Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the addition of Microsoft Defender exclusions via PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference) or direct Registry key modifications, occurring within two hours of a new autorun persistence entry being created on the same device. This behavior is indicative of a persistence-then-evasion sequence often used to ensure malicious tools remain undetected.
Detects the modification of network interface IP addresses using netsh or PowerShell cmdlets. This activity can be associated with unauthorized network configuration changes, static IP assignment for persistence, or evasion techniques.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands initiated from a .lnk file that query system information related to virtualization technologies (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, Hyper-V) or hardware details (e.g., BIOS, VideoController). This pattern is often used for environmental awareness or anti-sandbox/anti-analysis techniques by malware.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with common obfuscation or stealth-related flags (e.g., -enc, -nop, -w hidden) when initiated by CMD or from a LNK file, particularly when originating from Windows Explorer. This is a common pattern for malicious file execution and dropper activity.
Detects instances where PowerShell.exe acts as a parent process or initiator for potentially suspicious process injections into common host processes including csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe. This activity is often associated with code execution or persistence mechanisms where PowerShell injects malicious logic into other processes.
Detects long PowerShell command lines that perform in-memory assembly loading, often utilizing compression (GzipStream), encryption (Aes), or base64 decoding (FromBase64String). This combination is highly indicative of malicious payloads attempting to load reflective DLLs or executables directly into memory to evade file-based detection.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using built-in utilities such as wevtutil.exe or PowerShell cmdlets (Clear-EventLog, Clear-WinEvent). Adversaries often perform this action to remove traces of malicious activity from the system.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity originating from the WinRM service host (wsmprovhost.exe). It detects when command shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) are spawned by WinRM with known malicious command-line arguments (e.g., Evil-WinRM tools), monitors for the creation of potentially malicious configuration files (e.g., config.toml), and identifies established network connections to common WinRM ports (5985/5986) to detect unauthorized remote sessions.
Detects instances where PowerShell attempts to inject code into legitimate processes (such as csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe) using direct syscalls NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote or NtSetContextThreadRemote, indicating potential process injection activity.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window styles and encoded command arguments initiated directly from explorer.exe. This pattern is often indicative of malicious activity, such as fileless malware execution or obfuscated script delivery, where an attacker attempts to blend in with standard user interactions.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that exhibit characteristics frequently associated with malicious activity, such as reflective assembly loading, compression/decompression operations, use of specific known obfuscation markers, encoded commands, or execution originating from suspicious parent processes like explorer.exe or cmd.exe.
Detects a suspicious multi-step process injection sequence originating from an obfuscated PowerShell process. The rule identifies PowerShell executing with common obfuscation flags (e.g., -enc, -nop, IEX) and performing multiple API calls (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote, NtSetContextThreadRemote, CreateRemoteThread, or OpenProcess) targeting specific executables like csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe.
This rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell command-line activity originating from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) or embedded within RunMRU registry modifications. It detects obfuscated or hidden command execution patterns, such as base64 encoding, the use of -EncodedCommand, Invoke-Expression, or execution policy bypass flags, which are commonly associated with malicious scripts and fileless malware execution.
This rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell command-line activity originating from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) or embedded within RunMRU registry modifications. It detects obfuscated or hidden command execution patterns, such as base64 encoding, the use of -EncodedCommand, Invoke-Expression, or execution policy bypass flags, which are commonly associated with malicious scripts and fileless malware execution.
Detects a suspicious multi-step process injection sequence originating from an obfuscated PowerShell process. The rule identifies PowerShell executing with common obfuscation flags (e.g., -enc, -nop, IEX) and performing multiple API calls (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote, NtSetContextThreadRemote, CreateRemoteThread, or OpenProcess) targeting specific executables like csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using administrative tools like wevtutil.exe, PowerShell, or through the detection of mass log-clear audit events (such as Event IDs 1102 and 104) occurring in a rapid burst. This activity is often used by adversaries to hide evidence of post-compromise actions.
Detects PowerShell or PowerShell ISE spawned directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe, covering both Start-menu launches and the Run dialog abused by ClickFix) whose command line carries a genuine obfuscation/evasion signal - true -EncodedCommand/-e usage, a hidden/minimized window flag, or a remote download cradle (IEX, Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadString, certutil, mshta, etc.) - while excluding invocations that point at an on-disk script file under a standard install path, since ClickFix payloads are inline one-liners rather than references to a local .ps1. Bare -NoProfile/-NoLogo flags no longer trigger alone, since they are common in legitimate automation.
This rule detects the execution of suspicious command lines involving 'evilsocket/nyx' and the use of 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) within PowerShell or common download utilities (curl, wget). It also correlates this with network connections to 'raw.githubusercontent.com' fetching 'nyx.ps1', which is a common pattern for downloading and executing malicious scripts in memory.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that reference the 'nyx' script from 'raw.githubusercontent.com', combined with common download and execution patterns such as 'Invoke-Expression' or 'Invoke-WebRequest'. This activity is consistent with retrieving and executing remote post-exploitation scripts.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that reference the 'nyx' script from 'raw.githubusercontent.com', combined with common download and execution patterns such as 'Invoke-Expression' or 'Invoke-WebRequest'. This activity is consistent with retrieving and executing remote post-exploitation scripts.
Detects instances where PowerShell attempts to execute an external process with elevated privileges using 'Start-Process -Verb RunAs' combined with hidden window flags. The rule specifically looks for evidence that the targeted executable was recently initiated or exists in the context of the PowerShell operation, potentially indicating a UAC bypass attempt or malicious elevation of privileges.
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