Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
452 detections
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Detects OpenVPN Connect applying a server-controlled PAC AutoConfigURL to HKCU Internet Settings, potentially enabling proxy interception of user traffic. This is achieved when a malicious VPN server pushes a dhcp-option PROXY_AUTO_CONFIG_URL, causing the OpenVPN system-level agent to write the attacker-controlled URL to the user's registry hive.
Detects Browser-in-the-Middle (BitM) phishing infrastructure associated with PhaaS kits (e.g., Bluekit). The detection monitors proxy access logs for patterns where page assets (images, fonts, CSS) are fetched through a proxy API endpoint on behalf of the victim, combined with WebSocket connections used for real-time relay of victim inputs to the attacker.
This rule detects network activity associated with known malicious browser extensions identified as 'AdBlock' variants. It monitors for connections to the domain 'api.adblock-for-youtube.com' or requests to '/api/v2/rules' made by specific extension IDs that are known to perform unauthorized or suspicious activities.
Detects instances where the Squid proxy application is used to establish network connections over ports 21 (FTP) or 22 (SSH) to specific external IP ranges. This behavior may indicate an attacker using the internal proxy server to anonymize command-and-control (C2) traffic or perform unauthorized external reconnaissance.
Detects a web session that proxies an enterprise authorisation endpoint while also handling session-cookie names associated with authenticated access. This rule identifies suspicious activity indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack where an attacker proxies authentication requests and steals session cookies.
Detects a phishing page upgrading to WebSocket or polling transport with Socket.IO event framing during authentication. This behavior is indicative of an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attack, specifically associated with the 'Tycoon' threat activity.
Detects internal proxy connections used to relay C2 traffic through network
Detects network traffic matching the specific HTTP GET request URI used by the OceanLotus SPECTRALVIPER backdoor for command and control beaconing.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed to the specific URI path '/api/validate/keyboard-events', which is used by a North Korean-linked npm malware to exfiltrate keylogger data.
Detects HTTP requests where the Cookie header contains the specific prefixes 'euconsent-v2=' or 'zd_cs_pm=', which are used by the OceanLotus SPECTRALVIPER backdoor to exfiltrate encrypted host profiling data.
Detects C2 beaconing and token validation activity via GitHub API commit searches using the exact strings hardcoded in the Miasma payload. The worm uses these searches to validate connectivity and verify stolen token legitimacy.
Detects network connections or web proxy requests to malicious domains (such as colafunfacts.net) known to host initial droppers, decoy pages, and payload archives for the ClickFix RAT campaigns.
Detects CONNECT tunneling via compromised VPS servers used as proxy relay
Detects HTTP requests utilizing a specific, highly verbose, and legacy Internet Explorer 8 User-Agent string. This exact hardcoded string is utilized by a fileless .NET loader (originating from a malspam campaign) to download subsequent payload stages from its staging server.
This rule detects potential use of a compromised Virtual Private Server (VPS) as a proxy relay. It specifically looks for HTTP CONNECT requests, which are commonly used for tunneling traffic through a proxy. A threshold of 10 CONNECT requests within 60 seconds from a single source IP is set to identify suspicious activity, indicating a high volume of proxy usage.
This rule detects outbound TCP connections from any source to the local network ($HOME_NET) on port 9150. This port is commonly used by Tor Browser for its SOCKS proxy, indicating potential use of Tor for anonymization or to bypass network restrictions. The rule specifically looks for the SYN flag in the TCP handshake, signifying the initiation of a connection.
This rule detects the use of an internal proxy server to route C2 (Command and Control) traffic. Specifically, it looks for HTTP CONNECT requests within the internal network ($HOME_NET to $HOME_NET) that are established and occur at a high frequency (10 times in 60 seconds from the same source). This pattern is indicative of a system inside the network attempting to tunnel C2 communications through an internal proxy.
Detects network requests associated with FallSpy, an Android spyware utilized by the Russia-nexus threat group GREYVIBE. FallSpy is deployed via fake persona lures and spoofed applications to harvest critical intelligence. While the original YARA rule targets file-based artifacts (e.g., class names like DataCollectorWork), this Sigma rule adapts the logic to focus on the highly reliable exfiltration URL parameters observable in proxy and web gateway logs.
Detects the specific User-Agent string 'NSIS_InetLoad (Mozilla)' associated with the SessionGate multi-stage loader during its command and control (C2) check-ins. SessionGate is delivered via impersonated open-source tooling websites and gated TDS redirection chains.
Detects web requests containing the specific user-agent or custom secret headers used by the Moika campaign beacon to retrieve its stage 2 payload.
Detects web requests containing the specific user-agent or custom secret headers used by the Moika campaign beacon to retrieve its stage 2 payload.
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