Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of the C# compiler (csc.exe) initiated by PowerShell. This behavior is often indicative of in-memory compilation and execution of malicious code, bypassing traditional file-based detection.
Detects the execution of PowerShell from a shortcut (.lnk) file, particularly when suspicious command-line arguments such as hidden windows, encoded commands, or bypass flags are utilized. This pattern is commonly associated with initial access via malicious attachments or shortcut files.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window styles and encoded command arguments initiated directly from explorer.exe. This pattern is often indicative of malicious activity, such as fileless malware execution or obfuscated script delivery, where an attacker attempts to blend in with standard user interactions.
Detects the use of PowerShell's Start-Sleep cmdlet with a duration of 3 minutes or longer within process command lines. This technique is commonly used by malware, such as ClickFix-style droppers, to bypass sandbox time-based analysis by delaying execution until the sandbox timeout period has elapsed.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize .NET cryptography classes (AesManaged) in conjunction with data compression (GZipStream) and base64 decoding (FromBase64String). This combination of classes is highly characteristic of malicious scripts designed to decrypt and execute obfuscated or packed payloads in memory.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden flags and encoded commands spawned by a 'conhost.exe' process running in '--headless' mode. This specific process pattern is indicative of the obfuscated execution chain used by LausivLoader.
Detects instances where PowerShell is executed with encoded commands, seemingly spawned by a process masquerading as or related to the Microsoft Edge Update Task. The rule specifically monitors for process chains involving 'conhost.exe' with '--headless' arguments and subsequent PowerShell execution containing encoded commands, often associated with obfuscated activity.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that enumerate files within sensitive user directories such as Desktop, Downloads, Documents, or OneDrive, using common cmdlets like Get-ChildItem with recurrence or filtering. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to discover or stage files for exfiltration.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands (Get-Volume, Get-Partition, Get-Disk) to identify and inspect information about connected removable storage media such as USB, IEEE 1394, SD, or MMC devices. This behavior is indicative of an adversary enumerating potential targets for data staging or exfiltration.
This rule detects the execution of RUSTYMOVE, a tool associated with the Transparent Tribe (APT36) threat group, which is used for propagation via removable media. It monitors for the specific executable 'Automata-20.exe', the presence of specific task-related command line arguments, the dropping of suspicious file paths, and PowerShell-based enumeration of connected USB/removable drives.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with command-line arguments that suggest programmatically capturing or redirecting console output using ScriptBlock techniques (Create, Console, In, ReadToEnd). This pattern is often associated with obfuscated script execution, in-memory payloads, or attempts to bypass logging by capturing output via .NET streams.
Detects the execution of files related to 'UBPPatch' or 'HTSPnew', specifically looking for PowerShell scripts (.psh) or executables (.exe) that match these potentially non-standard or obfuscated update/patch filenames. The rule also looks for command lines referencing 'Update.Lst', often associated with custom or unauthorized patch mechanisms.
Detects the use of PowerShell script interpreters that utilize .NET runtime methods, such as 'RunspaceFactory' and 'CreateRunspace', to dynamically create and execute scripts, pipelines, or invoke methods. This technique is often used by fileless malware and offensive security tools to bypass traditional command-line logging by interacting directly with the System.Management.Automation assembly.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by using reflection to modify the 'amsiInitFailed' field within the 'AmsiUtils' class. This technique is commonly used by malicious scripts to disable AMSI scanning during their execution.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that utilize both 'Invoke-Expression' (iex) and 'Invoke-RestMethod' (irm), often used to download and execute code directly from remote sources. The rule specifically monitors for known indicators like specific IP addresses, file paths, or the concurrent use of these cmdlets in a single command line.
Detects the creation of a shortcut (.lnk) file within the Windows startup folder using PowerShell. The rule monitors for PowerShell processes executing commands to create .lnk files (e.g., via WScript.Shell) or directly monitors file creation events targeting the startup directory. This behavior is indicative of malicious persistence mechanisms.
Detects the addition of exclusion paths to Microsoft Defender via PowerShell (Add-MpPreference or Set-MpPreference) initiated by non-Microsoft signed processes or specific messaging applications. This behavior is often indicative of malware attempting to exclude malicious payloads from security scanning.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with execution policy bypass flags that simultaneously attempts to use curl.exe and Copy-Item to interact with suspicious remote domains or obfuscated command line arguments, potentially indicating a malicious payload delivery and staging attempt.
Detects instances where a GitLab runner process (gitlab-runner.exe) spawns a PowerShell process with arguments typically used to execute scripts while bypassing security restrictions, such as -NoProfile, -NonInteractive, -ExecutionPolicy, and Bypass. This pattern is indicative of automated task execution or potential abuse if the runner environment is compromised.
Detects signs of malicious activity involving specific files (StreamServiceSharedBridge.ps1, ComponentTask33Agent) and behaviors, including PowerShell execution, scheduled task creation, script execution via wscript, and registry run key modification. These behaviors are indicative of persistence mechanisms and potentially suspicious command execution.
Detects the use of PowerShell to delete .js files located within the 'Downloads' directory. This behavior is commonly associated with cleanup of dropped malicious payloads or script-based malware artifacts.
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