Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a multi-stage execution chain involving a malicious LNK file that triggers PowerShell. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell commands spawned by explorer.exe or mshta.exe that contain indicators of string deobfuscation (using .Replace), specific job-related keywords (CoreJob), or remote content retrieval (Net.WebClient.DownloadString). The detection correlates these process events with the presence of suspicious LNK files and decoy document files dropped within the temporary directory on the same endpoint.
This rule detects malicious activity associated with the DOUBLECUP/CountLoader malware by correlating specific PowerShell execution patterns within a single process lineage. It flags process sequences where an encoded PowerShell command (using -enc or -encodedcommand) occurs in conjunction with suspicious .NET reflection (System.Reflection.Assembly) or ScriptBlock invocation within a 5-minute window. The rule explicitly excludes processes with valid digital signatures to reduce false positives from legitimate administrative software.
Detects PowerShell processes whose command line chains a main() function call directly into Invoke-Expression, consistent with CountLoader's module-fetch-and-execute pattern used by DOUBLECUP LaaS.
Detects the execution of suspicious commands, PowerShell scripts, or LOLBins (Living-off-the-Land Binaries) - commonly seen in ClickFix and CrashFix campaigns - recorded in the Windows 'RunMRU' registry key.
Detects a Python process invoking native_host.py (the Edgecution native messaging host component) spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe with command-line flags consistent with UNC6692's Edgecution malware suite execution capability, including PowerShell launched with -NoProfile -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command or cmd.exe launched with /c chcp 65001.
Detects PowerShell processes launched with encoded command arguments (-enc/-EncodedCommand) alongside reflective .NET assembly loading or ScriptBlock usage from the same process lineage within a 5-minute window, indicative of CountLoader-style in-memory payload execution.
Detects PowerShell invoking Get-CimInstance against Win32_Process to enumerate running processes (ProcessId, ParentProcessId, Name, ExecutablePath, CommandLine), converting output to compressed JSON, when spawned by or related to python.exe or cmd.exe -- consistent with the Edgecution native host's process-enumeration command (command 6).
Detects malicious PowerShell activity attempting to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by identifying command-line patterns associated with 'CountLoader' and similar malware. It targets the use of .NET reflection to manipulate AmsiUtils fields and the use of dynamic function resolution (D/Invoke) techniques via GetDelegateForFunctionPointer and GetProcAddress to evade static detection.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Command Prompt initiated by specific integration or MFT (Managed File Transfer) software processes (e.g., Cleo, Harmony, VLTrader). The rule monitors for command-line arguments indicative of encoded commands, script execution, or base64 decoding, which may suggest malicious activity or lateral movement originating from an exposed or compromised integration server.
Detects the ClickFix technique where a fake 'Webcam Compatibility' / 'Zoom SDK Update' lure instructs a victim to press Win+R, paste clipboard content into the Run dialog, and press Enter, resulting in explorer.exe spawning powershell.exe with a short base64-encoded one-liner (<600 bytes)
Detects PowerShell staging commands that download an executable with Invoke-WebRequest to $env:APPDATA\sekv<random>.exe, unblock it, and launch it via Start-Process, consistent with GoGRPC backdoor delivery following a Quick Assist vishing session.
Detects attempts to modify Windows Defender settings, specifically disabling real-time monitoring or adding exclusions, using PowerShell commands. The rule filters for suspicious execution patterns, such as hidden windows or invocation from scripting hosts (wscript, cscript, mshta, cmd), while excluding common management tool paths to minimize noise.
Detects the use of PowerShell to invoke 'Confirm-SecureBootUEFI' or 'Clear-SecureBootKeys' cmdlets. These commands are utilized by the TOKYOCORE wiper malware to erase the UEFI Secure Boot key database, effectively preventing the system from booting a signed operating system as part of a destructive attack chain.
Detects PowerShell or pwsh execution containing a custom regex-based JSON key/value parsing pattern (mimicking CountLoader's manual JSON parsing) in either the raw command line or a base64-decoded encoded command, while excluding legitimate ConvertFrom-Json usage.
Detects a PowerShell process executing with a hidden window style while using the Compress-Archive cmdlet to target the tokyocore_data directory or archive, a behavior consistent with TOKYOCORE ransomware data staging for exfiltration.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform a fileless download-and-execute operation, characterized by the presence of web-based download cmdlets alongside in-memory execution primitives. This pattern is commonly used for staging malicious payloads such as Cobalt Strike, Sliver, or other offensive tooling while avoiding file-based detection.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform reflective assembly loading of a payload that has been decrypted using AES and decompressed with GZip. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to load malicious .NET assemblies directly into memory while bypassing static file-based detection.
Detects suspicious execution patterns associated with the SleeperGem supply chain attack, where a compromised Gem install script (git_credential_manager-2.8.3/bin/install) spawns shell or PowerShell commands to trigger secondary malicious scripts like deploy.sh or redirects output to /dev/null.
Detects an obfuscated, hidden-window PowerShell loader chaining campaign-specific SET environment-variable assignments to stage a payload path and download a next-stage payload from cdn.zoom-videos infrastructure, consistent with BlueNoroff's ClickFix PowerShell staging technique.
Detects attempts to modify Windows Defender settings, specifically disabling real-time monitoring or adding exclusions, using PowerShell commands. The rule filters for suspicious execution patterns, such as hidden windows or invocation from scripting hosts (wscript, cscript, mshta, cmd), while excluding common management tool paths to minimize noise.
Detects suspicious delivery and execution chains characteristic of the Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) group. The rule monitors for WScript, CScript, or CMD processes spawning PowerShell with evasive flags (hidden, bypass, encoded, etc.) accessing suspicious file paths, or the execution of a renamed AutoIt3 binary from non-standard locations like Temp or AppData, which are common indicators of stage-two downloader activity.
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