Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects attempts to capture audio using PowerShell cmdlets, specifically looking for commands related to the 'WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet' module or similar audio device manipulation cmdlets. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to record sensitive conversations or gather information from the compromised system's environment.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize base64 encoded 'IEX' (Invoke-Expression) cmdlets. Adversaries often encode malicious PowerShell scripts in base64 to evade detection and obfuscate their intentions. The rule specifically looks for patterns indicative of base64 encoded 'IEX' calls, including variations with 'New-Object' and different casing, as well as UTF-16 LE encoded versions of common 'IEX' patterns.
Detects calls to "SyncInvoke" that is part of the "CL_Invocation.ps1" script to proxy execution using "System.Diagnostics.Process". This technique can be used to bypass application control and execute malicious code.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service using PowerShell cmdlets, specifically looking for 'New-Service' and '-BinaryPathName' in the command line. This activity can be indicative of persistence mechanisms or privilege escalation attempts by adversaries.
Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using the PowerShell Get-LocalGroupMember Cmdlet to enumerate local group memberships, specifically looking for common administrative or privileged groups. This activity is often performed by attackers during the discovery phase to identify potential privilege escalation paths or valuable targets.
Detects non-interactive PowerShell activity by identifying PowerShell processes (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) that are not spawned by typical user-facing graphical interface processes such as explorer.exe. This rule aims to identify PowerShell execution that is not directly initiated by a user through interactive means, potentially indicating automated or malicious activity. It includes filters for known legitimate parent processes like those associated with Windows updates, VS Code, and Windows Terminal to reduce false positives.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell scripts attempting to copy the Security Account Manager (SAM) database. It specifically looks for PowerShell command lines that include both a reference to a volume shadow copy (e.g., '\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy') and the SAM file path ('System32\config\sam'), combined with common PowerShell copy commands or .NET file copy methods. This activity is indicative of an adversary trying to extract credentials by accessing the SAM database, often from a shadow copy to bypass file locks.
This rule detects suspicious invocations of PowerShell or PowerShell Core (pwsh.exe) when the parent process is a script engine like wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This behavior is often associated with adversaries using scripting languages to execute PowerShell commands, potentially bypassing direct PowerShell execution policies or obfuscating their activities. The rule specifically filters out legitimate activity from 'Health Service State' to reduce false positives.
Detects the use of the PowerShell "Set-Service" cmdlet to change the startup type of a service to "disabled" or "manual". This activity can be indicative of an adversary attempting to impair defenses or achieve persistence by modifying service configurations.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell command-line patterns indicative of downloading and executing remote content. Specifically, it looks for the use of `IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString` or `(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile` which are commonly abused by malicious scripts, stagers, and downloaders to fetch and run payloads from the internet.
Detects the use of the PowerShell Get-ADUser cmdlet to enumerate Active Directory user information and export it to a file or pipe it to other cmdlets for further processing, which can be indicative of reconnaissance or data staging by an attacker.
Detects attempts to tamper with the PowerShell execution policy by modifying registry keys via the command line. This technique is often used by adversaries to bypass script signing requirements, allowing the execution of unsigned or malicious PowerShell scripts.
This rule detects the use of the 'Expand-Archive' command within PowerShell logs. Adversaries may use this command to decompress files, potentially as part of a larger attack chain involving unpacking malicious payloads or tools.
Detects suspicious invocation of the Get-ADDBAccount PowerShell script that reads from an ntds.dit file. This technique can be used to gain access to credentials without relying on traditional credential dumping tools. The rule specifically looks for the presence of 'Get-ADDBAccount', 'BootKey', and 'DatabasePath' in the PowerShell payload, indicating an attempt to extract credentials from an NTDS database file.
Detects highly obfuscated PowerShell commands using the VAR++ LAUNCHER technique, often associated with Invoke-Obfuscation. This method involves using `&&set` and specific character patterns like `(\{\d\}){2,}\"` combined with `-f` and `cmd /c` to evade detection.
Detects the use of specific strings or NULL bits within PowerShell scripts that are commonly employed to bypass Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) functionalities. This technique aims to prevent security products from inspecting malicious script content.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration attempts using PowerShell by identifying scripts that manipulate binary data into audio file formats, specifically WAV. It looks for PowerShell script block text containing mathematical operations, file I/O mode definitions, and the use of BinaryWriter, combined with specific byte sequences indicative of a WAV file header. This technique can be used to encode arbitrary data into an audio file for covert exfiltration.
Detects the creation of a local user account using the 'New-LocalUser' PowerShell cmdlet. This rule specifically looks for the 'New-LocalUser' string within PowerShell script block logs, indicating an attempt to create a new local user on a Windows system.
Detects the usage of COM objects that can be abused to download files within PowerShell scripts by identifying specific CLSIDs. This technique is often used by adversaries for ingress tool transfer or to establish command and control.
Detects the usage of the 'Get-AdComputer' PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate computer objects or their properties within Active Directory. This activity is often performed during the discovery phase of an attack to map out the network environment.
Detects the usage of the "Add-AppxPackage" or its alias "Add-AppPackage" with the "-AllowUnsigned" flag to install unsigned AppX packages. This can be used by adversaries for persistence or defense evasion by installing malicious applications that bypass signature checks.
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