Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Enable-PSRemoting'. This cmdlet configures the computer to receive PowerShell remote commands, which adversaries may use for lateral movement and remote execution. Detection relies on Script Block Logging being enabled to capture the cmdlet's execution.
This rule detects PowerShell script blocks that utilize .NET's SslStream for establishing encrypted network connections. Specifically, it looks for the use of 'System.Net.Security.SslStream', 'Net.Security.RemoteCertificateValidationCallback', and '.AuthenticateAsClient' which are indicative of a client-side SSL/TLS connection being programmatically established, potentially for command and control (C2) purposes to evade detection.
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters indicative of obfuscated or malicious PowerShell execution. This includes attempts to execute base64 encoded commands, use of `IEX` (Invoke-Expression) with hidden windows and `New-Object`, execution of encoded commands, and use of `WebClient` to download and execute content.
This rule detects the use of potentially suspicious keywords within PowerShell scripts that are often associated with exploitation frameworks or advanced attack techniques. Specifically, it looks for reflection-related keywords like 'System.Reflection.Assembly.Load', '[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load', '[Reflection.Assembly]::Load', 'System.Reflection.AssemblyName', 'Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess', 'Reflection.Emit.CustomAttributeBuilder', and keywords related to interop services and process manipulation such as 'Runtime.InteropServices.UnmanagedType', 'Runtime.InteropServices.DllImportAttribute', 'SuspendThread', and 'rundll32'. These keywords can indicate attempts to load assemblies in-memory, interact with unmanaged code, or manipulate processes, which are common tactics used by malware and red teaming tools.
This rule detects suspicious command-line parameters commonly used by the Empire post-exploitation framework when launching PowerShell. Specifically, it looks for combinations of parameters such as '-NoP', '-sta', '-NonI', '-W Hidden', '-Enc', '-noP', '-w 1', '-enc', '-enc SQB', '-nop', '-exec bypass', and '-EncodedCommand'. These parameters are often used to execute encoded PowerShell scripts in a hidden or non-interactive manner, which is a common tactic for malicious PowerShell execution.
Detects the execution of a PowerShell script designed to dump stored credentials from Veeam Backup servers. The script specifically targets the "Veeam.Backup" class and uses `Invoke-Sqlcmd` to extract sensitive information, likely from the Veeam configuration database.
Detects attempts to decode a base64 encoded Gzip archive within a PowerShell script. This technique is often used by adversaries to load malicious content into memory, leveraging standard encoding for obfuscation and memory-resident execution.
Detects PowerShell commands attempting to load .NET assemblies reflectively using Base64 encoded strings. This technique is often used by adversaries to execute malicious code in memory, evading disk-based detections.
This rule detects the use of `System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken` within PowerShell script blocks. This specific class is used to request Kerberos service tickets (TGS) for a given Service Principal Name (SPN). This behavior is commonly observed in Kerberoasting attacks (T1558.003) where an attacker requests service tickets to crack their hashes offline, or in some cases, during the initial stages of a silver ticket attack (T1558.002) to gather SPNs. A successful execution of such a script would typically output the SPNs for the targeted endpoint.
Detects PowerShell scripts that contain references to the .NET `[System.Windows.Input.Keyboard]::IsKeyDown` function, which can be used for keystroke capturing. This function checks if a specified key is pressed, making it a common indicator of potential keylogger activity within PowerShell scripts.
Detects the execution of a PowerShell script known as POWERHOLD, which has been attributed to the FIN7 threat group. The rule specifically looks for the presence of '$env:APPDATA', 'function MainPayload', '::WriteAllBytes', and 'wscript.exe' within the PowerShell script block text, indicating the execution of this specific malicious script.
This rule detects the presence of keywords commonly associated with well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks such as Mimikatz and Metasploit within PowerShell script blocks. The keywords indicate attempts to perform privileged operations like manipulating access tokens, reading process memory, or other actions typically involved in credential dumping and privilege escalation. Detection relies on PowerShell Script Block Logging being enabled to capture the script content.
This rule detects PowerShell execution where the command line contains Base64 encoded strings that decode to 'Invoke-' keywords. It specifically looks for both UTF-8 and UTF-16 Little Endian (LE) encodings of 'Invoke-' when PowerShell or pwsh.exe is executed with the '-e' (encoded command) flag. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to obfuscate malicious PowerShell commands.
Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive via PowerShell. This technique is often used as a method to load malicious content into memory afterward. The detection relies on the presence of 'FromBase64String' for decoding, 'MemoryStream' for in-memory operations, and 'H4sI' which is a common magic string for Gzip compressed data.
Detects a specific PowerShell command line pattern used by the UNC2452 threat group (also known as APT29 or Nobelium) for execution. The rule looks for PowerShell commands that use 'Invoke-WMIMethod win32_process -name create -argumentlist' or 'wmic /node: process call create' in conjunction with 'rundll32 c:\windows'. This pattern was observed in the SolarWinds Compromise.
This rule detects the potential execution of the POWERTRASH PowerShell script by looking for a specific combination of strings within the PowerShell script block text. These strings include .NET framework components related to compression (IO.Compression.DeflateStream), memory manipulation (IO.MemoryStream), base64 decoding (::FromBase64String), and reflection/code execution (GetDelegateForFunctionPointer, .Invoke(), GlobalAssemblyCache). The presence of these indicators together suggests a highly obfuscated or advanced PowerShell script, often used for malicious purposes like in-memory execution or bypassing detection.
Detects PowerShell command line patterns in combination with encoded commands that often appear in malware infection chains. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell or pwsh executable names combined with common encoded command flags (-e, -enc, etc.) and specific Base64 encoded strings frequently seen in malicious payloads.
This rule detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies using PowerShell and WMI. Adversaries often delete shadow copies to prevent system recovery and hinder forensic analysis, especially in ransomware attacks. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell commands that interact with 'Win32_ShadowCopy' via 'Get-WmiObject' and then perform a 'Delete()' operation or use 'Remove-WmiObject'.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets 'Add-MpPreference' or 'Set-MpPreference' in conjunction with parameters like '-ExclusionPath', '-ExclusionExtension', '-ExclusionProcess', or '-ExclusionIpAddress' to configure exclusions for Microsoft Defender Antivirus. This activity is often associated with defense evasion tactics used by adversaries to prevent security software from detecting their malicious activities.
This rule detects specific code artifacts commonly found in offensive PowerShell payloads such as Cobalt Strike Beacon, PoshC2, Powerview, Letmein, Empire, and PowerSploit. These artifacts often remain unchanged due to poor operational security practices by attackers. The rule looks for specific strings like '$DoIt', 'harmj0y', 'mattifestation', '_RastaMouse', 'tifkin_', and '0xdeadbeef' within PowerShell script payloads.
Detects process executions that exhibit characteristics commonly associated with Emotet malware, specifically focusing on obfuscated PowerShell command line arguments. The rule looks for specific base64 encoded strings and patterns often used by Emotet for defense evasion and execution.
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