Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell or Bash commands, potentially for implant delivery, spawned from Visual Studio Code extension host processes (node.exe, code.exe, code-server, cursor). This rule specifically looks for command-line patterns associated with the GLASSWORM.WASM threat, such as 'irm', 'iex', 'curl -fsSL', 'Invoke-Expression', 'IEX', or combinations of 'powershell -Command', 'curl -fsSL', and 'bash -c'.
Detects suspicious file deletion activities using 'del' command with '/f' flag or 'Remove-Item' PowerShell cmdlet, and log clearing activities using 'wevtutil cl' or 'Clear-EventLog' PowerShell cmdlet. It also identifies Windows Event Log clearing events (Event ID 1102). The rule also includes a specific check for known malicious artifacts in the command line.
Detects the presence of specific keywords within PowerShell Script Block logs (EventCode 4104) that are characteristic of Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass techniques. These include attempts to manipulate the AMSI context, reflectively load assemblies to modify memory, or force scan failures.
Detects Microsoft Outlook spawning a command-line interpreter (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) followed by a network connection originating from that interpreter within a 5-minute window. This behavior is highly suspicious and often indicative of malicious macro execution or exploit delivery via email attachments leading to command-and-control activity.
This rule detects potential tunnel creation using PowerShell. It identifies network connections from PowerShell processes to common SSH (22) or Tor (9001, 9050) ports, as well as PowerShell script block activity involving socket connections directed at .onion domains, SSH keys, or authorized keys files, which may indicate remote access tunneling or command-and-control communication.
This rule detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil.exe, auditpol.exe, PowerShell) to interact with, query, or check status of security event logs and auditing configurations. While these tools are standard for administration, their usage by non-system accounts can indicate an adversary attempting to understand, monitor, or manipulate system audit policies and event log configurations as part of a reconnaissance or defense evasion strategy.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or pwsh that originates from an interactive parent process like explorer.exe or cmd.exe. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns containing 'IEX', 'Invoke-Expression', 'Invoke-WebRequest', 'iwr', or 'IRm', while excluding encoded commands, which is indicative of potential malicious clipboard-paste activity or manual attacker intervention.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands using suspicious combinations of flags, obfuscation techniques, or indicators often associated with fileless malware delivery, such as Base64 encoded commands, hidden window execution, and memory-resident loading (e.g., Invoke-Expression, IEX, VirtualAlloc). The rule scores based on the combination of indicators, flagging highly suspicious patterns.
Detects PowerShell processes executing with command-line arguments that suggest the use of 'Get-Alias' (gal) or 'Get-Command' (gcm) followed by suspicious patterns. This could indicate an adversary attempting to discover system capabilities or installed modules.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution initiated by explorer.exe, specifically when the command line includes a .lnk file, execution policy bypass, and contains keywords or paths commonly associated with malicious activity (e.g., tor, ssh, github.io, dropbox.com, or suspicious temporary/public directories). This pattern is often observed in initial access or execution phases of attacks.
Detects PowerShell commands that reverse byte arrays before dynamically loading assemblies into memory, a behavior commonly associated with advanced malware loaders and fileless execution techniques. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell process command lines containing 'IO.File', 'System.Reflection.Assembly', 'Length-1', and '..0', which are indicative of byte array manipulation and in-memory assembly loading.
Detects PowerShell commands using XOR operations together with execution primitives that may indicate obfuscated in-memory payload decoding. Specifically looks for 'powershell.exe' executing with '-bxor', '81', and either 'IEX' or 'Invoke-Expression' in the command line.
Detects the use of administrative tools like wmic.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe to invoke WMI event subscription components such as ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, or FilterToConsumerBinding. This behavior is a common technique for establishing persistence or elevating privileges by executing malicious code when specific system events occur.
Detects the ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe process spawning PowerShell or related host processes (pwsh.exe, conhost.exe), which may indicate the abuse of remoting or management services to execute scripts or bypass security controls.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry Run keys that are initiated by processes related to the Windows Package Manager (winget), specifically ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe or WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe, or by PowerShell scripts spawned by these processes. This behavior may indicate an attempt to establish persistence.
Detects PowerShell execution patterns used for host reconnaissance and application enumeration, specifically looking for combinations of Get-StartApps and Get-AppxPackage with silent error handling. This behavior was observed in the easy-day-js malware dropped via the Mastra npm supply chain compromise.
Detects potential timestomping activity using PowerShell Set-ItemProperty, as well as specific file metadata manipulation and file operations associated with the JFMBackdoor utilizing fltMC.exe.
This rule detects suspicious process execution chains associated with known Kimsuky campaign activity and NUKESPED malware. It identifies the execution of the NUKESPED secondary payload 'zlrenu8.exe' and a specific sandbox-evading JSE loader chain where WScript or CScript spawns hidden PowerShell instances using 'certutil' to decode files stored in the ProgramData directory.
Detects the Kimsuky NUKESPED JSE loader anti-analysis pattern. The rule monitors for wscript.exe executing a JSE file, followed by a delayed PowerShell execution containing hidden window flags, decoding or non-interactive flags, and references to ProgramData, which is consistent with sandbox evasion and NUKESPED payload staging.
Detects the execution of WMI queries or hidden PowerShell commands initiated by JScript/VBScript interpreters (wscript.exe/cscript.exe), a behavior characteristic of Kimsuky's NUKESPED loader for performing anti-analysis and sandbox evasion.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell is spawned by Windows Script Host processes (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments indicative of fileless execution or payload decoding, such as the use of hidden windows, encoded commands, or certutil-based file decoding from the ProgramData directory.
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