Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
881 detections
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Detects the execution of unauthorized Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools shortly after either Microsoft Teams activity or a surge of inbound emails (email bombing) targeting the same user, a common precursor pattern used by threat actors for social engineering and initial access.
Detects the installation or execution of unauthorized Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools such as MeshCentral, Atera, Teramind, AnyDesk, or AdaptixC2 artifacts on endpoints. It flags devices running multiple distinct RMM tools or featuring AdaptixC2.
Detects Akamai SIEM logs for PHP2Shell exploitation attempts associated with CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619
Detects a sequence of events on Linux hosts involving a remote interactive or network logon from an external IP, followed within 5 minutes by root-level process execution, and subsequently within 2 hours by an outbound SSH connection to a private or known attacker IP. Also includes a separate branch for direct logons from known malicious IPs.
Detects Kerberos service ticket principal name (SPN) enumeration or exposure events occurring shortly after the execution of common remote access tools (such as Quick Assist, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Atera, Zoho Assist, NetSupport, or LogMeIn) on the same device.
Detects the sequence where a private key file is written to the host followed by the execution of ssh.exe with parameters indicating a reverse port forwarding tunnel (-R), an identity file (-i), and background execution (-N or -f) within a 30-minute window.
Detects the execution of OpenConnect VPN clients on non-sanctioned devices followed within a 4-hour window by high-volume internal network connections across multiple ports indicative of network service discovery or pivoting activity.
Detects the installation or service setup of unauthorized remote access tools (such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or ScreenConnect) followed by outbound public network connections from the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects the execution of Microsoft Quick Assist followed by a different remote access tool (RAT) or remote monitoring and management (RMM) utility on the same device within a 24-hour window, which may indicate adversary staging or persistence establishment.
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools within a 30-minute window following Microsoft Teams network activity on the same device, which can be an indicator of unauthorized remote access or interactive command and control setup via remote support applications.
Correlates Microsoft Teams process activity with the subsequent launch of a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool on the same device within 30 minutes, potentially indicating social engineering or hands-on-keyboard access following external communications.
Detects the execution of unapproved Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software tools followed by subsequent outbound public IP network activity from the same process on the same device, indicating an active remote session.
Detects successful Palo Alto GlobalProtect VPN authentications where no Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge or related text is recorded in the firewall logs, and no corresponding successful MFA sign-in event is found in Entra ID (SigninLogs).
Detects the correlation of remote execution tools (such as PsExec, WinRM, or specific PowerShell remote execution commands) with RDP or ScreenConnect remote management activity on the same device within a one-hour window, potentially indicating lateral movement or unauthorized remote control.
Detects a sequence where a device exhibits Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool execution followed by high-volume outbound network connections to consumer cloud storage services (such as OneDrive or Google Drive) from the same device, potentially indicating data exfiltration via RMM.
Detects newly seen devices (no Tailscale process activity in the prior 30 days) executing Tailscale enrollment or login commands followed by outbound network connections to Tailscale control infrastructure within 10 minutes, potentially indicating unauthorized VPN tunneling.
Detects the execution of NetSupport Manager client binaries (client32.exe or pcictlui.exe) from user-writable directories such as AppData, ProgramData, or Public folders, optionally spawned by script loaders or command interpreters.
The following analytic detects network traffic associated with known remote access software applications, such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer.
It leverages Palo Alto traffic logs mapped to the Network_Traffic data model in Splunk. This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
It leverages Palo Alto traffic logs mapped to the Network_Traffic data model in Splunk. This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
Detects non-root SSH execution performing remote port forwarding (-R) targeting a Unix socket bind on hosts running the tailscaled daemon, excluding known automation tools.
Detects VPN connection events where the client hostname contains the string 'kali', which may indicate the use of a penetration testing operating system or a suspicious device connecting to the corporate network via Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect.
Detects potential data exfiltration activity where a device first exhibits usage of a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool, followed by the execution of known data transfer or exfiltration utilities such as WinSCP or Rclone.
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