Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,501 detections
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Detects the use of GDI functions (GetDC, CreateCompatibleBitmap, BitBlt, GetDIBits) combined with suspicious base64 encoding activity by a process masquerading as an NVIDIA binary (nvidia-sysruntime.exe). This behavior is indicative of screen capture and exfiltration attempts typical of the LabubaRAT implant.
Rule for T1548.002 technique "Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (cmd)"
Detects the installation and service creation of the Nezha agent, a monitoring tool often abused by threat actors to establish persistent backdoors on compromised systems.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to modify Windows Defender preferences, specifically by adding exclusions for paths or processes. Attackers commonly use this technique to exclude malicious files, directories, or process names from antivirus scanning, thereby facilitating the execution and persistence of malware.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Microsoft Defender Antivirus security settings through PowerShell commands (Set-MpPreference/Add-MpPreference) or by modifying Windows Registry keys related to Defender exclusions. Attackers often use these techniques to bypass security controls and prevent detection of malicious files or processes.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe that involves the string 'CrysomeLoader' in the command line, which is indicative of persistence or execution mechanisms associated with the CrysomeLoader malware.
This rule detects the execution of the Mimikatz credential dumping tool by monitoring for specific process names or command-line arguments, including the use of 'sekurlsa' modules to harvest credentials from memory. Mimikatz is widely used by adversaries to perform credential theft, including dumping passwords, hashes, and Kerberos tickets from memory.
Detects the use of the built-in Windows utility esentutl.exe to copy sensitive registry hives (SAM, SECURITY, or SYSTEM). This is a known technique used by adversaries to perform offline credential dumping by accessing the registry hive files.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via explorer.exe using hidden windows styles and encoded commands. This behavior is often associated with fileless execution, initial access via malicious attachments or documents, and various obfuscation techniques used by adversaries to evade detection.
Detects the execution of processes originating from the /private/tmp/.CrashReporter directory on macOS systems. This path is often used by adversaries to store or execute malicious binaries in a hidden, temporary location to evade detection.
Detects the use of the Get-ADReplicationSubnet PowerShell cmdlet to query Active Directory replication subnet configurations. Attackers may use this command to map the internal network topology, identify domain controllers, and scope lateral movement targets within the AD environment.
Detects attempts to discover domain controllers using various fallback techniques including nltest, PowerShell cmdlets (Get-ADDomainController), and querying the LOGONSERVER environment variable. Attackers use these methods to map network infrastructure and identify domain controllers for lateral movement or domain enumeration.
Detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Get-DnsServerResourceRecord' to enumerate DNS zone records. Attackers frequently use this technique to map out network infrastructure, identify internal assets, and discover target subnets within an Active Directory environment.
Detects unauthorized installation, service creation, and registry modifications associated with the RustDesk remote access tool. The rule monitors for command-line activity indicating the installation of RustDesk as a service, execution of installation scripts, and imports of configurations from non-standard locations, which may indicate the deployment of unauthorized remote access software for C2 purposes.
Detects the use of the Windows 'net use' utility to mount a C$ administrative share using explicit user credentials. This behavior is commonly associated with lateral movement techniques where an adversary attempts to connect to a remote system share to gain access, transfer files, or execute binaries.
Detects a specific sequence of commands involving the termination of the AnyDesk process using taskkill, a short delay via the timeout command, and an immediate system reboot. This sequence is often associated with persistence setup or system preparation by threat actors.
Detects the execution of the PowerShell script 'install_ad.ps1' with the '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass' flag. This pattern is commonly associated with automated software deployment scripts, such as AnyDesk, and may be used by adversaries to facilitate malicious script execution while evading security policies.
Detects the execution of processes where the image name or path contains the string 'werkbit'. This is often associated with the execution of potentially malicious or unauthorized tools.
Detects multiple occurrences of processes initiating with a hidden window (SW_HIDE) flag within a short timeframe on the same device. This behavior is often associated with obfuscated script execution, persistence mechanisms, or malicious tools attempting to remain stealthy during execution.
Detects the creation or modification of cron jobs initiated by processes associated with the OpenClaw or ClawHub platforms. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism being established by these applications, which may be leveraged by attackers if the processes themselves are compromised or malicious.
Detection logic covering multiple stages of the Gentlemen ransomware attack lifecycle, including reconnaissance, defense impairment (disabling Defender/EDR), persistence, lateral movement using GPO and PsExec, and anti-forensic activities such as shadow copy deletion and log clearing.
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