security-related services on an endpoint, which may indicate malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for processes involving the "sc.exe" or "net.exe" command with the "stop" parameter or the PowerShell "Stop-Service" cmdlet. This activity is significant because disabling security services can undermine the organization's security posture, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further attacks like malware installation or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could compromise the endpoint and the entire network, necessitating immediate investigation and response.
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Find-LocalAdminAccess` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is part of PowerView, a toolkit for Windows domain enumeration. Identifying the use of `Find-LocalAdminAccess` is crucial as adversaries may use it to find machines where the current user has local administrator access, facilitating lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to target and compromise additional systems within the network, significantly increasing their control and access to sensitive information.
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell commands to add or set Windows Defender exclusions. It leverages EventCode 4104 to identify suspicious `Add-MpPreference` or `Set-MpPreference` commands with exclusion parameters. This activity is significant because adversaries often use it to bypass Windows Defender, allowing malicious code to execute without detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to evade antivirus defenses, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities undetected.
The analytic detects PowerShell commands using the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window while connecting to the Internet. This behavior is identified through Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions that include variations of the WindowStyle parameter. This activity is significant because it attempts to bypass default PowerShell execution policies and conceal its actions, which is often indicative of malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands stealthily, potentially leading to unauthorized data exfiltration or further compromise of the endpoint.
This analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainPolicy` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). It leverages logs capturing script block text to identify attempts to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams to gather domain policy information, which is crucial for planning further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to detailed knowledge of domain security settings, aiding in privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the enabling of the SMB1 protocol via `powershell.exe`. It leverages PowerShell script block logging (EventCode 4104) to identify the execution of the `Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature` cmdlet with the `SMB1Protocol` parameter. This activity is significant because enabling SMB1 can facilitate lateral movement and file encryption by ransomware, such as RedDot. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to propagate through the network, encrypt files, and potentially disrupt business operations.
The analytic detects the execution of multiple offensive toolkits and commands through the process execution datamodel. This method captures commands given directly to powershell.exe, allowing for the identification of suspicious activities including several well-known tools used for credential theft, lateral movement, and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information within the environment.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` PowerShell cmdlet, which is used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. This activity is identified by leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). Monitoring this behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to enumerate domain policies, a common tactic used by adversaries for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to understand password policies, aiding in further attacks such as password guessing or policy exploitation.
The analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to enumerate domain users via the `Get-DomainUser` command. This activity indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams using PowerView for Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain situational awareness and identify valuable targets within the domain, potentially leading to further exploitation.
This analytic detects the execution of the `Get-ForestDomain` cmdlet, which is part of the PowerView toolkit. PowerView is commonly used for Windows domain enumeration, particularly for gathering detailed information about Active Directory forest and domain configurations. The detection relies on PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). Adversaries and Red Teams utilize this cmdlet to understand the domain structure, which can facilitate lateral movement or privilege escalation within an environment.
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