Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

3,347 detections

Detects Node.js or related helper processes executing shell commands (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or other processes where the execution involves the 'withCreateProcessUser' argument. This often indicates attempts to bypass execution restrictions or run malicious payloads by utilizing Node.js as an execution proxy within unconventional or temporary directories.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
102
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize base64-encoded strings, window style arguments for obfuscation, and subsequent decoding to reveal suspicious indicators such as network downloading commands or archive manipulation, indicative of potential fileless malware staging.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
This rule detects the use of PowerShell or common command-line network tools (curl, wget) to download or interact with files containing references to WPPConnect or WhatsApp automation JavaScript libraries. It flags activity where the parent process is a common LOLBIN (Living Off the Land Binary) or originates from suspicious locations such as user temporary directories, which is indicative of malicious automated tooling or script execution.
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F S@Fsdr
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
000
Detects Evil-WinRM / WinRM-fs usage or wsmprovhost.exe-spawned PowerShell tied specifically to bird-agent backdoor artifacts (cplsupport, wtass, config.toml) or encoded/download-cradle command patterns, rather than any WinRM session, reducing noise from routine remote administration.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
004
Detects execution of PowerShell.exe initiated by cplsupport.exe with hidden window styles and non-interactive, no-profile flags, which is often indicative of obfuscated command execution or malicious script activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
104
Detects instances where PowerShell is launched with explorer.exe as its parent process, but where the child process's metadata (creation time, logon ID, or account SID) does not align with the recorded explorer.exe process. This discrepancy is a strong indicator of Parent Process ID (PPID) spoofing, a technique often used to evade security monitoring.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
000
DNSExfiltrator allows for transferring (exfiltrate) a file over a DNS request covert channel
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 months ago
205
Detects the execution of powershell scripts with calls to the "Start-NetEventSession" cmdlet. Which allows an attacker to start event and packet capture for a network event session.
Adversaries may attempt to capture network to gather information over the course of an operation.
Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 months ago
105
Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 months ago
105
Detects instances where PowerShell is used to download an executable named 'svchost.exe' from an external IP address (103.86.86.244). The rule monitors for network connections to this IP, file creation events matching specific download patterns in fonts directories, and direct command-line arguments involving the suspicious IP and file path, indicating potential malware dropper activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell execution patterns involving hidden windows, administrative elevation via 'Start-Process -Verb RunAs', and the targeting or execution of rsetup64.exe within specific system paths. It also flags execution chains where 'net session' commands, often used for discovery or local privilege verification, are piped to null and followed by or initiate the same target executables, suggesting lateral movement or persistence attempts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects PEEP Secure Preferences integrity-hash forgery (protection.macs/super_mac) and known PEEP persistence scripts (patch_secure_prefs.ps1, install_silent.ps1, force_enable.ps1), anchored to actual Chrome/Edge profile paths rather than generic terms like 'protection' or 'developer_mode' that appear in unrelated admin tooling.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects the execution of common system administration tools (cmd, powershell, net, nltest, etc.) used to perform environment discovery or credential enumeration, specifically when targeting Domain Controllers, Active Directory objects, database credentials, or sensitive configuration files.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
Detects the execution of common system administration tools (cmd, powershell, net, nltest, etc.) used to perform environment discovery or credential enumeration, specifically when targeting Domain Controllers, Active Directory objects, database credentials, or sensitive configuration files.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Hunters
2 months ago
000
This rule detects potentially malicious command-line activity involving powershell.exe or mshta.exe that is initiated by a web browser process (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, or iexplore.exe). It monitors for indicators such as encoded commands, usage of Invoke-Expression, download cradles, hidden window flags, and specific known IOCs, correlating these events with recent browser activity to identify potential drive-by download or browser-based exploitation attempts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
202
This rule detects potentially malicious command-line activity involving powershell.exe or mshta.exe that is initiated by a web browser process (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, or iexplore.exe). It monitors for indicators such as encoded commands, usage of Invoke-Expression, download cradles, hidden window flags, and specific known IOCs, correlating these events with recent browser activity to identify potential drive-by download or browser-based exploitation attempts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects AS-REP roasting is an attack that is often-overlooked. It is not very common as you have to explicitly set accounts that do not require pre-authentication.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 months ago
004
Detects Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script and alike. Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 months ago
004
Detects execution of PowerShell.exe initiated by cplsupport.exe with hidden window styles and non-interactive, no-profile flags, which is often indicative of obfuscated command execution or malicious script activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., encoded commands, hidden windows) initiated by mshta.exe, excluding instances where a .ps1 script file is involved. This pattern often indicates attempts to bypass execution policy or run obfuscated payloads in memory, which is a common behavior of malicious HTA files.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects instances where OpenVPN service binaries (openvpn.exe or openvpnserv.exe) spawn command-line interpreters (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) with suspicious command-line characters or potentially unbalanced quotes. This behavior may indicate an attempt to leverage OpenVPN for code execution or persistence, often seen in environments where VPN configurations are manipulated to run arbitrary scripts.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
101
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