Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of PowerShell or Command Prompt processes that attempt to bypass execution policies while performing file downloads from suspicious domains (mnl.ac) or IP addresses (149.255.35.135). It also flags the use of common web-request cmdlets (Invoke-WebRequest, IWR, DownloadString, DownloadFile) to fetch scripts named 'configuration.ps1'. The rule includes detection for obfuscated commands using caret (^) symbols often used to evade keyword-based security filters.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell or Command Prompt processes that attempt to bypass execution policies while performing file downloads from suspicious domains (mnl.ac) or IP addresses (149.255.35.135). It also flags the use of common web-request cmdlets (Invoke-WebRequest, IWR, DownloadString, DownloadFile) to fetch scripts named 'configuration.ps1'. The rule includes detection for obfuscated commands using caret (^) symbols often used to evade keyword-based security filters.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell or Command Prompt processes that attempt to bypass execution policies while performing file downloads from suspicious domains (mnl.ac) or IP addresses (149.255.35.135). It also flags the use of common web-request cmdlets (Invoke-WebRequest, IWR, DownloadString, DownloadFile) to fetch scripts named 'configuration.ps1'. The rule includes detection for obfuscated commands using caret (^) symbols often used to evade keyword-based security filters.
Detects a suspicious PowerShell process lineage spawned by explorer.exe that exhibits characteristics of a 'ClickFix' social engineering lure (using obfuscated command lines) and proceeds to inject code into legitimate Windows or browser processes such as csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe. This activity is often associated with malware attempting to evade debugging.
This rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell command-line activity originating from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) or embedded within RunMRU registry modifications. It detects obfuscated or hidden command execution patterns, such as base64 encoding, the use of -EncodedCommand, Invoke-Expression, or execution policy bypass flags, which are commonly associated with malicious scripts and fileless malware execution.
Detects a suspicious multi-step process injection sequence originating from an obfuscated PowerShell process. The rule identifies PowerShell executing with common obfuscation flags (e.g., -enc, -nop, IEX) and performing multiple API calls (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote, NtSetContextThreadRemote, CreateRemoteThread, or OpenProcess) targeting specific executables like csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that exhibit characteristics frequently associated with malicious activity, such as reflective assembly loading, compression/decompression operations, use of specific known obfuscation markers, encoded commands, or execution originating from suspicious parent processes like explorer.exe or cmd.exe.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window styles and encoded command arguments initiated directly from explorer.exe. This pattern is often indicative of malicious activity, such as fileless malware execution or obfuscated script delivery, where an attacker attempts to blend in with standard user interactions.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform recursive file/directory enumeration within sensitive user profile directories (Desktop, Documents, Downloads, Pictures, OneDrive) immediately followed by a network connection over port 443. This behavior is indicative of potential data staging and exfiltration activity performed by a malicious script or threat actor.
The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104). It leverages specific patterns and keywords within the ScriptBlockText field to detect potentially malicious activities. This detection is significant for SOC analysts as PowerShell is commonly used by attackers for various malicious purposes, including code execution, privilege escalation, and persistence.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, exfiltrate data, or maintain long-term access to the compromised system, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, exfiltrate data, or maintain long-term access to the compromised system, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
Detects persistence attempts via registry run key modifications or additions, specifically targeting the 'DailyFitnessTracker' value. The rule monitors both direct registry operations (value setting, key creation) and process-based modifications performed by reg.exe or PowerShell.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using administrative tools like wevtutil.exe, PowerShell, or through the detection of mass log-clear audit events (such as Event IDs 1102 and 104) occurring in a rapid burst. This activity is often used by adversaries to hide evidence of post-compromise actions.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using administrative tools like wevtutil.exe, PowerShell, or through the detection of mass log-clear audit events (such as Event IDs 1102 and 104) occurring in a rapid burst. This activity is often used by adversaries to hide evidence of post-compromise actions.
Detects host-enumeration activities performed by PowerShell processes, including anti-virus queries, system information gathering, network configuration checks, and file/drive enumeration, specifically when correlated with suspicious outbound network connections to common task-runner C2 infrastructure.
Detects a sequence of PowerShell commands consistent with the VelvetCake reconnaissance module, including enumeration of antivirus software via SecurityCenter2, system information, IP configurations, running processes, recent files, and drive mapping within a short timeframe.
Detects a multi-stage malware execution pattern consistent with VelvetCake activity. This includes staging text-based files in C:\Users\Public, downloading PowerShell scripts to temporary directories, executing the script via PowerShell, and subsequently deleting both the staged text files (except for specific allowed filenames) and the payload script.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that reference the 'nyx' script from 'raw.githubusercontent.com', combined with common download and execution patterns such as 'Invoke-Expression' or 'Invoke-WebRequest'. This activity is consistent with retrieving and executing remote post-exploitation scripts.
Detects the execution of PrintSpoofer or its derivatives, often used to perform privilege escalation on Windows systems by abusing the Print Spooler service. The rule also covers the download of the tool via PowerShell.
Detects PowerShell or PowerShell ISE spawned directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe, covering both Start-menu launches and the Run dialog abused by ClickFix) whose command line carries a genuine obfuscation/evasion signal - true -EncodedCommand/-e usage, a hidden/minimized window flag, or a remote download cradle (IEX, Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadString, certutil, mshta, etc.) - while excluding invocations that point at an on-disk script file under a standard install path, since ClickFix payloads are inline one-liners rather than references to a local .ps1. Bare -NoProfile/-NoLogo flags no longer trigger alone, since they are common in legitimate automation.
Detects post-exploitation shell activity spawned from the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe), narrowed to command lines carrying encoded/obfuscated PowerShell flags, remote-download cradles, or basic recon/persistence commands (whoami, certutil, bitsadmin, schtasks, reg add). This reduces noise from benign w3wp.exe-initiated automation while retaining the behavioral pattern seen in the Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX unauthenticated RCE chain (webshell/in-memory DLL execution dropping to a shell).
Detects the use of PowerShell to download files from Vultr Object Storage, specifically targeting patterns associated with the HEAVYGRAM malware distribution. The rule monitors for PowerShell cradles (WebClient, DownloadFile), archive extraction commands, or the execution of a specific payload name (RuntimeSSH.exe) often linked to the Handala Hack threat activity.
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