Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
442 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
177
95
67
56
11
Contributors
86
58
55
51
21
Categories
20,417
11,806
5,870
5,145
4,864
Platforms
441
8
3
3
1
Products / Services
144
116
86
36
21
MITRE Techniques
343
237
197
130
121
CVEs
3
2
1
1
1
IDS Classtypes
10
IDS Protocols
10
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events: first, a modification to the 'ExtensionInstallForcelist' registry key, followed within one hour by access to browser credential stores (specifically 'Login Data' or 'Cookies' files). This combination suggests an attacker might be attempting to force the installation of a malicious browser extension to steal credentials.
Detects a process launching from the USOShared or firefx public folders and subsequently modifying the registry. This activity is associated with the Operation XENOFISCAL campaign, which has been observed deploying the Xenorat RAT.
This rule detects when VBScript (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) attempts to modify critical system policies in the Windows Registry, specifically those related to 'Policies\System', 'Policies\Windows', or 'UserAccessControl'. This activity can indicate an attempt to alter system behavior, disable security features, or bypass User Account Control (UAC).
This rule detects attempts to impair defensive mechanisms by creating or modifying Quality of Service (QoS) policies that specifically target Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) or Antivirus (AV) processes. Adversaries may use QoS policies to throttle network traffic for security products, hindering their ability to communicate with central management or cloud services, thus impairing their effectiveness. The rule looks for command-line arguments used to create or set QoS policies (`New-NetQosPolicy`, `Set-NetQosPolicy`) that include throttling parameters (`ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond`, `AppPathNameMatchCondition`) and target common EDR/AV process names. It also detects direct registry modifications to QoS policies (`\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\QOS`) that include EDR/AV process names.
Detects modifications to CommonGlobUserSettings, used by Makop for UI/shell behavior manipulation.
Detects modifications to COM InprocServer32 registry keys under HKEY_CURRENT_USER. This activity is often associated with COM hijacking, a technique used by adversaries to achieve persistence or execute malicious code when a hijacked COM object is invoked by legitimate applications. The rule specifically flags suspicious or non-Microsoft COM registrations, particularly those pointing to files within the user's AppData/Local directory.
Identifies the creation or modification of the 'NvmProtocal' registry value within the CurrentVersion\Run key. This mechanism is used by the cross-platform infostealer associated with the compromised Mastra npm packages to maintain persistence across system reboots.
This rule detects various activities associated with suspicious implants, including file creation/execution, process execution, DLL loading (potential injection), and persistence via Run registry keys. It specifically looks for files named 'senti.dll', 'Thal.exe', and mentions 'PhantomBackdoor' and 'TencShell' as suspicious artifacts.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with 'Operation Poisson', specifically focusing on the creation of a scheduled task named 'TaskAdmin1' with highest privileges that launches 'wscript.exe' with 'sys.vbs' at logon, or the use of Registry Run keys to achieve similar persistence with 'sys.vbs'. It also detects the execution of 'wscript.exe' with 'sys.vbs'.
Detects the creation or modification of a registry run key that uses a name similar to '.NET Runtime Optimization Service' and points to a suspicious location within 'C:\ProgramData\'. This technique is often used by adversaries to establish persistence on a system by masquerading as legitimate software.
Detects a script process creating files in a specific HP-themed path and then creating a Run key for persistence, indicative of the Turla Kazuar VBScript dropper.
Detects modifications to the Windows Svchost registry key adding 'Brn_Agent', a technique used by Vidar to load its malicious DLL via svchost.exe. This specific registry modification indicates an attempt to establish persistence.
This rule detects attempts to establish persistence for 'vds.exe' (Virtual Disk Service) by modifying the Image File Execution Options (IFEO) registry key to point its debugger to an executable located within the Windows Fonts directory. This technique is often used by adversaries to maintain access or elevate privileges, as the Fonts directory is typically writable by standard users and can be used to hide malicious executables.
Udm Hola Monitor Service
YARA-L
This rule detects modifications to the Windows Registry related to the 'hola_monitor_svc' service. Specifically, it looks for registry keys containing 'services\hola_monitor_svc' and registry value data or process command lines that include 'holamonitorservice.exe'. This activity indicates the configuration or presence of the Hola Monitor Service, which could be associated with the Hola VPN application.
This rule detects persistence attempts using Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debugger redirection for 'vds.exe'. Specifically, it looks for registry modifications where the 'debugger' value for 'vds.exe' points to an executable located within the 'Windows\Fonts' directory. This technique is often used by adversaries to maintain access or elevate privileges by hijacking legitimate application execution.
Identifies Run/RunOnce registry modifications pointing to binaries located in anomalous, hidden folders, specifically within the AppData\LocalLow directory.
Detects the creation or modification of registry run keys that establish persistence by executing programs from user-specific application data folders (AppData\Roaming or %APPDATA%) with randomized names. This rule specifically excludes legitimate Windows and Program Files paths to reduce false positives.
Detects disabling of Windows Defender through registry modifications
Correlates the malicious ms-settings registry hijack with the execution of the auto-elevating ComputerDefaults.exe. This rule detects a specific UAC bypass technique where an attacker modifies the 'ms-settings' registry key to point to a malicious executable, which is then launched when 'ComputerDefaults.exe' is executed, leading to privilege escalation.
Detects the creation or modification of registry run keys that establish persistence by executing programs from user-specific application data folders (AppData\Roaming or %APPDATA%) with randomized names. This rule specifically excludes legitimate Windows and Program Files paths to reduce false positives.
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender features by modifying specific registry values. This rule looks for changes to registry keys under `\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender` where values like `DisableAntiSpyware`, `DisableRealtimeMonitoring`, `DisableBehaviorMonitoring`, or `DisableIOAVProtection` are set to '1', indicating an attempt to disable these security features.
Page 8 of 22