Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects activities associated with the 'CTRL' Russian .Net access framework. It looks for a combination of a hidden PowerShell stager, UAC bypass attempts via registry modification (ms-settings), and the launch of fodhelper.exe. Additionally, it requires the presence of at least one of the following: disguised registry payload storage, FRP configuration file staging, keylogger artifact creation, named pipe creation ('ctrlPipe'), RDP tampering artifacts, or PowerShell commands related to Windows Defender exclusion changes.
Faux Elevate Uac Bypass
YARA-L
This rule detects a Faux-Elevate UAC bypass technique. It correlates the launch of auto-elevated processes like 'fodhelper.exe' or 'eventvwr.exe' with the subsequent spawning of suspicious child processes such as 'powershell.exe', 'cmd.exe', or 'wscript.exe'. The detection is further refined by looking for malicious PowerShell patterns within the command line of these child processes, specifically keywords like 'IEX', 'DownloadString', 'Invoke-WebRequest', or '-enc'. Additionally, the rule identifies registry modifications targeting keys related to 'ms-settings\shell\open\command', which is indicative of a registry hijack often used in UAC bypasses.
Detects Windows registry run keys executing processes out of suspicious paths, for establishing persistence
Detects the Faux-Elevate UAC bypass technique where auto-elevated binaries (fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe) are abused to launch suspicious child processes like PowerShell or cmd.exe. The detection logic further correlates this with registry modifications related to UAC bypass (specifically 'Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command') and subsequent outbound network activity to retrieve payloads, indicating a full chain of execution and C2 communication.
This rule detects the creation or modification of services, registry keys, or driver loads that exhibit characteristics associated with the ValleyRAT malware. Specifically, it looks for services or registry entries pointing to executables in common temporary directories (Users, ProgramData, Windows AppData\Local\Temp, or \Temp\) and driver loads from similar temporary paths. It also includes a specific check for drivers signed by 'Shandong Anzai Information Technology' and known SHA256 hashes associated with ValleyRAT. The rule excludes legitimate Symantec AV components and a Lenovo signed driver to reduce false positives.
Detects the execution of sc.exe or reg.exe to create or modify specific Windows services to point to a malicious DLL. This technique is used by the Silver Dragon APT group to hijack legitimate services like 'bthsrv' and 'wuausrv' for persistence.
Detects the creation of registry Run or RunOnce keys that point to executables mimicking popular VPN clients. This technique is used by threat actors like Storm-2561 to establish persistence for their malicious payloads, which are often fake VPN clients designed for credential theft. The rule specifically looks for these executables being run from non-standard locations, such as user profiles, instead of the legitimate 'Program Files' directory.
This rule detects multiple stages of activity associated with BaqiyatLock ransomware and Remcos RAT. It identifies the execution of known BaqiyatLock/Remcos files, attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via ms-settings registry hijack, creation of files with the '.bqtlock' extension indicative of BaqiyatLock encryption, and network communication with 'icanhazip.com' for external IP discovery, which is a common reconnaissance step.
Detects modifications to the 'User Shell Folders' registry key, which can be abused by adversaries to alter the location of special folders (e.g., Desktop, Documents) to point to attacker-controlled locations, potentially for persistence or data staging.
Detects attempts to aggressively hijack file associations by modifying the Windows Registry using 'reg.exe' or 'cmd.exe'. Specifically looks for command-line arguments indicating deletion of 'UserChoice' registry keys (which define default applications for file types) and addition of 'ApplicationAssociationToasts' keys (which can suppress notifications related to file association changes). This behavior is indicative of an attacker trying to silently change default applications to maintain persistence or execute malicious code.
This rule detects attempts to hijack file associations by monitoring command-line executions of 'cmd.exe' or 'reg.exe' that involve deleting 'UserChoice' registry keys or adding 'ApplicationAssociationToasts'. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to modify default program associations to achieve persistence or execute malicious code.
Detects Windows registry run keys executing processes out of suspicious paths, for establishing persistence
Detects scripts modifying Windows registry run keys for establishing persistence
This rule detects when a process, potentially a Go-compiled binary (indicated by 'go' in the command line), establishes persistence by creating or modifying a registry run key or by dropping a file in a startup folder. This behavior is associated with the Moonrise RAT.
This rule detects suspicious modifications to Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) configurations via `reg.exe` and `netsh.exe`. Specifically, it looks for attempts to enable RDP by setting `fDenyTSConnections` to 0, modify the `UserAuthentication` setting in `RDP-Tcp` to 0, or add a firewall rule to allow RDP traffic on port 3389. These actions can indicate an adversary attempting to establish or facilitate remote access to a system.
Detects a high volume of modifications to the default 'open' command for various file extensions in the registry. This technique is used by malware to prevent users from running applications or opening documents, effectively causing a denial of service.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain associated with BQTLock and GREENBLOOD ransomware. It identifies the staging of registry keys for a fodhelper UAC bypass, the subsequent execution of fodhelper.exe, the creation of run-key persistence, and the execution of processes containing the keyword 'greenblood' in their command line, indicating the final payload or related activity.
This rule detects attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by monitoring modifications or creations of specific registry keys. Adversaries often manipulate these registry keys to achieve privilege escalation without triggering a UAC prompt, allowing them to execute malicious code with elevated permissions. The rule specifically looks for changes to registry paths commonly abused in UAC bypass techniques, such as those related to ms-settings, mscfile, Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript, exefile, Folder, and Image File Execution Options.
This rule detects various activities associated with the FoxKitsune malware, including network staging, suspicious file drops in SysWOW64, unusual svchost execution, service persistence, and attempts to tamper with Windows Defender. It correlates these events to identify potential FoxKitsune infections.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving the Windows RunMRU registry key followed by a process launch. Specifically, it looks for modifications to the `RunMRU` registry key that contain certain suspicious strings (e.g., `nslookup`, `dig`, `powershell`, `cmd.exe`, `curl`, `wget`, `certutil`, `bitsadmin`, or various command-line obfuscation/download patterns). Subsequently, it correlates this registry modification with a process launch on the same host and by the same user, where the process command line also contains one of these suspicious strings. This behavior could indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or execute malicious commands.
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