Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
24 detections
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Detects observable hiding actions targeting ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) clients, such as modifying registry keys to hide uninstall entries, using attrib.exe to set hidden attributes, or launching management tools with hidden window styles.
Detects the deletion of Chrome registry keys related to extension integrity verification. This behavior is often associated with browser-based attacks, such as malware or malicious extensions attempting to tamper with browser security configurations to enable persistent browser hijacking or unauthorized extension modification.
Detects the removal of persistence mechanisms related to the 'ComponentTask33Agent' task, specifically the deletion of a scheduled task or registry Run key, followed by the deletion of associated files within specific Microsoft-themed AppData subdirectories within a 30-minute window.
Detects evidence of anti-forensic activities associated with the SparroWocky toolset. The rule monitors for the removal of the 'ProcAuditManager' service, deletion of the 'SnapCart' registry key, and the execution of a self-deleting batch script used to remove forensic artifacts.
Detects the deletion of Google Chrome browser extension settings from the Windows Registry. Adversaries often target the 'extensions.settings' registry value under 'PreferenceMACs' to disable security extensions, force the installation of malicious extensions, or tamper with browser-based security controls.
Detects the deletion of registry keys or values associated with Chrome extension settings by processes other than chrome.exe. This activity is often associated with the removal or tampering of browser extension configurations to maintain persistence, bypass security, or disable malicious extensions during an incident response or by an attacker.
Detects the deletion of registry keys or values associated with Chrome extension settings by processes other than chrome.exe. This activity is often associated with the removal or tampering of browser extension configurations to maintain persistence, bypass security, or disable malicious extensions during an incident response or by an attacker.
Detects the deletion of registry keys or values associated with Chrome extension settings by processes other than chrome.exe. This activity is often associated with the removal or tampering of browser extension configurations to maintain persistence, bypass security, or disable malicious extensions during an incident response or by an attacker.
Detects the deletion of registry keys or values associated with Google Chrome's extension settings preferences. This activity may indicate an attempt to disable installed extensions or tamper with browser security configurations.
Detects the deletion of the registry key responsible for Chrome extension integrity verification (PreferenceMACs). Deleting this key allows an adversary to tamper with installed Chrome extensions without triggering security warnings. This activity has been observed in the Rapuncel campaign.
Detects the deletion of the registry key responsible for Chrome extension integrity verification (PreferenceMACs). Deleting this key allows an adversary to tamper with installed Chrome extensions without triggering security warnings. This activity has been observed in the Rapuncel campaign.
Detects attempts to tamper with or destroy Windows Boot Configuration Data (BCD) using bcdedit.exe to weaken system security policies or registry-based deletion of the BCD store to inhibit system boot and recovery.
Detects a malicious teardown sequence involving the 'drvsvc' service being stopped or deleted in the registry, followed by the deletion of the 'C:\Windows\System32\drivers\drv.sys' file within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a driver redeployment process, often associated with the removal of security-disabling components.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry keys associated with Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger configurations or Event Log service configurations. These modifications can be used by adversaries to disable or tamper with event logging mechanisms, effectively blinding security telemetry and evading detection.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry keys associated with Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger configurations or Event Log service configurations. These modifications can be used by adversaries to disable or tamper with event logging mechanisms, effectively blinding security telemetry and evading detection.
Detects creation or modification of SilverFox/Sauron campaign-specific registry keys (Software\ODBDC, SOFTWARE\JDBCC, SOFTWARE\Sauron) and the 'revbs' value name used as infection state tracking markers.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with PowerShell logging mechanisms (Script Block Logging, Module Logging, Transcription) by modifying or deleting specific registry keys or setting their values to disable logging. This activity is often performed by adversaries to evade detection.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with PowerShell logging mechanisms (Script Block Logging, Module Logging, Transcription) by modifying or deleting specific registry keys or setting their values to disable logging. This activity is often performed by adversaries to evade detection.
Detects modifications to the Windows Defender exclusion registry key. This could indicate a potentially suspicious or even malicious activity by an attacker trying to add a new exclusion in order to bypass security.
Detects the creation of the 'WSPrint' scheduled task followed by specific registry modifications intended to hide the task from the Task Scheduler UI. This is a known persistence technique used by the UAT-9244 actor for its TernDoor backdoor.
This rule detects attempts to clear the connection history for Microsoft Terminal Server Client (MSTSC) by deleting specific registry keys or values. This activity can be performed by an attacker to remove forensic evidence of their remote access to a system.
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