Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects the execution of a malicious MSI installer file named '331.msi' masquerading as a 'PowerShell Cleaner' utility. The rule monitors for the execution of this MSI package and the subsequent staging of suspicious files, specifically 'cleaner.ps1' and 'archive6.zip', within the '%LocalAppData%\PowershellCleaner\script\' directory.
Detects the execution of the temp_auto_push.bat tool, associated with the threat actor Void Dokkaebi, used to perform malicious commit amendments and code injection in source code repositories. The tool achieves this by manipulating the system clock to timestomp commit metadata, amending commits using 'git commit --amend --no-verify' to bypass security controls, and force-pushing the compromised history.
This rule detects the creation or modification of suspicious files (extensions associated with web shells or modules, such as .aspx, .ashx, .asmx, .dll, or .config) within common Microsoft IIS and Exchange web directories. It correlates these file events with process activity initiated by common web server or management processes (e.g., w3wp.exe, powershell.exe) and filters out trusted files (Microsoft-signed), known administrative update activity, and files with a broader footprint in the environment to identify potentially malicious, low-prevalence artifacts.
Detects execution chains where archive utilities (7-Zip, WinRAR) or explorer.exe, when initiated from temporary or download directories, spawn common scripting engines (PowerShell, mshta.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe) that contain suspicious network-related or obfuscated command-line indicators.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack pattern associated with Akira ransomware, including AD enumeration using PowerShell, data staging with WinRAR, S3 exfiltration via s5cmd, AnyDesk service installation, registry manipulation for persistence via Safe Mode, and boot configuration changes to facilitate EDR bypass. It also incorporates detection for specific IOCs like attacker jump host RDP connections and malicious file hashes.
This rule detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task named 'TaskHandler' using the schtasks.exe utility. The task is configured to execute a specific file, 'F7u00ex.exe', on system startup under the 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM' account. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism, often associated with the Spark RAT malware, which attempts to maintain a foothold on the system with high-level privileges.
This rule detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create or configure a service named 'TaskHandler'. The rule specifically looks for command lines that reference potentially malicious files like 'F7u00ex.exe' or specific driver/restart patterns often associated with the persistence mechanism of the Spark RAT.
This rule detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create or configure a service named 'TaskHandler'. The rule specifically looks for command lines that reference potentially malicious files like 'F7u00ex.exe' or specific driver/restart patterns often associated with the persistence mechanism of the Spark RAT.
Detects the use of curl.exe or curl to communicate with the malicious domain 'i.apee.my.id', initiated by a VS Code integrated terminal process. This behavior is indicative of malicious VS Code extensions exfiltrating data via a hidden terminal session.
Detects the execution of native binaries, the creation/modification of Node-API (.node) files, or the loading of .node modules from Visual Studio Code extensions directories. This behavior is indicative of malicious VS Code extensions attempting to execute arbitrary native code for reconnaissance, persistence, or exfiltration.
Detects the execution of commands 'ls' or 'drives' via command line, which are often used by threat actors for reconnaissance and file/directory enumeration on a compromised host.
Detects the spawning of cmd.exe by processes associated with Microsoft Exchange Server, specifically MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe or w3wp.exe. This activity is indicative of post-exploitation command execution following an exploit of an Exchange web service or MRSProxy endpoint.
Detects the execution of various command-line tools (sc, net, powershell, wmic, taskkill, systemctl, launchctl) used to stop or disable system services. This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to stop security services, backup agents, or other critical infrastructure for impact, defense evasion, or prior to data destruction.
This rule detects instances where the Windows Defender Antivirus service (MsMpEng.exe) spawns common command-line shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, conhost.exe) while running under the SYSTEM context. This behavior is highly irregular for a security product and is indicative of process injection, exploit payload execution, or anti-tampering bypass attempts.
Detects PowerShell invoking the .NET CopyFromScreen method to capture a screenshot and write it to shot.png, spawned as a child process of pythonw.exe. This behavior matches the TWINLOOT Python implant, which abuses trusted Microsoft cloud services for C2 and uses pythonw.exe to launch PowerShell for screen capture as part of its credential harvesting and reconnaissance capabilities.
This rule detects malicious activity associated with the RtkNGUI64.exe backdoor, which masquerades as a legitimate Realtek Audio process. It identifies when this process spawns cmd.exe for command execution or interacts with 'tempcache.tmp' files, indicating potential C2 tasking and persistence via WMI event consumers.
Detects a build process (cargo/rustc/build-script-build) that drops an executable to /tmp/rust-setup and launches it detached so it persists after the build completes — the payload-delivery mechanism used by the compromised proc-macro1 Rust crate.
Linux Unexpected Process Spawning su
Cortex XDR
Detects instances where a non-root user process launches 'su' or a shell command executing 'su' from an unusual parent process (excluding standard shells like bash/sh/zsh/ksh or elevation tools like sudo/su). This is used to identify suspicious attempts to switch user context or escalate privileges.
The following analytic detects the use of net.exe or net1.exe to configure the Windows maximum password age policy as unlimited.
It leverages process creation telemetry from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents and identifies executions of the `net accounts` command using the `/maxpwage:unlimited` option.
When specified, Windows configures the maximum password age with an unlimited value, effectively preventing passwords governed by the affected password policy from expiring.
This behavior is significant because an adversary may modify password expiration settings to weaken credential security controls and maintain access to compromised accounts for an extended period.
If confirmed malicious, this activity may indicate an attempt to establish or maintain persistence by preventing expected password rotation from invalidating credentials under the affected password policy.
It leverages process creation telemetry from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents and identifies executions of the `net accounts` command using the `/maxpwage:unlimited` option.
When specified, Windows configures the maximum password age with an unlimited value, effectively preventing passwords governed by the affected password policy from expiring.
This behavior is significant because an adversary may modify password expiration settings to weaken credential security controls and maintain access to compromised accounts for an extended period.
If confirmed malicious, this activity may indicate an attempt to establish or maintain persistence by preventing expected password rotation from invalidating credentials under the affected password policy.
Suspicious Discovery Command Execution
Cortex XDR
Detects the execution of common command-line utilities frequently used by adversaries for system, network, and account discovery after gaining initial access to a host.
Detects the invocation of the Windows Error Reporting service (WerFault.exe) where the command line arguments reference Zoom-related processes (Zoom.exe, CptHost.exe, or zoom.us). This behavior is often indicative of an abnormal application crash, which may be associated with memory corruption exploitation attempts against the Zoom client.
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