Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule performs a point-in-time IOC hunt within CommonSecurityLog data to detect indicators associated with NeedyMantis. It monitors for specific C2 infrastructure domains ('tripswithengine.com') and a hardcoded user-agent string ('Firefox/21.0') in proxy, firewall, or network logs, which are characteristic of this threat actor's activity.
This rule detects obfuscated JavaScript payloads characteristic of the Exvicy malware distribution framework (a successor to ErrTraffic) being served via compromised WordPress pages. The detection logic searches for specific obfuscation patterns and 'human verification' lures within HTTP response bodies on web proxies.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the TrustSink rogue MFA provider, specifically tracking the domain 'trident-sip-filter.ngrok-free.dev' and its associated OIDC discovery path. It aggregates signals from sign-in logs, audit logs, DNS queries, and network proxy traffic to identify attempts to interact with this malicious infrastructure.
Detects network requests originating from mobile device user-agents to suspected phishing or OAuth-consent URLs. This rule identifies patterns common in 'quishing' (QR-code phishing) campaigns where a mobile device is used to interact with a malicious redirect chain or credential-harvesting page. It excludes known legitimate OAuth authorization flows to reduce noise.
This rule establishes a daily baseline of request volumes to mail.google.com per user and per host using proxy logs. It identifies anomalous spikes in traffic or unexpected users/hosts accessing personal webmail, which may indicate data exfiltration using a legitimate web service.
Detects outbound network requests to OpenAI Assistants API endpoints (threads, assistants, runs) that do not originate from common web browsers. This activity may indicate malicious usage of AI services, such as command and control communication via AI agents or automated exfiltration scripts, as opposed to legitimate user-initiated browsing.
Detects proxy requests directed towards the Microsoft OAuth2 device authorization endpoint originating from suspicious referrers (e.g., .de top-level domains). This pattern is consistent with device code phishing attacks where users are redirected from external malicious sites to a legitimate Microsoft authentication page to obtain an authorization code.
Detects web proxy requests that resemble phishing attempts targeting Apple Activation Lock. The rule identifies URLs containing specific Apple-related keywords in combination with common phishing URL paths, while filtering out legitimate Apple support documentation pages.
Detects web traffic directed towards the AnonyMousKIT SMS relay API endpoint, commonly used by threat actors for dispatching SMS phishing lures. The rule monitors for requests to specific API paths related to SMS dispatching and analyzes the gateway status messages returned by the service.
Detects an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing pattern where the legitimate Microsoft authentication URL is embedded as a sub-path within an attacker-controlled proxy domain. This technique is characteristic of AiTM kits, such as Evilginx2, which proxy the legitimate Microsoft authentication flow to capture credentials and session cookies.
Detects outbound web requests to the Telegram API triggered by Google Apps Script components (sidebar macros). This pattern is indicative of malicious Google Docs or Slides files using embedded scripts to exfiltrate data or perform command-and-control communication via the Telegram API when the document is opened by a user.
Detects outbound proxy traffic indicating potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing activity. The rule identifies requests directed at domains mimicking major Identity Providers (Microsoft, Okta, Duo, Google) that either utilize punycode homograph encoding or arrive via known URL shortener/redirector services, while filtering out known legitimate brand domains.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing activity by identifying requests to common tunneling services (e.g., ngrok, Cloudflare Tunnel) that include suspicious authentication or login-related URI paths, correlated with referrers from well-known email providers.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing activity by identifying requests to common tunneling services (e.g., ngrok, Cloudflare Tunnel) that include suspicious authentication or login-related URI paths, correlated with referrers from well-known email providers.
Detects Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) phishing pages by inspecting web proxy or EDR-captured page content for malicious HTML/JS structures. The rule identifies fabricated browser chrome, such as fake address bars and title bars, initialized via window.open with specific dimensions, while ensuring the serving domain is not a known, legitimate identity provider.
Detects outbound network requests from endpoints to known 'uncensored' or jailbroken LLM-as-a-Service domains (e.g., WormGPT, FraudGPT). These platforms are specifically marketed to threat actors for illicit purposes like generating malware, phishing kits, or exploit code, and identifying access to them serves as a leading indicator of adversarial activity.
Detects outbound network requests from endpoints to known 'uncensored' or jailbroken LLM-as-a-Service domains (e.g., WormGPT, FraudGPT). These platforms are specifically marketed to threat actors for illicit purposes like generating malware, phishing kits, or exploit code, and identifying access to them serves as a leading indicator of adversarial activity.
Detects outbound web or proxy connections to known consumer-grade cloud storage and file-sharing services. This activity is often indicative of data exfiltration, where an adversary uploads staged or archived sensitive data to third-party file hosting services (e.g., Mega, Dropbox, transfer.sh, pastebin) to bypass traditional enterprise exfiltration controls.
Detects HTTP(S) requests to known SideCopy/ReverseRAT payload-delivery URLs identified in Operation SideCopy spear-phishing campaigns targeting Indian academia.
This rule identifies potential Apple iCloud phishing attempts by monitoring web proxy logs for requests containing specific indicators of a spoofed 'Find My' page. It specifically looks for URLs that include '/help?' combined with keywords like 'Find Devices', 'Geräte finden', 'icloud', or 'findmy', which are common markers for malicious phishing landing pages attempting to harvest user credentials.
Detects HTTP requests directed to the Vapi.ai API from potential phishing panels or malicious infrastructure. This behavior is indicative of an attacker leveraging Vapi.ai's conversational AI services to conduct automated voice phishing (vishing) campaigns by initiating calls or managing AI assistants.
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