Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious execution chain where hh.exe (HTML Help) launches wscript.exe, which then executes certutil.exe, followed by the launch of powershell.exe. This pattern is commonly associated with Living-off-the-Land (LotL) techniques to execute malicious scripts or payloads, often used to bypass security controls or fetch remote files.
Detects instances where Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) spawns common command-line interpreters (powershell.exe, mshta.exe, cmd.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments indicative of fileless execution, obfuscation, or remote payload retrieval.
Detects the use of a common PowerShell download cradle (Invoke-Expression with Invoke-RestMethod) targeting a direct IP address. This pattern is frequently observed in 'ClickFix' style attacks where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious commands into their terminal, which then pull secondary payloads from adversary-controlled infrastructure.
Detects anomalous PowerShell activity associated with the EKZ Stealer, characterized by a multi-stage chain involving file download, hidden process execution, temporary file staging, base64 encoding, and exfiltration via HTTP POST requests, followed by cleanup of logs.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving the execution of PowerShell via explorer.exe, followed by subsequent sub-process activity that attempts to access sensitive browser-stored credentials (Login Data or Cookies) or specific cryptocurrency wallet data, combined with a concurrent network connection attempt, indicative of credential exfiltration via a command-and-control (C2) beacon.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with a hidden window (-w 1) and base64 encoded arguments containing a specific string (JABVAHIAbAA). This combination is commonly used by malicious scripts or fileless malware loaders to execute obfuscated code silently.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with the encoded command parameter (-encodedcommand or -enc), followed by a substantial base64-encoded string. This is a common technique used by attackers to obfuscate malicious PowerShell scripts, bypass signature-based detection, and execute payloads in memory.
Detects instances where common productivity (e.g., Office) or web browser applications spawn PowerShell.exe with suspicious command-line arguments often associated with malicious script execution or obfuscated code downloaders, such as '-w hidden', '-nop', or '-enc'.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize the .NET TCPClient class to initiate network connections. This behavior is frequently associated with reverse shell activity where a command shell (cmd.exe) spawns PowerShell to establish a remote connection to an attacker-controlled listener.
Detects the clearing of Windows Security or System event logs using either the 'wevtutil' command-line utility or the 'Clear-EventLog' PowerShell cmdlet. This activity is commonly associated with anti-forensic efforts by adversaries to remove evidence of malicious actions, such as credential harvesting, following a compromise.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with flags commonly used to obfuscate command lines or hide activity from the user, such as -EncodedCommand or -WindowStyle Hidden. These techniques are frequently used by adversaries to execute malicious scripts while avoiding detection.
Detects instances where PowerShell is executed via the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe), utilizing common download-cradle patterns (IEX/Invoke-Expression and Invoke-RestMethod) typically associated with ClickFix clipboard-hijacking social engineering campaigns.
This rule monitors for instances where powershell.exe is spawned by cmd.exe, which in turn is a child process of the RemoteMouse application. It specifically flags command lines that involve network socket initialization or encoded commands, both of which are common indicators of malicious activity such as reverse shells or script-based attacks originating from a possibly compromised or malicious binary.
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender real-time protection, behavior monitoring, or scan capabilities. This is achieved by monitoring for specific HKLM registry modifications under 'SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender' or the execution of PowerShell cmdlets 'Set-MpPreference' and 'Add-MpPreference' with arguments designed to disable security features or add file/process exclusions, often observed during initial stages of ransomware attacks.
Detects execution of PowerShell with encoded commands ('-enc') and window style hidden ('-w 1') initiated by processes associated with Fortinet FortiClient (e.g., scheduler.exe, fortitray.exe), or matching known encoded command patterns. This often indicates the use of legitimate management processes to execute obfuscated malicious scripts.
Detects potential exfiltration activity involving PowerShell scripts interacting with a specific remote IP address, using System.Net.WebClient to upload file contents, and referencing a common local staging file (C:\ProgramData\log.txt).
Detects the execution of PowerShell with security-bypassing flags (-ExecutionPolicy Bypass, -NoProfile, -WindowStyle Hidden) launched by the Windows Script Host (wscript.exe). This pattern is associated with the VEIL#DROP campaign where JavaScript lures invoke PowerShell to bypass AMSI and security controls.
Detects specific User Account Control (UAC) bypass techniques involving fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe, and sdclt.exe, often used in conjunction with PowerShell 'RunAs' elevation to install system-level tools like Tailscale or OpenSSH, as observed in Operation Poisson.
The analytic detects a PowerShell script that enumerates camera devices on the targeted host. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for commands querying Win32_PnPEntity for camera-related information. This activity is significant as it is commonly observed in DCRat malware, which collects camera data to send to its command-and-control server. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to gather sensitive visual information from the host, potentially leading to privacy breaches or further exploitation.
Detects an obfuscation technique where a threat actor hides Invoke-Expression (IEX) execution by using Get-Variable to parse out IEX characters from the MaximumDriveCount built-in variable and reconstruct them via -Join.
This rule detects processes that rapidly create and unload .NET application domains within a 60-second window. This behavior is often associated with .NET-based in-memory code execution, where attackers use AppDomains to isolate, execute, and quickly dispose of malicious payloads to avoid detection.
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