Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential Active Directory enumeration attempts by monitoring for the execution of common command-line tools and PowerShell cmdlets used to query domain information, such as users, groups, and domain controllers.
Detects PowerShell referencing AMSI internals, reflection, or amsiInitFailed before executing a downloaded stage. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell processes executing commands that contain keywords related to AMSI bypass techniques, such as 'AmsiUtils', 'amsiInitFailed', 'AmsiScanBuffer', 'amsiContext', 'GetField', combined with 'SetValue', 'Reflection', or 'NonPublic'. This indicates an attempt to modify AMSI's behavior in memory.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell execution patterns involving scripts or payloads stored within specific directory paths (ProgramData\WC3\ or ProgramData\wt1). It flags instances where PowerShell commands include reflective loading techniques ('IEX' or 'Invoke-Expression') while referencing files in these paths, which is often associated with fileless malware execution or malicious loaders.
Detects the creation of BITS jobs using PowerShell that initiates a connection to an external network location, excluding known Microsoft domains. This behavior is often associated with the use of BITS for downloading arbitrary files or tools from non-trusted sources, which is a common technique used in ingress tool transfer.
Detects the creation of BITS jobs using PowerShell that initiates a connection to an external network location, excluding known Microsoft domains. This behavior is often associated with the use of BITS for downloading arbitrary files or tools from non-trusted sources, which is a common technique used in ingress tool transfer.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands that modify file system metadata (e.g., CreationTime, LastWriteTime, LastAccessTime). This technique, often referred to as 'timestomping', is used by adversaries to manipulate file timestamps to evade detection or hide activity.
Detects attempts to leverage PowerShell to register a loose-file AppX package from a UNC path. This technique can be used to trigger NTLM coercion via InstallService.exe or achieve SYSTEM DLL load, often associated with the 'UNCanny' coercion method. The rule looks for PowerShell command lines containing 'Add-AppxPackage', '-Register', and a UNC path (\\) along with 'AppxManifest.xml'. Additional suspicious indicators like '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass', 'DiscCoerceProbe', 'poc.ps1', 'Invoke-InstallServiceCoerce.ps1', or '-AttackerHost' increase the suspicious score.
Detects attempts to bypass or disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell sessions by monitoring for common indicators such as manual manipulation of AmsiUtils, AmsiScanBuffer, or reflection-based patching techniques. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute malicious code without security interference.
Detects various activities associated with Operation Poisson Havoc Demon, including the loading of 'senti.dll' (a shellcode carrier), PowerShell execution spawned from 'explorer.exe' (indicating potential shellcode injection), execution of 'RevS.ps1' (a PowerShell reverse shell), and the presence of other suspicious files like 'PhantomBackdoor' and 'TencShell'.
Detects PowerShell scripts that reconstruct native cmdlets (e.g., Test-Path) from fragmented character arrays mapped to Simplified Chinese variables, a technique observed in AsyncRAT campaigns for obfuscation.
Detects attempts to bypass or disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell sessions by monitoring for common indicators such as manual manipulation of AmsiUtils, AmsiScanBuffer, or reflection-based patching techniques. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute malicious code without security interference.
Detects PowerShell running Profile.ps1 decrypting the payload into RuntimeBroker_update.exe. This rule specifically looks for the execution of 'powershell.exe' with 'Profile.ps1' in its command line, followed by the creation of 'RuntimeBroker_update.exe' by that PowerShell process.
This rule detects the use of common cloud command-line interfaces (Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, and AWS CLI) to perform resource discovery, specifically identifying commands used to list virtual machines or describe EC2 instances. Such activity, if performed by an unexpected user or on an endpoint where cloud management tools are not typically installed, may indicate reconnaissance by an adversary.
Detects instances where Windows event logs are cleared using built-in utilities (wevtutil.exe) or PowerShell (Get-EventLog/Get-WinEvent, Clear-EventLog) shortly after those same logs were queried or enumerated by the same user on the same device. This pattern is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to conceal malicious activity.
Detects instances where common web browsers (chrome.exe, firefox.exe, etc.) spawn command shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) to execute suspicious commands or perform file downloads, often indicative of an initial stage of a drive-by download or malicious script execution.
Detects suspicious activities within a Veeam backup environment, including unauthorized process spawning by Veeam services, LSASS memory access, destruction of backup catalogs or restore points via PowerShell, and unauthorized access to Veeam database files by non-Veeam processes.
Detects PowerShell process executions that include the string 'bubble' in combination with string manipulation functions ('replace', 'split') or a campaign-specific function ('otidiform'). This pattern is indicative of attempts to deobfuscate PowerShell commands, often used by adversaries to hide malicious code.
Detects node.exe spawning powershell.exe as a child process, consistent with malicious npm postinstall lifecycle hooks used by the PostCSS typosquatting campaign (postcss-minify-selector-parser / postcss-minify-selector). The attack chain decrypts an AES-256-GCM blob at runtime and executes a PowerShell downloader stage.
Detects execution of New-NetQosPolicy in PowerShell, indicative of EDRChoker QoS throttling, which can be used to impair defenses.
Identifies string splitting techniques used in Dropping Elephant downloaders to evade static PowerShell logging. The rule specifically looks for obfuscated substrings like 'iw''r', 'g''c''i', 'r''e''n', 'c''p''i', and 'g''cm sch' within PowerShell command lines.
Detects PowerShell command lines attempting to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) by leveraging 'AmsiUtils' and 'amsiContext'. This technique is often used by adversaries to evade security controls that rely on AMSI for script scanning.
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