Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects unauthorized modifications to SSH 'authorized_keys' files or the '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' configuration file on Linux systems. These actions can be used for persistent access (key injection) or to weaken SSH security controls (e.g., enabling root login) and are typical indicators of account manipulation or compromise.
Detects potential dynamic linker hijacking on Linux systems by monitoring for the use of non-standard LD_PRELOAD paths in process command lines or unauthorized modifications to the /etc/ld.so.preload configuration file, which can be used to inject malicious code into processes.
Detects the use of legitimate command-line utilities such as rclone, AWS CLI, AzCopy, curl, and wget to upload data to cloud storage endpoints, which is a common technique used for data exfiltration.
Detects instances of PowerShell executing Base64-encoded commands initiated by Windows Explorer, a common technique used in the Potemkin Loader/ClickFix campaign to evade static analysis and security controls.
This rule monitors for potentially malicious use of the Windows Certutil utility, specifically targeting the -urlcache (often used to download remote files) and -decode (used to decode hidden or obfuscated payloads) command-line arguments. It filters out common trusted processes like Microsoft's msiexec.exe to reduce noise.
Detects various techniques used to extract the Active Directory NTDS.dit database on Windows. The rule monitors for the misuse of administrative tools including ntdsutil.exe (for IFM or instance activation), vssadmin.exe (to create volume shadow copies as a prerequisite), and esentutl.exe (for direct ESE database operations). The detection focuses on suspicious command-line patterns indicative of credential dumping attempts.
Detects instances where a process launch exhibits PPID spoofing (where the reported parent PID does not match the actual creator PID) followed by that spoofed process attempting to access high-privileged system processes such as lsass.exe, services.exe, or winlogon.exe within a two-minute window. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts.
Detects a burst of reconnaissance activity typical of the StrikeShark toolkit, where an adversary executes four or more distinct system enumeration commands (systeminfo, whoami, ipconfig, net view, hostname, nltest, arp) from the same host and parent process within a 120-second window. The rule excludes common system management process lineages to reduce noise.
Detects instances where 'node.exe' executes common npm lifecycle scripts (e.g., preinstall, postinstall) that subsequently spawn suspicious child processes such as shell interpreters, network utilities, or scripting engines. This behavior is indicative of malicious packages (such as those associated with the Trum3it campaign) attempting to download or execute secondary payloads during the installation phase.
Detects the execution of wusvc.exe (Windows Update Service) from suspicious locations such as Downloads or Temp folders with high integrity level, which is characteristic of masquerading techniques used by adversaries to hide malicious activity as a legitimate system process.
Detects process creation events where the Image field lacks an absolute path,
which occurs when the backing file no longer exists on disk at the time of
logging - commonly caused by Process Ghosting or other unorthodox process creation techniques.
which occurs when the backing file no longer exists on disk at the time of
logging - commonly caused by Process Ghosting or other unorthodox process creation techniques.
Detects the execution of known diagnostic, debugging, or analysis tools (such as IDA Pro, Process Hacker, Wireshark, etc.) by processes other than standard Windows system processes. This behavior may indicate an adversary conducting reconnaissance, attempting to bypass protections, or analyzing system artifacts.
Detects execution of Windows utilities used by the TrymeLocker ransomware to inhibit system recovery, including disabling boot recovery features via bcdedit, clearing backup catalogs via wbadmin, deleting volume shadow copies via vssadmin or wmic, and disabling the Windows Recovery Environment via reagentc.
Detects processes attempting to connect to the Cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) IP address (169.254.169.254) or referencing it in the command line. This behavior is often associated with credential theft or reconnaissance on cloud instances.
Detects execution of PowerShell processes (powershell.exe, pwsh.exe) containing command-line arguments indicative of Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass attempts. This includes known bypass strings, reflection-based patching of memory internals (AmsiUtils, GetDelegateForFunctionPointer), and base64-encoded fragments of common bypass techniques.
Detects the use of icacls.exe or cacls.exe to modify access control lists (ACLs) on sensitive Windows system directories and files. The rule specifically alerts when these commands are executed by non-Microsoft signed processes, which is a common indicator of unauthorized privilege escalation or persistence mechanisms.
This rule detects known evasion techniques used by the Pay2Key and Grixba malware families. It identifies timing-based delays triggered by malicious 'ping.exe' commands targeting invalid IP addresses and locale-based geofencing checks performed via registry queries for custom locale settings.
Detects suspicious usage of the Bun runtime, specifically when it is spawned by common Node.js development processes (like npm or node-gyp) or downloaded from non-official sources using command-line tools or browsers. This behavior is associated with the Miasma malware campaign, which abuses the Bun runtime for malicious operations.
This rule detects unauthorized modifications to Firefox registry keys related to the 'SmartWindow' AI feature, specifically identifying instances where the feature is silently enabled without user consent or where the SmartWindow endpoint and API key configurations are redirected to non-standard, potentially malicious URLs. It also monitors for Firefox process executions involving SmartWindow-related arguments, which may indicate exploitation of this browser-based feature.
Detects the dropping, service creation, or execution of known vulnerable drivers and associated BYOVD tools. These tools are used by The Gentlemen RaaS group to escalate privileges to kernel level and terminate endpoint security products.
This rule detects attempts to acquire Windows credentials by accessing critical registry hives (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY) or their shadow copies. It looks for the use of 'reg save' to export hives, as well as direct file access to these hives or their shadow copy variations by non-standard system processes.
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