Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a sequence of events where a new local account is created on a device using common administrative commands (net user, PowerShell New-LocalUser), followed within 60 minutes by the execution of known offensive security tools or frameworks such as Impacket, NetExec, CrackMapExec, Chisel, or Havoc agent on the same device. This pattern is indicative of potential unauthorized system access, staging of persistence mechanisms, or active reconnaissance activities.
Detects reconnaissance activity where PowerShell scripts named 'lightlife.ps1' or 'Update.ps1' execute common Windows system information discovery commands such as systeminfo, whoami, hostname, and wmic. This activity is indicative of the Lightlife RAT performing post-exploitation host enumeration.
This rule detects common PowerShell code patterns associated with Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass techniques. The detection monitors for the presence of specific keywords and method calls in script content, such as 'AmsiUtils', 'amsiInitFailed', and reflection-based attempts to modify memory buffers used by AMSI to scan for malicious scripts.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with the Compress-Archive cmdlet where the process originates from user-writable directories (AppData\Local or AppData\Roaming). This behavior is often associated with the staging of data for exfiltration or the compression of unauthorized tools or logs in a user context.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands originating from suspicious process paths (outside Windows or Program Files directories). The rule includes logic to identify potential sandbox evasion by correlating the PowerShell activity with subsequent tasklist.exe execution within a short window, often characteristic of malware performing environment checks.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes using taskkill, tskill, or PowerShell's Stop-Process cmdlet. This is a common technique used by adversaries to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) or antivirus (AV) agents on a compromised system to evade detection.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring for specific keywords associated with memory patching or tampering within the command lines of PowerShell, .NET-based binaries (dotnet.exe, csc.exe, msbuild.exe), and related processes. The rule specifically looks for strings like 'AmsiUtils', 'amsiInitFailed', and base64-encoded equivalents often used by offensive security tools to neutralize AMSI scanning capabilities.
Detects reconnaissance activity where PowerShell is used to enumerate installed software by querying Windows registry uninstall keys (HKLM and HKCU) via cmdlets such as Get-ItemProperty, Get-StartApps, or Get-AppxPackage. This behavior is associated with the ROOTBOY/Prinz Eugen campaign, typically performed as a precursor to ransomware deployment.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes using taskkill, tskill, or PowerShell's Stop-Process cmdlet. This is a common technique used by adversaries to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) or antivirus (AV) agents on a compromised system to evade detection.
Detects the use of PowerShell to initiate web requests to Storj-hosted URLs (link.storjshare.io or .storj.io), utilizing either the WebClient class or the Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet. This behavior is associated with the REF8372 OXLOADER malvertising campaign, where PowerShell scripts are used to download malicious payloads.
Detects node.exe spawning PowerShell, a technique used by the MuddyWater (also known as Seedworm) threat group for post-exploitation reconnaissance, staging, and screenshot capture. This rule specifically looks for the 'node.exe' process initiating 'powershell.exe' or 'pwsh.exe'.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or PWSH attempting to download external content via web-oriented cmdlets (Net.WebClient, Invoke-WebRequest, Start-BitsTransfer) using typical obfuscation flags (e.g., -WindowStyle Hidden).
Detects the execution of PowerShell with an encoded command flag (e.g., -EncodedCommand, -e, -ec) where the command string exceeds 200 characters. This pattern is commonly used to obfuscate malicious PowerShell scripts, payloads, or downloader cradles.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or PWSH attempting to download external content via web-oriented cmdlets (Net.WebClient, Invoke-WebRequest, Start-BitsTransfer) using typical obfuscation flags (e.g., -WindowStyle Hidden).
This rule detects PowerShell activity where scripts or commands are used to interact with the Windows clipboard, such as retrieving text or data. This is often indicative of reconnaissance or data theft attempts, where an adversary aims to capture credentials, secrets, or sensitive information stored in the clipboard by a user.
This rule detects PowerShell activity where scripts or commands are used to interact with the Windows clipboard, such as retrieving text or data. This is often indicative of reconnaissance or data theft attempts, where an adversary aims to capture credentials, secrets, or sensitive information stored in the clipboard by a user.
Detects execution of the EDRUnChoker remediation tool, useful for situational awareness. This rule specifically looks for the command line containing 'Install-EdrChokerWmiDefense.ps1', indicating the execution of a PowerShell script related to EDR evasion or manipulation.
Identifies rapid creation of multiple QoS policies, matching EDRChoker's behavior iterating through process lists. This rule detects when three or more QoS policies are created within a one-minute window on a single device, indicated by the execution of 'New-NetQosPolicy' via PowerShell.
Identifies PowerShell utilizing ProcessHollowing.Execute to hijack MsBuild.exe.
Detects a script or document containing PowerShell commands for web retrieval (Invoke-WebRequest or DownloadString) that specifically targets an .rtf file from a URL. This pattern is indicative of a staging mechanism for malware like Animateclipper.
This rule detects the use of native Windows utilities such as nltest.exe, netdom.exe, and PowerShell to enumerate Active Directory domain trust relationships. Attackers commonly perform this discovery to map out target environments, identify lateral movement opportunities, or plan further exploitation in multi-domain or forest environments.
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