Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., encoded commands, hidden windows) initiated by mshta.exe, excluding instances where a .ps1 script file is involved. This pattern often indicates attempts to bypass execution policy or run obfuscated payloads in memory, which is a common behavior of malicious HTA files.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell execution that attempts to download files from the internet using the Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet. It specifically looks for PowerShell processes launched with hidden and execution policy bypass flags, coupled with specific hardcoded malicious URL patterns associated with a known campaign (NotaFiscal/nfe_valid_access_key_2026_secure).
Detects a specific pattern of PowerShell execution involving the download of files from a remote endpoint using parameters associated with Brazilian tax documents (NotaFiscal) to the Desktop directory, followed by immediate execution. The rule looks for a combination of hidden window style, Invoke-WebRequest, specific URL parameters (dl.php, NFe identifiers), and subsequent Start-Process calls, which is indicative of malware dropper activity.
This rule detects activity associated with the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities. It looks for connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific credential harvesting tools, reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist) executed by the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), suspicious PowerShell downloads of AnyDesk, and unauthorized access to PaperCut configuration files or log files containing known exploit strings.
This rule detects the execution of powershell.exe with command-line arguments that utilize 'curl' to download a file from a specific remote IP address (103.86.86.244). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using built-in Windows tools or redirected utilities to perform ingress tool transfer as part of a malicious payload delivery.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Windows Defender security settings by adding exclusion paths or processes. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to whitelist malicious files or processes to evade detection by the antivirus solution.
Detects PEEP Secure Preferences integrity-hash forgery (protection.macs/super_mac) and known PEEP persistence scripts (patch_secure_prefs.ps1, install_silent.ps1, force_enable.ps1), anchored to actual Chrome/Edge profile paths rather than generic terms like 'protection' or 'developer_mode' that appear in unrelated admin tooling.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender Antivirus configurations, specifically adding file exclusions or disabling protection features like Real-time or IOAV monitoring. These actions are common indicators of an adversary attempting to disable security controls to evade detection.
Detects a specific pattern of PowerShell execution involving the download of files from a remote endpoint using parameters associated with Brazilian tax documents (NotaFiscal) to the Desktop directory, followed by immediate execution. The rule looks for a combination of hidden window style, Invoke-WebRequest, specific URL parameters (dl.php, NFe identifiers), and subsequent Start-Process calls, which is indicative of malware dropper activity.
Detects a specific pattern of PowerShell execution involving the download of files from a remote endpoint using parameters associated with Brazilian tax documents (NotaFiscal) to the Desktop directory, followed by immediate execution. The rule looks for a combination of hidden window style, Invoke-WebRequest, specific URL parameters (dl.php, NFe identifiers), and subsequent Start-Process calls, which is indicative of malware dropper activity.
Detects the execution of common system administration tools (cmd, powershell, net, nltest, etc.) used to perform environment discovery or credential enumeration, specifically when targeting Domain Controllers, Active Directory objects, database credentials, or sensitive configuration files.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution initiated by explorer.exe containing encoded commands, correlated with concurrent activity in the Windows RunMRU registry key or execution of rundll32.exe referencing 'WindowsUpdate.log'. This pattern is frequently used to mask malicious activity and maintain stealth during fileless execution or persistence operations.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution initiated by explorer.exe containing encoded commands, correlated with concurrent activity in the Windows RunMRU registry key or execution of rundll32.exe referencing 'WindowsUpdate.log'. This pattern is frequently used to mask malicious activity and maintain stealth during fileless execution or persistence operations.
Detects the use of PowerShell to download string content from the internet and execute it immediately using Invoke-Expression (IEX). This is a common pattern for fileless malware delivery and secondary stage payload execution.
Detects the use of PowerShell to download string content from the internet and execute it immediately using Invoke-Expression (IEX). This is a common pattern for fileless malware delivery and secondary stage payload execution.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands to add directory exclusions to Windows Defender settings. Adversaries often use this technique to exclude directories in 'AppData' from being scanned by antivirus solutions to hide malicious activity, tools, or persistence mechanisms.
Detects a specific pattern of PowerShell execution involving the download of files from a remote endpoint using parameters associated with Brazilian tax documents (NotaFiscal) to the Desktop directory, followed by immediate execution. The rule looks for a combination of hidden window style, Invoke-WebRequest, specific URL parameters (dl.php, NFe identifiers), and subsequent Start-Process calls, which is indicative of malware dropper activity.
Detects instances where PowerShell is used to download an executable named 'svchost.exe' from an external IP address (103.86.86.244). The rule monitors for network connections to this IP, file creation events matching specific download patterns in fonts directories, and direct command-line arguments involving the suspicious IP and file path, indicating potential malware dropper activity.
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell execution patterns involving hidden windows, administrative elevation via 'Start-Process -Verb RunAs', and the targeting or execution of rsetup64.exe within specific system paths. It also flags execution chains where 'net session' commands, often used for discovery or local privilege verification, are piped to null and followed by or initiate the same target executables, suggesting lateral movement or persistence attempts.
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell execution patterns involving hidden windows, administrative elevation via 'Start-Process -Verb RunAs', and the targeting or execution of rsetup64.exe within specific system paths. It also flags execution chains where 'net session' commands, often used for discovery or local privilege verification, are piped to null and followed by or initiate the same target executables, suggesting lateral movement or persistence attempts.
Detects the execution of command-line shells (cmd, powershell, pwsh) running under the SYSTEM context that were initiated by or associated with a process containing 'ShieldBreak' in its filename. This behavior is indicative of a suspicious or potentially malicious process (e.g., a security bypass tool) attempting to spawn elevated shells.
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