Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell command-line activity originating from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) or embedded within RunMRU registry modifications. It detects obfuscated or hidden command execution patterns, such as base64 encoding, the use of -EncodedCommand, Invoke-Expression, or execution policy bypass flags, which are commonly associated with malicious scripts and fileless malware execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window style attempting to download Node.js related files (e.g., .msi or node.exe) from nodejs.org using common download cmdlets or utilities.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window style attempting to download Node.js related files (e.g., .msi or node.exe) from nodejs.org using common download cmdlets or utilities.
Detects potential ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a victim is prompted to execute an encoded PowerShell command (often via copy-paste into a terminal). The rule specifically monitors PowerShell processes initiated by shell environments (explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or WindowsTerminal.exe) that execute encoded, hidden scripts to perform multiple suspicious network requests for files (e.g., .zip, .enc, .bin) from non-standard domains.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity where specific non-standard processes (e.g., RuntimeSSH.exe, MicDriver.exe, MsCache.exe) either execute PowerShell commands related to security feature tampering (disabling Windows Defender exclusions) or create persistent Registry run keys associated with these process names. This pattern is indicative of malware attempting to establish persistence or evade security controls.
Detects PowerShell command execution containing specific strings associated with the Veil framework XOR decoding routine, including a hardcoded key and the use of the -bxor operator for payload deobfuscation.
Detects instances where WScript.exe or CScript.exe spawn PowerShell.exe as a child process. The rule specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of policy bypass (-ExecutionPolicy Bypass) and remote payload retrieval (Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadString), which is a common pattern in obfuscated JavaScript-based infection chains.
Detects the use of .NET reflection APIs (specifically System.Reflection.Assembly::Load) within PowerShell script blocks. This technique allows for the dynamic loading of .NET assemblies into memory, often to execute obfuscated or encrypted payloads without writing them to disk, which is a common tactic for bypassing file-based security controls.
Detects the use of [ScriptBlock]::Create() within PowerShell command lines. This method allows for the dynamic construction and execution of arbitrary PowerShell code entirely in memory, a technique often used by fileless malware and frameworks like Veil#Drop to evade disk-based detection mechanisms.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line flags often associated with malicious scripts (e.g., hidden windows, no profile, bypassed execution policies) when the script is located in the Windows Temporary directory.
Detects instances where wscript.exe spawns powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of stealth or obfuscation, such as hidden windows or encoded commands. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious script execution lures, such as JavaScript-based droppers or ClickFix-style campaigns that use PowerShell to stage and execute in-memory payloads.
Detects instances where wscript.exe spawns powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of stealth or obfuscation, such as hidden windows or encoded commands. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious script execution lures, such as JavaScript-based droppers or ClickFix-style campaigns that use PowerShell to stage and execute in-memory payloads.
Detects PowerShell command lines that simultaneously utilize .NET cryptography classes (TripleDES or AES) for decryption and runspace pipeline creation. This pattern indicates an in-memory execution technique where malicious payloads are decoded and executed directly within the PowerShell process, effectively bypassing disk-based security controls.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to evade detection through programmatic runtime creation using Runspaces (RunspaceFactory, CreatePipeline, AddScript) combined with cryptographic operations or dynamic string substitution techniques. This behavior is often associated with obfuscated malware payloads attempting to execute code in memory.
Detects the use of PowerShell string concatenation to construct the malicious C2 domain 'merabs.pro'. This technique is used to bypass simple string-based detections that look for the full domain name in command-line arguments.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to download common Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) or remote access tools from the internet. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious actors attempting to establish persistent remote access to a compromised system.
Detects the execution of staged scripts (.cmd, .ps1, .vbs, .js) from user temporary directories using cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or wscript.exe. This behavior is consistent with the Sauron Loader malware family, which utilizes these interpreters to execute secondary C2-tasked payloads.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize a combination of 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) and obfuscated strings typical of download cradles. The rule looks for escaped double quotes inside the command line and specific regex patterns that match common obfuscation techniques used to hide malicious URLs or script components.
Detects execution of PowerShell or Command Prompt where the command line contains obfuscated indicators or specific suspicious files and IP addresses, while simultaneously bypassing the execution policy. This is characteristic of malicious script execution or payload delivery attempts.
Detects execution of PowerShell or CMD commands originating from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) that exhibit characteristics of malicious command-line obfuscation, such as encoded commands, bypass flags, or caret-based character obfuscation.
Detects the use of .NET reflection and assembly loading techniques within PowerShell or C# compiler (csc.exe) command lines. Attackers frequently use these methods to load malicious payloads directly into memory, bypassing disk-based detection mechanisms. The rule looks for the combination of reflection-related namespaces/methods and indicators of obfuscation or encoding such as Base64 strings, Gzip compression, and decryption routines.
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