Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell or PWSH with command-line arguments often used to obfuscate scripts or hide activity, such as encoded commands (-enc), base64 decoding, or running the process with a hidden window.
Detects instances where common web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Safari) or related desktop applications spawn shell interpreters (PowerShell on Windows, bash/zsh/sh on macOS) with command-line arguments indicative of malicious activity, such as base64-encoded payloads, hidden windows, or remote script downloading.
Detects ClickFix-style activity where a web browser or common application launcher spawns a terminal or PowerShell process to execute obfuscated, copied, or piped commands. This behavior often indicates a social engineering attack where a user is tricked into manually executing a malicious command script.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets such as Invoke-WmiMethod, Invoke-CimMethod, Get-CimInstance, or Get-WmiObject to interact with the Win32_Process class for process creation on local or remote systems. This behavior is frequently associated with administrative activity but is also commonly used by adversaries for remote command execution and lateral movement.
This rule detects potentially suspicious file deletion activity originating from PowerShell processes (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe). It monitors for commands targeting temporary directories and specific file extensions (such as .vbs, .lnk, .js, or .ps1) combined with recursive deletion arguments. Additionally, it highlights scenarios where these PowerShell commands are executed by potentially unusual parent processes such as script engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe) or other command-line utilities.
Detects PowerShell command execution that uses bitwise XOR operations combined with the .NET [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes method. This pattern is commonly used by malware, such as AsyncRAT, to deobfuscate and drop secondary payloads or modules onto the file system during execution.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that exhibit signs of obfuscation by searching for specific string manipulation methods commonly used to hide malicious code. Specifically, it identifies the use of base64 decoding (FromBase64String) or string concatenation combined with character replacement techniques (Replace) on the command line, which are often used by threat actors to execute encoded payloads while bypassing simple string-based signatures.
Detects the execution of base64 encoded PowerShell commands initiated by conhost.exe with the --headless flag. The decoded command contains specific suspicious patterns, including accessing environment variables, reading file content, and deleting files, which is characteristic of malicious scripts attempting to stealthily interact with the environment.
Detects the execution of base64 encoded PowerShell commands initiated by conhost.exe with the --headless flag. The decoded command contains specific suspicious patterns, including accessing environment variables, reading file content, and deleting files, which is characteristic of malicious scripts attempting to stealthily interact with the environment.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands, specifically when initiated by a 'conhost.exe' process running with the '--headless' flag. The rule further inspects the decoded command to identify patterns indicative of .NET reflection-based code execution, often used in malicious activity such as reflective assembly loading.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands, specifically when initiated by a 'conhost.exe' process running with the '--headless' flag. The rule further inspects the decoded command to identify patterns indicative of .NET reflection-based code execution, often used in malicious activity such as reflective assembly loading.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands, specifically when initiated by a 'conhost.exe' process running with the '--headless' flag. The rule further inspects the decoded command to identify patterns indicative of .NET reflection-based code execution, often used in malicious activity such as reflective assembly loading.
Detects the use of PowerShell to add Microsoft Defender exclusions (paths or extensions) where the process was initiated by or involves LockAppHost.exe. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to bypass security protections by excluding malicious artifacts from scanning.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution initiated by explorer.exe containing encoded commands, correlated with concurrent activity in the Windows RunMRU registry key or execution of rundll32.exe referencing 'WindowsUpdate.log'. This pattern is frequently used to mask malicious activity and maintain stealth during fileless execution or persistence operations.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution initiated by explorer.exe containing encoded commands, correlated with concurrent activity in the Windows RunMRU registry key or execution of rundll32.exe referencing 'WindowsUpdate.log'. This pattern is frequently used to mask malicious activity and maintain stealth during fileless execution or persistence operations.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving the creation of scheduled tasks for persistence using command-line arguments indicative of tool execution (e.g., chisel, powershell) or the direct execution of hidden PowerShell scripts intended to bypass execution policy.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving the creation of scheduled tasks for persistence using command-line arguments indicative of tool execution (e.g., chisel, powershell) or the direct execution of hidden PowerShell scripts intended to bypass execution policy.
Detects the execution of hidden, base64-encoded PowerShell commands spawned directly from explorer.exe, a pattern observed in the CRPx0 ClickFix campaign where attackers trick users into pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects host and user discovery commands (whoami, hostname, systeminfo, wmic) executed within a 15-minute window following a suspected CRPx0 ransomware execution event, identified by either encoded PowerShell or curl-to-bash activity.
Detects the use of PowerShell, pwsh, or cmd to execute the 'Add-MpPreference' command with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, specifically targeting common directories like Telegram Desktop or specific system directories. This activity suggests an attempt to bypass security scanning by excluding known malicious locations or folders from Microsoft Defender's real-time monitoring.
Detects instances where PowerShell or PowerShell ISE performs suspicious process injection activities, specifically targeting executables such as csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe, or utilizes specific remote thread/memory allocation functions.
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