Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell script activity that leverages low-level Windows API calls, such as SetWindowsHookEx and GetAsyncKeyState, which are frequently used by the LxBaseRAT malware to implement keylogging functionality by monitoring user keystrokes.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activity involving persistence via Registry Run keys (specifically targeting SMQDService or winappx entries) followed by modifications to Microsoft Defender configuration (adding exclusions via PowerShell) within a two-hour window on the same device.
Detects the initialization of the SEE_MASK_NOZONECHECKS environment variable within a PowerShell process command line. Setting this variable to '1' is a known technique used to suppress Windows zone-based security prompts (Mark-of-the-Web) for downloaded files, facilitating the execution of potentially malicious payloads.
Detects the use of .NET reflection APIs, such as Assembly.Load or Reflection.Emit, within PowerShell command lines. This technique is commonly used to load and execute malicious code entirely in memory, facilitating fileless malware execution and bypassing traditional disk-based security controls.
Detects the execution of a hidden PowerShell process that subsequently spawns a child process using the 'Start-Process' cmdlet with the '-Verb RunAs' argument within a short time window. This pattern is commonly associated with attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) or execute processes with elevated privileges silently.
This rule detects repeated PowerShell executions using 'Start-Process' with the 'RunAs' verb and hidden window styles. The detection specifically looks for high-frequency occurrences of these commands within a tight 18-25 second window on the same host, which is characteristic of certain automated execution or privilege escalation attempts.
Detects a multi-stage PowerShell execution pattern often associated with 'ClickFix' or similar social engineering lures, where a base64-encoded or obfuscated command is used to invoke malicious network downloads (IEX, WebClient, DownloadString). The rule further correlates these execution patterns with potential persistence mechanisms, specifically monitoring modifications to Windows startup locations or Run keys.
Detects a suspicious multi-stage PowerShell execution pattern where an initial process utilizing obfuscated arguments (e.g., -EncodedCommand) launches a secondary PowerShell process that performs network operations indicative of downloading and executing a remote payload.
Detects potential ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a victim is prompted to execute an encoded PowerShell command (often via copy-paste into a terminal). The rule specifically monitors PowerShell processes initiated by shell environments (explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or WindowsTerminal.exe) that execute encoded, hidden scripts to perform multiple suspicious network requests for files (e.g., .zip, .enc, .bin) from non-standard domains.
Detects the use of PowerShell, pwsh, or cmd to execute the 'Add-MpPreference' command with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, specifically targeting common directories like Telegram Desktop or specific system directories. This activity suggests an attempt to bypass security scanning by excluding known malicious locations or folders from Microsoft Defender's real-time monitoring.
Detects the use of PowerShell, pwsh, or cmd to execute the 'Add-MpPreference' command with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, specifically targeting common directories like Telegram Desktop or specific system directories. This activity suggests an attempt to bypass security scanning by excluding known malicious locations or folders from Microsoft Defender's real-time monitoring.
Detects the use of PowerShell, pwsh, or cmd to execute the 'Add-MpPreference' command with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, specifically targeting common directories like Telegram Desktop or specific system directories. This activity suggests an attempt to bypass security scanning by excluding known malicious locations or folders from Microsoft Defender's real-time monitoring.
Detects the execution of wmic.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe with command-line arguments related to querying antivirus products or security centers (e.g., AntiVirusProduct, SecurityCenter2). The rule focuses on executions originating from non-standard system paths (e.g., Temp, Users, AppData) or processes that lack a valid code signing signature, which is often indicative of reconnaissance by malicious actors.
Detects post-exploitation shell activity spawned from the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe), narrowed to command lines carrying encoded/obfuscated PowerShell flags, remote-download cradles, or basic recon/persistence commands (whoami, certutil, bitsadmin, schtasks, reg add). This reduces noise from benign w3wp.exe-initiated automation while retaining the behavioral pattern seen in the Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX unauthenticated RCE chain (webshell/in-memory DLL execution dropping to a shell).
Detects instances where explorer.exe spawns cmd.exe or powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of obfuscated execution, such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or bypass flags. This pattern is consistent with ClickFix social engineering attacks where users are deceived into manually executing malicious commands via the Windows Run dialog.
Detects instances where explorer.exe spawns cmd.exe or powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of obfuscated execution, such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or bypass flags. This pattern is consistent with ClickFix social engineering attacks where users are deceived into manually executing malicious commands via the Windows Run dialog.
Detects the use of PowerShell to load .NET assemblies directly from memory or via Base64/encoded streams. This technique is commonly used by malicious payloads to execute shellcode, reflection-based attacks, or obfuscated scripts while minimizing their on-disk footprint.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands containing indicators of AMSI or ETW unhooking (e.g., references to amsi.dll, AmsiScanBuffer, EtwEventWrite, or VirtualProtect). This activity is commonly associated with attackers attempting to bypass endpoint security telemetry and antimalware scanning mechanisms prior to executing malicious payloads.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands containing suspicious arguments (e.g., encoded commands, download cradles) initiated by scheduled task binaries (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) or involving specific suspicious strings associated with identified threat activity.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands containing suspicious arguments (e.g., encoded commands, download cradles) initiated by scheduled task binaries (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) or involving specific suspicious strings associated with identified threat activity.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands containing suspicious arguments (e.g., encoded commands, download cradles) initiated by scheduled task binaries (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) or involving specific suspicious strings associated with identified threat activity.
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