Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
881 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
442
92
80
78
55
Contributors
228
168
138
43
37
Categories
20,440
11,814
5,871
5,145
4,864
881
Platforms
595
135
115
71
51
Products / Services
204
150
139
78
67
MITRE Techniques
314
263
221
214
207
CVEs
15
12
4
4
3
IDS Classtypes
20
13
10
8
3
IDS Protocols
24
14
12
1
This rule detects potentially malicious activity leveraging the Windows Remote Management (WinRM) protocol over HTTP (ports 5985/5986). It specifically monitors for POST requests to the '/wsman' URI that contain the string 'powershell' in the request body, which is indicative of remote command execution via WinRM using PowerShell.
Detects potential SSH reverse tunneling or SOCKS proxying, often used by threat actors like Akira or associated with Bumblebee loaders, to establish persistent C2 channels. The rule monitors process execution of plink.exe and ssh.exe with suspicious arguments (e.g., -R, -D, -N), network connections to known malicious C2 IP addresses, and SSH tunnel processes running as SYSTEM or spawned by non-interactive service-related processes.
This rule detects a high volume of remote desktop session changes (logon/logoff) for a single user within a one-hour window. Event IDs 4778 and 4779 indicate a session reconnected or disconnected, respectively. A high count (>=10) could suggest suspicious activity such as session hijacking, rapid reconnections by an attacker, or automated tools interacting with remote sessions.
Detects network connections over port 3389 (RDP) initiated by processes other than standard Remote Desktop clients (mstsc.exe). This rule specifically looks for suspicious indicators such as execution from non-standard or temporary file paths, or the use of common living-off-the-land binaries (like powershell.exe, cmd.exe, rundll32.exe) that might be acting as a proxy for remote access or lateral movement.
Detects unauthorized access and command execution associated with MSP service accounts. The rule triggers on successful SSH authentication using specific service account names (e.g., egnyteservice) followed by the execution of interactive shells under those same service account contexts, which is indicative of potential lateral movement or compromise in downstream environments.
Detects SSH, SFTP, or SCP connections originating from internal edge appliances such as pfSense firewalls or Synology NAS devices directed at internal network hosts. This activity is consistent with VerdantBamboo BRICKSTORM lateral movement, where compromised edge infrastructure is leveraged as a pivot point to gain access to the internal network.
This rule detects the execution of Quick Assist (quickassist.exe) or Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe) in scenarios where the parent process, causality chain, or command line includes references to Microsoft Teams. This behavior is indicative of social engineering attempts where attackers impersonate IT support via Teams to induce users to launch remote access tools, a tactic observed in campaigns like BlackBasta.
Detects the execution of known remote access tools (e.g., AnyDesk, SyncFuture) or processes originating from common user-writable directories (AppData, Temp, Local) that subsequently spawn other processes within these same user-writable directories. This pattern is commonly observed in malware staging or the misuse of remote support tools for unauthorized access.
Detects the execution of remote monitoring and management (RMM) binaries AnyDesk or SyncFuture when launched by suspicious parent processes commonly associated with phishing delivery chains (e.g., mshta, wscript, cmd, powershell), or when executed from user-writable directories like Temp or AppData, which is a common pattern for persistent remote access abuse.
Detects execution of the RustDesk remote access tool from non-standard, user-writable directories, or when spawned by suspicious parent processes such as shells or scripting hosts. This rule is designed to identify unauthorized use of RustDesk as a persistence or remote access mechanism by adversaries attempting to bypass standard software management.
Detects the spawning of common command-line shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, net.exe) by the Windows Remote Management (WinRM) process, wsmprovhost.exe. This activity is indicative of lateral movement or remote command execution via WinRM.
This rule detects a high volume (5 or more within an hour) of process creation events where the command line contains keywords associated with remote access protocols like DCOM, WMI, or RPC. This could indicate an adversary utilizing these protocols for lateral movement or remote execution.
This rule detects successful SSH login attempts from external IP addresses (not within common private IP ranges). It specifically looks for 'Accepted' messages in syslog from the 'sshd' process and filters out internal source IPs.
Detects suspicious WinRM SOAPAction headers indicating potential lateral movement or remote command execution (e.g., shell command, process creation, or WMI operations) over WinRM HTTP ports 5985 and 5986.
Detects the execution of VS Code Tunnel processes (code-tunnel.exe or code.exe with tunnel arguments) initiated by processes other than standard development-related parent processes (e.g., explorer, terminal, IDEs). This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistent unauthorized remote access to a compromised host using the VS Code Tunnel functionality.
Detects potential lateral movement activity involving Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The rule monitors for common WinRM-related tools (winrs.exe), PowerShell WinRM cmdlets (e.g., Invoke-Command) targeting non-local systems, and the spawning of suspicious processes by the WinRM host process (wsmprovhost.exe).
Identifies anomalous session cookie replays where a user token logs in without interactive MFA from an entirely different geographic location within minutes. This rule specifically looks for non-interactive sessions (IsInteractive == false) where a single AccountUpn (user) has IP addresses from two or more distinct geographic locations within a 30-minute window.
Detects potential lateral movement activity where PowerShell or the Windows Remote Management (WinRM) host process (wsmprovhost.exe) initiates network connections to multiple distinct destination IP addresses over the WinRM default ports (5985/5986). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary using legitimate remote administration tools to pivot or spread across a network.
This rule detects suspicious network connections originating from internal IP addresses to common service ports (DNS, SMB, RDP, WinRM) on remote, non-internal IP addresses. It flags instances where a single process on a device makes 10 or more such connections within an hour, which could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data exfiltration attempts.
This rule detects the execution of known remote access tools (such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or RustDesk) that are spawned as child processes from common web browsers. It correlates process creation events with subsequent network connections by these tools to public IP addresses over specific ports commonly used by remote access software, within a 30-minute timeframe of the process start.
Detects the execution of Dropbear SSH binaries (dropbear, dropbearkey, dropbearmulti) on identified OT, ICS, or SCADA assets. The rule flags suspicious configurations such as the use of non-standard ports (2222, 44818), remote port forwarding, or running in the foreground, which may indicate unauthorized remote access or tunneling on sensitive operational technology infrastructure.
Page 22 of 42