Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
452 detections
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Sweeps DNS, endpoint network and proxy/firewall telemetry for BraZetsu C2, panel and shop domains using exact or subdomain matching. The apex installscenter.com remains active on Cloudflare with wildcard certificates.
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
Detects potential Cobalt Strike or Sliver command and control (C2) beaconing behavior by analyzing network proxy, firewall, and flow logs for common C2 URI patterns, known malicious JA3/JA3S TLS fingerprints, and consistent periodic communication intervals (low jitter) characteristic of automated beacons.
Detects HTTP proxy traffic containing specific header or cookie patterns associated with the Evilginx2 or BigBear adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing frameworks. These frameworks use these artifacts to proxy connections and facilitate the theft of session tokens for MFA bypass.
This rule performs a point-in-time IOC hunt within CommonSecurityLog data to detect indicators associated with NeedyMantis. It monitors for specific C2 infrastructure domains ('tripswithengine.com') and a hardcoded user-agent string ('Firefox/21.0') in proxy, firewall, or network logs, which are characteristic of this threat actor's activity.
Detects HTTP beacon traffic patterns indicative of Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profiles using default URI paths and User-Agent strings. This rule identifies common default configurations often left unchanged during adversarial deployment, allowing for the detection of beacon communication over HTTP.
Detects network traffic indicators associated with Cobalt Strike beaconing activity, specifically focusing on common default or near-default Malleable C2 HTTP profile patterns. This includes hardcoded URI paths often used in default configurations (e.g., jQuery library names, pixel gifs) and specific combinations of HTTP headers and user-agent strings commonly observed in adversary C2 frameworks.
Detects network traffic to the Telegram Bot API where the request URI contains indicators of sensitive data exfiltration such as 'cookie', 'session', 'password', or 'credential'. This pattern is often associated with adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing kits (e.g., Evilginx2) exfiltrating stolen session tokens or credentials to an attacker-controlled Telegram bot.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the TrustSink rogue MFA provider, specifically tracking the domain 'trident-sip-filter.ngrok-free.dev' and its associated OIDC discovery path. It aggregates signals from sign-in logs, audit logs, DNS queries, and network proxy traffic to identify attempts to interact with this malicious infrastructure.
Detects large outbound HTTP POST requests to known public AI-inference APIs and paste services. This pattern is potentially indicative of data exfiltration or sensitive information exposure where attackers leverage third-party services to bypass traditional outbound egress filtering.
Detects outbound HTTP requests traversing a proxy where the User-Agent string contains structurally consistent but algorithmically randomized components. This pattern is characteristic of AI-generated C2 client code attempting to create plausible yet non-standard browser signatures for each beacon. Detection relies on identifying User-Agent strings that follow a standard browser template (e.g., Chrome/Safari) but include anomalous hex/alphanumeric tokens in the version fields.
Detects suspicious outbound HTTPS POST traffic to major generative AI API endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google) originating from scripting hosts like powershell.exe or python.exe. The detection is triggered by either unusually large outbound payload sizes or the use of unauthorized scripting tools, which is indicative of data exfiltration using AI infrastructure as a relay.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests originating from legacy and outdated User-Agent strings (specifically older versions of Internet Explorer). Such User-Agent strings are frequently utilized by automated tools, scripts, or malware beaconing to command-and-control (C2) servers, as they are often used to evade security filters or simulate legacy traffic. The rule filters out common content types like text/html or image files to focus on potentially malicious API interactions.
Detects Bitsadmin connections to domains with uncommon TLDs
Detects external reconnaissance activity targeting AI backend services. Adversaries scan for known AI infrastructure ports (such as TensorFlow Serving, Triton, or Ray) and common API paths (e.g., /v1/models, /predict) to identify potential targets. The detection utilizes proxy logs to correlate these suspicious network attributes, high request rates, or known scanning user agents.
This rule detects potentially malicious traffic patterns associated with 'ClickFix' phishing campaigns, specifically those leveraging a combination of Google Ads redirects through ChatGPT Custom GPT URLs and malicious landing pages hosted on Google Sites that contain 'antibot' identifiers.
Detects high volumes of HTTP redirect responses (3xx status codes) associated with a single client IP address, which is indicative of a redirect chain often used in malicious activity such as drive-by compromise or social engineering campaigns involving fake browser updates or 'ClickFix' lures.
Detects HTTP proxy requests for script files (.hta, .js, .ps1) where the HTTP referer indicates the request originated from a search engine or known ad/syndication network. This behavior is highly indicative of 'ClickFix' phishing campaigns, where users are lured from malicious search results or advertisements to download and execute scripts.
This rule performs a point-in-time IOC hunt within CommonSecurityLog data to detect indicators associated with NeedyMantis. It monitors for specific C2 infrastructure domains ('tripswithengine.com') and a hardcoded user-agent string ('Firefox/21.0') in proxy, firewall, or network logs, which are characteristic of this threat actor's activity.
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