Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,347 detections
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Detects obfuscated PowerShell scripts that enumerate Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility exported commands
and invoke cmdlets indirectly by array index. This can be used to evade detections
that look for explicit strings such as Invoke-RestMethod or Invoke-Expression.
and invoke cmdlets indirectly by array index. This can be used to evade detections
that look for explicit strings such as Invoke-RestMethod or Invoke-Expression.
The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprvse.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it could indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it could indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
Detects usage of powershell cmdlets to disable or remove ETW trace sessions
Detects a behavioral chain where PowerShell stages a hidden base64-encoded command and schedules a VBScript task, or PowerShell fetches an upgrade.txt file via web client methods for execution.
Detects a behavioral chain where PowerShell stages a hidden base64-encoded command and schedules a VBScript task, or PowerShell fetches an upgrade.txt file via web client methods for execution.
Detects a behavioral chain where PowerShell stages a hidden base64-encoded command and schedules a VBScript task, or PowerShell fetches an upgrade.txt file via web client methods for execution.
Detects PowerShell execution performing port checks across multiple internal hosts using Test-NetConnection in a looping construct with output redirected to a log file, indicative of post-compromise reconnaissance (such as LONEPAGE scanning).
Detects a suspected ClickFix social engineering attack where a user is tricked into pasting malicious commands into Windows Terminal, leading to a PowerShell download, followed by the appearance of specific known malicious artifacts (LockScreenContentServer.exe, dui70.dll, or 1.bat) within 15 minutes on the same device.
The following analytic detects attempts to stop security-related services on an endpoint, which may indicate malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for processes involving the "sc.exe" or "net.exe" command with the "stop" parameter or the PowerShell "Stop-Service" cmdlet. This activity is significant because disabling security services can undermine the organization's security posture, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further attacks like malware installation or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could compromise the endpoint and the entire network, necessitating immediate investigation and response.
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell to delete shadow copies via the WMIC PowerShell module. It leverages EventCode 4104 and searches for specific keywords like "ShadowCopy," "Delete," or "Remove" within the ScriptBlockText. This activity is significant because deleting shadow copies is a common tactic used by ransomware, such as DarkSide, to prevent data recovery. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to irreversible data loss and hinder recovery efforts, significantly impacting business continuity and data integrity.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` running the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` cmdlet, which is used to retrieve the password policy in a Windows domain.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts by adversaries to gather information about domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of domain security settings.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts by adversaries to gather information about domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of domain security settings.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to enumerate domain users via the `Get-DomainUser` command. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams using PowerView for Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain situational awareness and identify valuable targets within the domain, potentially leading to further exploitation.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet, which is used to query local user accounts. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is significant because adversaries and Red Teams may use it to enumerate local users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to identify potential targets for further exploitation or privilege escalation within the environment.
The following analytic detects the use of the EncodedCommand parameter in PowerShell processes.
It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify variations of the EncodedCommand parameter, including shortened forms and different command switch types.
This activity can be significant because adversaries often use encoded commands to obfuscate malicious scripts, making detection harder.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent threats within the environment.
Review parallel events to determine legitimacy and tune based on known administrative scripts.
It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify variations of the EncodedCommand parameter, including shortened forms and different command switch types.
This activity can be significant because adversaries often use encoded commands to obfuscate malicious scripts, making detection harder.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent threats within the environment.
Review parallel events to determine legitimacy and tune based on known administrative scripts.
The following analytic detects the use of the Enable-PSRemoting cmdlet, which allows PowerShell remoting on a local or remote computer. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify when this cmdlet is executed. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attacker enabling remote command execution capabilities on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to take control of the system remotely, execute commands, and potentially pivot to other systems within the network, leading to further compromise and lateral movement.
The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell's Start-Service or Stop-Service cmdlets on an endpoint. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to detect these commands. This activity is significant because attackers can manipulate services to disable or stop critical functions, causing system instability or disrupting business operations. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to disable security services, evade detection, or disrupt essential services, leading to potential system downtime and compromised security.
The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell scripts to query Active Directory for domain computers. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify specific script blocks containing `adsisearcher` and `objectcategory=computer` with methods like `findAll()` or `findOne()`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to perform Active Directory discovery and gain situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further reconnaissance and potential lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's download methods such as
"DownloadString" and "DownloadData" from the WebClient class or Invoke-WebRequest
and it's aliases "IWR" or "Curl".
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on
process execution logs that include command-line details.
This activity can be significant such methods and functions are commonly used in malicious
PowerShell scripts to fetch and execute remote code.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download and run
arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration,
or further compromise of the affected system.
"DownloadString" and "DownloadData" from the WebClient class or Invoke-WebRequest
and it's aliases "IWR" or "Curl".
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on
process execution logs that include command-line details.
This activity can be significant such methods and functions are commonly used in malicious
PowerShell scripts to fetch and execute remote code.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download and run
arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration,
or further compromise of the affected system.
The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet `export-pfxcertificate` by leveraging Script Block Logging. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate certificates from the Windows Certificate Store. Monitoring this behavior is crucial for identifying potential certificate theft, which can lead to unauthorized access and impersonation attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to compromise secure communications, authenticate as legitimate users, and escalate their privileges within the network.
The following analytic detects the usage of PowerShell Cmdlets - New-WebGlobalModule, Enable-WebGlobalModule, and Set-WebGlobalModule, which are used to create, enable, or modify IIS Modules. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically monitoring EventCode 4104 for these cmdlets. This activity is significant as adversaries may use these lesser-known cmdlets to manipulate IIS configurations, similar to AppCmd.exe, potentially bypassing traditional defenses. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, manipulate web server behavior, or escalate privileges.
The following analytic detects potential malicious activities involving PowerShell's task scheduling cmdlets. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify unusual or suspicious use of cmdlets like 'New-ScheduledTask' and 'Set-ScheduledTask'. This activity is significant as attackers often use these cmdlets for persistence and remote execution of malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, deliver additional payloads, or execute ransomware, leading to data theft or other severe impacts. Immediate investigation and mitigation are crucial to prevent further compromise.
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