Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-DomainController` command, which is used to discover remote systems within a Windows domain. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an attempt to enumerate domain controllers, a common tactic in Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain situational awareness, potentially leading to further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that query for domain groups using `Get-DomainGroup`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Monitoring this activity is crucial as `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a tool often used by adversaries for domain enumeration and situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain insights into domain group structures, aiding in further exploitation and privilege escalation.
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet, part of the PowerView tool, is used to enumerate domain groups within a Windows domain. The detection leverages script block text to identify this specific command. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team performing reconnaissance to gain situational awareness and map out Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further exploitation, including privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that utilize the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet to discover remote systems, specifically targeting the `DS_Computer` parameter.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain computers and gather situational awareness within Active Directory.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map the network, identify critical systems, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain computers and gather situational awareness within Active Directory.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map the network, identify critical systems, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.
The following analytic detects attempts to modify or add a Component Object Model (COM) entry to the InProcServer32 path within the registry using PowerShell. It leverages PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify suspicious script blocks that target the InProcServer32 registry path. This activity is significant because modifying COM objects can be used for persistence or privilege escalation by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or maintain persistent access to the compromised system, posing a severe security risk.
The following analytic identifies attempts to disable Windows Defender
real-time behavior monitoring via PowerShell commands. It detects the use of specific
`Set-MpPreference` parameters that disable various security features. This activity
is significant as it is commonly used by malware such as RATs, bots, or Trojans
to evade detection by disabling antivirus protections. If confirmed malicious, this
action could allow an attacker to operate undetected, leading to potential data
exfiltration, further system compromise, or persistent access within the environment.
real-time behavior monitoring via PowerShell commands. It detects the use of specific
`Set-MpPreference` parameters that disable various security features. This activity
is significant as it is commonly used by malware such as RATs, bots, or Trojans
to evade detection by disabling antivirus protections. If confirmed malicious, this
action could allow an attacker to operate undetected, leading to potential data
exfiltration, further system compromise, or persistent access within the environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of a COM CLSID through PowerShell. It leverages EventCode 4104 and searches for specific script block text indicating the creation of a COM object. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by adversaries and malware, such as the Conti ransomware, to execute commands, potentially for privilege escalation or bypassing User Account Control (UAC). If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to gain elevated privileges or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic identifies the use of the `get-localgroup` command executed via PowerShell or cmd.exe to enumerate local groups on an endpoint. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gather information about local group memberships, which can be a precursor to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to identify and target privileged accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the system.
The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell cmdlet `get-localgroup` using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, providing detailed visibility into script execution. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to enumerate local groups, which may be a precursor to privilege escalation or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain insights into group memberships, potentially leading to unauthorized access or privilege abuse. Review parallel processes and the entire script block for comprehensive analysis.
The following analytic detects the creation of a New-CIMSession cmdlet followed by the use of the Invoke-CIMMethod cmdlet within PowerShell. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify these specific cmdlets in the ScriptBlockText field. This activity is significant because it mirrors the behavior of the Invoke-WMIMethod cmdlet, often used for remote code execution via NTLMv2 pass-the-hash authentication. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over targeted systems.
The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell command `Start-BitsTransfer`, which can be used for file transfers, including potential data exfiltration. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because `Start-BitsTransfer` can be abused by adversaries to upload sensitive files to remote locations, posing a risk of data loss. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially leading to further exploitation of the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that use PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries may use it for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery on compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gather critical user information, aiding in further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user by leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method monitors script blocks containing `$env:UserName` or `[System.Environment]::UserName`. Identifying this activity is significant as adversaries and Red Teams may use it for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery on compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain insights into user context, aiding in further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.
This analytic detects the execution of the ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command via PowerShell Script Block Logging.
The ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command is part of the AADInternals toolkit, which is used primarily for security testing and administrative tasks in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) environments.
This particular command is designed to create a "backdoor" in a federated Azure AD domain.
When executed, ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor modifies the federation settings of a domain by adding or changing the federation configuration to allow an attacker to control the authentication process.
This manipulation enables the creation of security tokens that can impersonate any user within the Azure AD tenant.
Consequently, this allows an attacker to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access to the Azure AD environment.
The ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command is part of the AADInternals toolkit, which is used primarily for security testing and administrative tasks in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) environments.
This particular command is designed to create a "backdoor" in a federated Azure AD domain.
When executed, ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor modifies the federation settings of a domain by adding or changing the federation configuration to allow an attacker to control the authentication process.
This manipulation enables the creation of security tokens that can impersonate any user within the Azure AD tenant.
Consequently, this allows an attacker to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access to the Azure AD environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of the Invoke-ShareFinder PowerShell cmdlet from PowerView. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify instances where this specific command is executed. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it indicates an attempt to enumerate network file shares, which may contain sensitive information such as backups, scripts, and credentials. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable an attacker to escalate privileges or move laterally within the network, potentially compromising additional systems and sensitive data.
The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to query Active Directory for domain organizational units. This detection leverages PowerShell operational logs to identify script blocks containing `[adsisearcher]`, `objectcategory=organizationalunit`, and `findAll()`. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gain situational awareness of the domain structure. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further exploitation, such as privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the use of `get-WebConfigurationProperty` and `Set-ItemProperty` commands in PowerShell to disable HTTP logging on Windows systems. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for script blocks that reference HTTP logging properties and attempt to set them to "false" or "dontLog". Disabling HTTP logging is significant as it can be used by adversaries to cover their tracks and delete logs, hindering forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to evade detection and persist in the environment undetected.
The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell Cmdlet `export-certificate` by leveraging Script Block Logging. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate certificates from the local Certificate Store on a Windows endpoint. Monitoring this behavior is crucial because stolen certificates can be used to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive data, or facilitate further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to encrypted communications and sensitive information, posing a severe security risk.
The following analytic detects the use of the Get-CimInstance cmdlet with the -ComputerName parameter, indicating an attempt to retrieve information from a remote computer. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify this specific command execution. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized remote access or information gathering by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to collect sensitive data from remote systems, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic identifies attempts to stop services on a system using `net.exe`, `sc.exe` or the "Stop-Service" cmdlet. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry. This activity can be significant as adversaries often terminate security or critical services to evade detection and further their objectives. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to disable security defenses, facilitate ransomware encryption, or disrupt essential services, leading to potential data loss or system compromise.
The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet 'export-certificate' executed via the command line, indicating an attempt to export a certificate from the local Windows Certificate Store. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. Exporting certificates is significant as it may indicate credential theft or preparation for man-in-the-middle attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive communications, or gain unauthorized access to systems and data.
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