Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender settings to disable real-time, behavior, and IOAV protection, while simultaneously adding a full-drive exclusion for the root directory (C:\). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary attempting to disable security monitoring to facilitate further malicious activity or avoid detection.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell execution that attempts to download files from the internet using the Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet. It specifically looks for PowerShell processes launched with hidden and execution policy bypass flags, coupled with specific hardcoded malicious URL patterns associated with a known campaign (NotaFiscal/nfe_valid_access_key_2026_secure).
Detects a specific pattern of PowerShell execution involving the download of files from a remote endpoint using parameters associated with Brazilian tax documents (NotaFiscal) to the Desktop directory, followed by immediate execution. The rule looks for a combination of hidden window style, Invoke-WebRequest, specific URL parameters (dl.php, NFe identifiers), and subsequent Start-Process calls, which is indicative of malware dropper activity.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution initiated by explorer.exe containing encoded commands, correlated with concurrent activity in the Windows RunMRU registry key or execution of rundll32.exe referencing 'WindowsUpdate.log'. This pattern is frequently used to mask malicious activity and maintain stealth during fileless execution or persistence operations.
Detects the use of PowerShell to download string content from the internet and execute it immediately using Invoke-Expression (IEX). This is a common pattern for fileless malware delivery and secondary stage payload execution.
Detects the use of PowerShell to download string content from the internet and execute it immediately using Invoke-Expression (IEX). This is a common pattern for fileless malware delivery and secondary stage payload execution.
Detects PowerShell scripts that utilize native PowerShell Identity modules to request Kerberos tickets.
This behavior is typically seen during a Kerberos or silver ticket attack. A successful execution will output the SPNs for the endpoint in question.
This behavior is typically seen during a Kerberos or silver ticket attack. A successful execution will output the SPNs for the endpoint in question.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets such as Invoke-WmiMethod, Invoke-CimMethod, Get-CimInstance, or Get-WmiObject to interact with the Win32_Process class for process creation on local or remote systems. This behavior is frequently associated with administrative activity but is also commonly used by adversaries for remote command execution and lateral movement.
Detects the execution of common system administration tools (cmd, powershell, net, nltest, etc.) used to perform environment discovery or credential enumeration, specifically when targeting Domain Controllers, Active Directory objects, database credentials, or sensitive configuration files.
This rule detects potentially malicious command-line activity involving powershell.exe or mshta.exe that is initiated by a web browser process (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, or iexplore.exe). It monitors for indicators such as encoded commands, usage of Invoke-Expression, download cradles, hidden window flags, and specific known IOCs, correlating these events with recent browser activity to identify potential drive-by download or browser-based exploitation attempts.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activities where PowerShell downloads or extracts specific zip files (node.zip, build.zip) to staging directories, followed by the execution of associated binaries like node.exe, winpty-agent.exe, or winpty.dll from those same locations. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging and executing tooling within temporary user directories.
This rule detects activity associated with the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities. It looks for connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific credential harvesting tools, reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist) executed by the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), suspicious PowerShell downloads of AnyDesk, and unauthorized access to PaperCut configuration files or log files containing known exploit strings.
This rule detects activity associated with the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities. It looks for connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific credential harvesting tools, reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist) executed by the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), suspicious PowerShell downloads of AnyDesk, and unauthorized access to PaperCut configuration files or log files containing known exploit strings.
This rule detects activity associated with the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities. It looks for connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific credential harvesting tools, reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist) executed by the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), suspicious PowerShell downloads of AnyDesk, and unauthorized access to PaperCut configuration files or log files containing known exploit strings.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize base64-encoded strings, window style arguments for obfuscation, and subsequent decoding to reveal suspicious indicators such as network downloading commands or archive manipulation, indicative of potential fileless malware staging.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize base64-encoded strings, window style arguments for obfuscation, and subsequent decoding to reveal suspicious indicators such as network downloading commands or archive manipulation, indicative of potential fileless malware staging.
Detect built in PowerShell cmdlet Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature, Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool.
Similar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images
Similar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images
This rule detects potential fileless execution by correlating network connections to a known suspicious domain (workers.dev) with subsequent PowerShell activity on the same device. The rule specifically looks for processes executing PowerShell commands involving Base64 decoding, ChaCha20 decryption, or Assembly.Load, occurring within a 10-minute window of the network connection.
Detects Evil-WinRM / WinRM-fs usage or wsmprovhost.exe-spawned PowerShell tied specifically to bird-agent backdoor artifacts (cplsupport, wtass, config.toml) or encoded/download-cradle command patterns, rather than any WinRM session, reducing noise from routine remote administration.
Detects the execution of command interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, WindowsTerminal) spawned by common user-facing applications (Explorer, WindowsTerminal, DLLHost) where the command line arguments contain keywords associated with automated human verification (e.g., CAPTCHA, bot detection) and suspicious download/execution patterns (e.g., iex, base64). This behavior is characteristic of malicious automated scripts or malware attempting to bypass security challenges via interactive shells.
This rule detects the execution of powershell.exe with command-line arguments that utilize 'curl' to download a file from a specific remote IP address (103.86.86.244). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using built-in Windows tools or redirected utilities to perform ingress tool transfer as part of a malicious payload delivery.
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