Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential container escape attempts on Linux systems by monitoring suspicious file system access patterns to the host's root directory or process creation events involving 'mount', 'nsenter', or 'chroot' commands with parameters indicative of host interaction. Specifically, it looks for file operations on '/proc/1/root', '/proc/1/cwd', '/proc/1/exe', '/proc/1/fd', '/proc/1/ns', '/proc/1/environ', '/proc/1/mounts' or paths starting with '/host', '/hostroot', '/host-root', '/node-root'. It also flags 'mount' commands targeting '/proc/1/root', '/proc/1', 'nsenter', '--target 1', 'hostpath', or '/host', 'nsenter' commands with namespace manipulation arguments, and 'chroot' commands targeting '/proc/1/root', '/host', or '/hostroot'. These activities are commonly associated with adversaries trying to break out of a containerized environment to gain access to the underlying host.
This rule detects the execution of common remote administration tools (PsExec, PaExec, RemCom) specifically on devices identified as domain controllers based on their naming convention.
Detects execution of the Velociraptor binary (velociraptor.exe) running with SYSTEM privileges while not being launched by the expected services.exe process. This often indicates potential unauthorized use or manual deployment of the tool, bypassing standard management procedures.
Detects execution of the Velociraptor binary (velociraptor.exe) running with SYSTEM privileges while not being launched by the expected services.exe process. This often indicates potential unauthorized use or manual deployment of the tool, bypassing standard management procedures.
This rule detects when the Microsoft Teams process (Teams.exe) creates an executable or installer file (.exe or .msi) in common user-writable directories such as AppData, Temp, or Users/Public. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity, as legitimate Teams application updates and add-ins typically reside in specific, protected subdirectories within the Teams folder structure.
Detects the use of the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe) to proxy the execution of mshta.exe. This LOLBIN evasion technique is actively used by ClickFix loaders to execute remote HTA payloads while evading process-based detections.
Detects the use of legitimate administrative tools (regsvcs.exe, infinstall.exe, devcon.exe) being executed with command-line arguments indicative of driver or kernel-level installations (e.g., 'kernel', 'ring0', 'driver install'). This behavior is commonly associated with the installation of rootkits or the execution of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to gain kernel-mode privileges.
This rule detects the use of native Windows utilities such as nltest.exe, netdom.exe, and PowerShell to enumerate Active Directory domain trust relationships. Attackers commonly perform this discovery to map out target environments, identify lateral movement opportunities, or plan further exploitation in multi-domain or forest environments.
Detects the execution of known remote access and remote management tools (e.g., TeamViewer, AnyDesk) where the process was initiated by a web browser, suggesting potential drive-by downloads or social engineering attacks involving remote access software.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities on macOS: downloading a file from a potentially malicious source using curl, mounting a disk image using hdiutil, and subsequently opening files from the mounted volume. This pattern is commonly associated with the delivery and execution of malicious payloads, such as trojanized software or malware installers.
Detects the use of the built-in Windows tool 'ntdsutil.exe' to perform an Install from Media (IFM) operation, which creates a copy of the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit). The rule specifically flags when this output is directed to suspicious paths like 'C:\Windows\Temp' or 'C:\Users\Public', which are common locations used by adversaries to stage files for exfiltration.
This rule detects suspicious activity associated with the Bun runtime after an npm package install. It flags instances where Bun, or download utilities (curl/wget) fetching 'bun.sh', are spawned from Node.js-related processes (npm, node, node-gyp) particularly when located in common temporary or cache directories, indicating potential supply chain compromise or unauthorized runtime deployment during build processes.
Detects the use of the built-in Windows tool 'ntdsutil.exe' to perform an Install from Media (IFM) operation, which creates a copy of the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit). The rule specifically flags when this output is directed to suspicious paths like 'C:\Windows\Temp' or 'C:\Users\Public', which are common locations used by adversaries to stage files for exfiltration.
Detects the execution of Dropbear SSH binaries (dropbear, dropbearkey, dropbearmulti) on identified OT, ICS, or SCADA assets. The rule flags suspicious configurations such as the use of non-standard ports (2222, 44818), remote port forwarding, or running in the foreground, which may indicate unauthorized remote access or tunneling on sensitive operational technology infrastructure.
Detects reconnaissance activity where adversaries enumerate domain user accounts using standard Windows command-line tools, PowerShell Active Directory modules, and direct LDAP queries. This behavior is commonly performed to identify user accounts for subsequent password spraying, brute force attacks, or privilege escalation.
This rule detects common methods used by adversaries to perform credential dumping by accessing the memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). It specifically flags the use of Procdump to create a memory dump of LSASS, the use of the native Windows utility comsvcs.dll via rundll32 to dump process memory, and the creation of LSASS dump files via the Windows Task Manager.
Detects reconnaissance activity where adversaries enumerate domain user accounts using standard Windows command-line tools, PowerShell Active Directory modules, and direct LDAP queries. This behavior is commonly performed to identify user accounts for subsequent password spraying, brute force attacks, or privilege escalation.
Nightmare Eclipse (also known as Chaotic Eclipse) publicly released MiniPlasma, a zero-day local privilege escalation exploit granting SYSTEM-level access, exploiting a previously believed-patched flaw rooted in the Cloud Filter driver's HsmOsBlockPlaceholderAccess routine. As part of post-exploitation activity, the technique involves launching a process named wermgr.exe (Windows Error Reporting Manager) from a directory other than its legitimate system paths — a masquerading technique (T1036.005) used to blend in with normal Windows telemetry while evading naive name-based allowlisting. This detection identifies that specific anomaly: process creation events where the image name is wermgr.exe but the launch path falls outside System32, SysWOW64, WinSxS, servicing, or Windows Update staging directories. This rule should be paired with the registry IoC (symbolic-link creation under CloudFiles\BlockedApps) and scheduled-task abuse (QueueReporting) for full chain coverage, since the process-creation anomaly alone is a downstream artifact rather than the initial exploitation step.
This rule monitors for suspicious child processes (like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or rundll32.exe) spawned by dllhost.exe. Dllhost.exe is typically a legitimate Windows process for COM object hosting, and it spawning command-line interpreters or administrative utilities is often indicative of malicious activity, such as process injection or lateral movement.
Detects execution of mshta.exe with a command-line containing a URL, which is a common technique used by attackers to proxy the execution of remote malicious payloads such as HTA, VBScript, or JScript files. The rule excludes common Microsoft domains to reduce false positives.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry keys commonly associated with COM hijacking. Attackers modify these keys to redirect legitimate system calls to malicious executables, achieving persistence and potential privilege escalation. This rule monitors for registry value creation or modification in keys related to shell open commands for MS-settings, MSC files, or executables.
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