Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of specific shortcut files (.lnk) or the use of WScript.Shell and CreateShortcut methods within PowerShell, associated with the VILE ransomware's fake decryptor lure technique.
Detects PowerShell execution involving reflection patterns (GetMethod('C') and Invoke) combined with the execution or targeting of known Living-off-the-Land binaries (LOLBins). This pattern is often used to execute malicious payloads in-memory, bypassing traditional signature-based detection.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell via wscript.exe or certutil.exe, followed by the use of suspicious command-line arguments often associated with malicious fileless execution, such as downloading content from the web or executing base64 encoded payloads.
Detects instances where cmd.exe spawns powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of malicious activity, such as network connection attempts via TCPClient or the use of Base64 encoded commands.
This rule detects a suspicious network connection on local port 1313 followed within 5 minutes by a PowerShell network connection to a non-standard port (not 80, 443, 8080, 8443). This behavior is characteristic of an initial exploit attempt targeting a service on port 1313, followed by a post-exploitation reverse shell.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with flags indicating encoded commands (-enc) or hidden window styles (-windowstyle hidden), which are common techniques used to obfuscate malicious activity or run payloads stealthily. This behavior is often associated with the post-compromise execution phase of various threats, including payloads delivered via malicious portals.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using either the command-line utility 'wevtutil.exe' or the PowerShell cmdlet 'Clear-EventLog'. Additionally, it monitors for Windows Security Event ID 1102, which specifically indicates the clearing of the Security log. These actions are common indicators of an adversary attempting to remove evidence of their activity from a host system.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the UAC-0226 threat actor by identifying a LNK shortcut file located in the user Startup folder that executes a minimized cmd.exe process. This command shell subsequently launches a hidden PowerShell command that reads and executes code from C:\ProgramData\WC3 using Invoke-Expression (IEX). This activity is linked to the GIFTEDCROOK delivery chain.
Detects the use of native Windows administration utilities (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, wmic, powershell) to delete shadow copies, modify boot configurations to disable recovery, or remove backup catalogs, a behavior typically performed by ransomware groups like The Gentlemen to prevent system recovery.
Detects instances where FortiTray.exe or scheduler.exe (associated with FortiClient) initiate a cmd.exe process that subsequently launches a PowerShell process with hidden window (-w 1) and encoded command (-enc) flags. This pattern is indicative of a living-off-the-land attack where a legitimate, signed application process is abused to execute obfuscated malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of encoded PowerShell commands initiated by a .cmd script associated with a FortiClient VPN configuration. This activity is indicative of the FortiBleed post-exploitation chain, where an attacker injects malicious PowerShell into VPN configuration scripts via a compromised FortiClient EMS admin API.
Detects the execution of 'net.exe' from a 'powershell.exe' parent process to either reset the local administrator password or reactivate a built-in domain administrator account. This behavior is associated with the Akira ransomware group's pre-encryption stage to ensure access to compromised endpoints.
Detects the creation or registration of virtual machines across multiple hypervisor platforms (Hyper-V, VMware ESXi, and VirtualBox) using PowerShell, command-line utilities, or security event logs. The rule alerts on these actions when performed outside of designated business hours or by accounts not included in a pre-defined list of authorized administrators.
Detects suspicious PowerShell activity using Active Directory enumeration cmdlets (e.g., Get-ADUser, Get-ADComputer, Get-DnsServerZone) that outputs results into CSV or text files within the C:\ProgramData directory. This pattern is commonly used during reconnaissance and staging for data exfiltration by threat actors.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by using reflection to locate and modify the internal 'amsiInitFailed' or 's_amsiInitFailed' fields within the AmsiUtils class. This technique prevents PowerShell from correctly identifying or blocking malicious scripts by forcing the AMSI initialization status to a state indicating a failure has already occurred, effectively disabling the security engine for that session.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands initiated directly from explorer.exe that contain indicators of the 'ClickFix' attack vector, specifically commands designed to extract data from the clipboard (e.g., Get-Clipboard) or download/execute remote content (e.g., iwr, iex). This activity typically occurs when a user is socially engineered into copying and pasting malicious instructions into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects the use of Windows Package Manager (winget) or Configuration Remoting Server processes to execute account management commands such as adding users or modifying group memberships via net.exe or PowerShell. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation or persistence attempts using legitimate administrative tools.
Detects persistence establishment via the Windows Package Manager (WinGet) Desired State Configuration (DSC) engine. The rule identifies instances where 'ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe' or 'WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe' spawns 'schtasks.exe' or uses PowerShell to create scheduled tasks. It correlates process execution events with Security Event ID 4698 to identify unauthorized scheduled task creation within the WinGet DSC context.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or the PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer cmdlet for downloading files from the internet or local network, often used by attackers to perform ingress tool transfer or to maintain persistence via BITS jobs.
Detects cmd.exe spawning powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of a reverse shell, specifically leveraging encoded commands or TCP socket objects. This pattern is characteristic of attackers injecting malicious keystrokes via the Remote Mouse Socket.IO service.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands targeting a specific staging directory 'ProgramData\Zooms', typically associated with the ClickFix malware campaign. The rule flags processes invoking secondary payload retrieval via '.r2.dev' or 'dl-callback' patterns, which are indicative of staged second-stage download activities.
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