Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious modification of the Windows TIP AggregateResults registry key with large data indicative of persistence.
Detects a combination of suspicious registry persistence under the Microsoft TIP AggregateResults key and PowerShell launched with ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted referencing LunarApplication. Based on publicly described artefacts and intended for tuning and validation.
Detects XWorm V6 adding update.vbs to the Run registry key in APPDATA or TEMP directories
This rule detects various activities associated with the 'CrashFix' variant of the 'Clickfix' malware, which deploys a Python-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The detection logic covers several stages of the attack:
1. **Browser Extension Installation**: Identifies the creation of a specific malicious Chrome extension file (.crx) with a unique identifier.
2. **Command and Control (C2) Traffic**: Monitors network connections to known malicious URLs and IP addresses associated with the malware's C2 infrastructure.
3. **Malicious Hashes**: Detects the execution of processes with specific SHA256 hashes known to belong to the CrashFix malware.
4. **LOLBIN Abuse**: Identifies the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) like 'finger.exe' and 'ct.exe' in suspicious command-line combinations, potentially for discovery or execution.
5. **Malicious IP Communication**: Looks for network connections initiated by 'ct.exe' with the 'confirm' argument, indicating communication with potentially malicious remote IPs.
6. **Python TTPs**: Detects Python execution patterns, specifically 'pythonw.exe' running 'modes.py' and making outbound network connections to non-local IPs, indicative of the Python RAT.
7. **Persistence via Registry Run Key**: Monitors for registry modifications related to 'pythonw.exe modes.py', suggesting persistence mechanisms.
8. **Persistence via Scheduled Task**: Identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute 'run.exe' and 'udp.pyw', another persistence method.
1. **Browser Extension Installation**: Identifies the creation of a specific malicious Chrome extension file (.crx) with a unique identifier.
2. **Command and Control (C2) Traffic**: Monitors network connections to known malicious URLs and IP addresses associated with the malware's C2 infrastructure.
3. **Malicious Hashes**: Detects the execution of processes with specific SHA256 hashes known to belong to the CrashFix malware.
4. **LOLBIN Abuse**: Identifies the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) like 'finger.exe' and 'ct.exe' in suspicious command-line combinations, potentially for discovery or execution.
5. **Malicious IP Communication**: Looks for network connections initiated by 'ct.exe' with the 'confirm' argument, indicating communication with potentially malicious remote IPs.
6. **Python TTPs**: Detects Python execution patterns, specifically 'pythonw.exe' running 'modes.py' and making outbound network connections to non-local IPs, indicative of the Python RAT.
7. **Persistence via Registry Run Key**: Monitors for registry modifications related to 'pythonw.exe modes.py', suggesting persistence mechanisms.
8. **Persistence via Scheduled Task**: Identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute 'run.exe' and 'udp.pyw', another persistence method.
This YARA rule set detects various artifacts associated with the Remcos RAT 'ClickFix' campaign. The rules identify persistence mechanisms (registry run keys or scripts involving 'Shotcut video editor', '2120206', and 'shotcut.exe' for DLL sideloading), archive or path indicators ('2120206' and 'shotcut.exe'), clipboard scripts used for dropping malware related to the Shotcut DLL sideloading technique.
Detects modifications to the Image File Execution Options (IFEO) or SilentProcessExit registry keys, which can be abused for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion. Adversaries may use these mechanisms to attach debuggers or monitor programs to legitimate executables, causing malicious code to run when the target application starts or exits.
thx to Maurice Fielenbach for Sharing this Attack Path on Linkedin
thx to Maurice Fielenbach for Sharing this Attack Path on Linkedin
Detects TTPs associated with the Lazarus Group malware families OtterCookie and BeaverTail. This rule identifies persistence via registry run keys and scheduled tasks, suspicious node.js execution for keylogging, and network connections to known C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects potential malware execution and persistence by correlating suspicious script and HTA activity with known malicious infrastructure. It flags mshta, wscript, and cscript executing remote HTA or script content, related network connections and downloads, temporary file artefacts, connections to listed suspicious domains and IPs, attempts to add Windows Defender exclusions, and fake browser update style process launches that retrieve executables over HTTP.
Detects the modification of registry keys to disable Windows Defender Credential Guard. Disabling this security feature can expose credentials to theft and is a common precursor to lateral movement.
This query detects attempts to disable or modify critical security services using either the 'sc.exe' utility or direct registry modification. This is a common defense evasion technique used by adversaries to weaken a system's security posture before performing further actions.
Detects potential Remcos RAT installation by correlating the creation of an executable in a user's AppData directory with the creation of a registry run key for persistence.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks used for persistence by fake PDF converter malware. These tasks are created in the registry under the TaskCache tree.
This rule detects attempts to use the Windows registry key 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\TypedPaths' to execute potentially malicious commands. It specifically looks for the presence of 'powershell', 'mshta', 'certutil', 'curl', 'bitsadmin', or 'wget' within the registry data associated with this key. This technique can be used for persistence or execution of malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of Mimikatz for credential dumping shortly after the WDigest 'UseLogonCredential' registry key is enabled. This combination of TTPs is associated with the Qilin ransomware group.
Detects modifications to critical registry settings that weaken security controls related to NTLM authentication, Restricted Admin mode, and RDP security. The rule specifically looks for disabling NTLM traffic restrictions (RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic set to 0), disabling Restricted Admin mode (DisableRestrictedAdmin set to 0), or weakening RDP security by setting the SecurityLayer to '1'. An alert is generated if two or more such modifications occur within a 7-day timeframe.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry keys related to Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) configuration. Malware like DarkGate is known to manipulate these settings to enable or modify RDP for persistence and remote access.
Detects modifications to the Windows Registry that disable critical security features, specifically related to Restricted Admin Mode, UAC remote token filtering, and DSRM logon behavior. Ink Dragon uses these modifications to facilitate lateral movement and maintain domain dominance.
Detects indicators associated with a watering hole attack originating from a compromised xubuntu.org website. This includes the creation of a tampered 'tos.txt' file, the dropping and execution of a trojanized dropper ('elzvcf.exe') in AppData\Roaming, and the establishment of persistence via a registry Run key.
Detects Component Object Model (COM) hijacking used by the ForumTroll APT group for persistence. This rule identifies modifications to the registry where a malicious DLL is registered to be loaded by legitimate processes by overriding the CLSID for twinapi.dll in the HKEY_CURRENT_USER hive.
This rule detects the creation of executable files (.exe, .dll, .pyd) within browser extension folders (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) followed by a related registry modification within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of malicious browser extension installation or modification, often used for persistence or data exfiltration.
Detects the possible addition of shadow credentials to an Active Directory object by monitoring for Event ID 5136 (Directory Service Changes) where the 'msDS-KeyCredentialLink' attribute is modified. This attribute is used in shadow credential attacks to establish persistence and gain unauthorized access.
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