Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
452 detections
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Detects the setting of the TS_SERVE_ALLOW_ALL_INTERFACES environment variable or registry key combined with the execution of Tailscale serve or funnel commands on the same device within a 24-hour window, potentially indicating unauthorized exposure of local services.
Correlates a CVE-2026-76504 encoded /%6a_security_check login POST with a follow-on /dataservice/admin/user request from the same client to the same vManage within 10 minutes. Summarized and sorted by follow-on count.
Detects potential abuse of WordPress application passwords by correlating an authorization mint request (authorize-application.php) from an administrator's browser with a subsequent REST API page creation request to the same destination server from a different source IP address within a short time window.
Correlates a CVE-2026-76504 encoded /%6a_security_check login POST with a follow-on /dataservice/admin/user request from the same client to the same vManage within 10 minutes. Summarized and sorted by follow-on count.
Detects a web request bypassing SafeSquid filtering policy. The extractor exposes
BYPASSED as a distinct action, which is unusual and valuable — most gateways record
only allow or block, so a bypass is normally indistinguishable from an allow.
A bypass means policy was deliberately not applied to that request, and the question
is who arranged that.
Onboarding: SAFESQUID-SWG is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 812).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='SAFESQUID-SWG' and action='BYPASSED'
| groupby srcip, user, domain, url, category
BYPASSED as a distinct action, which is unusual and valuable — most gateways record
only allow or block, so a bypass is normally indistinguishable from an allow.
A bypass means policy was deliberately not applied to that request, and the question
is who arranged that.
Onboarding: SAFESQUID-SWG is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 812).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='SAFESQUID-SWG' and action='BYPASSED'
| groupby srcip, user, domain, url, category
Detects potential data exfiltration to popular public paste-sites and code-sharing services (such as Pastebin, Paste.ee, Hastebin, Ghostbin, ControlC, Dpaste, Rentry.co, Privatebin) using HTTP POST or PUT requests based on upload frequency and volume thresholds.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
Detects web access through Meraki content filtering. Branch users frequently work
without the endpoint controls applied at headquarters, so the network appliance is
often the only layer observing where they go.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='URL_ACCESSED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, domain, url, useragent, user
without the endpoint controls applied at headquarters, so the network appliance is
often the only layer observing where they go.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='URL_ACCESSED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, domain, url, useragent, user
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Sweeps DNS, endpoint network and proxy/firewall telemetry for BraZetsu C2, panel and shop domains using exact or subdomain matching. The apex installscenter.com remains active on Cloudflare with wildcard certificates.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Detects potential exploitation of the libcurl CURLOPT_REQUEST_TARGET CRLF injection vulnerability via web/proxy request logs where curl user-agents are observed with carriage return/line feed characters or injected request lines within the URI path.
Detects a rise in redirected web requests through the gateway. Redirection can
indicate traffic being steered somewhere other than the user intended, whether by
policy change or by interference further along the path.
Onboarding: SAFESQUID-SWG is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 812).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='SAFESQUID-SWG' and action='URL_REDIRECTED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, domain, url, category
indicate traffic being steered somewhere other than the user intended, whether by
policy change or by interference further along the path.
Onboarding: SAFESQUID-SWG is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 812).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='SAFESQUID-SWG' and action='URL_REDIRECTED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, domain, url, category
Detects web traffic where a non-Google hosted domain serves pages containing both Google Form lookalike patterns and login/sign-in lookalike paths within a short timeframe (30 minutes), indicative of a credential harvesting or phishing campaign.
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
Sweeps DNS, endpoint network and proxy/firewall telemetry for BraZetsu C2, panel and shop domains using exact or subdomain matching. The apex installscenter.com remains active on Cloudflare with wildcard certificates.
Sweeps DNS, endpoint network and proxy/firewall telemetry for BraZetsu C2, panel and shop domains using exact or subdomain matching. The apex installscenter.com remains active on Cloudflare with wildcard certificates.
Sweeps DNS, endpoint network and proxy/firewall telemetry for BraZetsu C2, panel and shop domains using exact or subdomain matching. The apex installscenter.com remains active on Cloudflare with wildcard certificates.
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