Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of common command-line interface tools (such as PowerShell, cmd, wscript, and certutil) spawned by the SimpleHelp remote support binary ('simplehelp.exe'). It also monitors for specific network connections associated with the SimpleHelp infrastructure (IP 96.126.130.126 on port 58942) that may indicate remote support activity or misuse of the platform.
Detects external Microsoft Teams calls involving screen sharing and impersonation of trusted entities. This rule identifies high-risk credential theft or RAT installation vectors by filtering for calls where screen sharing occurs and the `identity_name` (likely the external caller's domain or display name) matches patterns associated with free/abused TLDs, cheap/throwaway TLDs, phishing-common TLDs, high-risk specialty TLDs, PHaaS kit TLDs, or impersonates common trusted entities like 'microsoft', 'helpdesk', 'it.support', 'admin', 'security.team', 'apple', 'google', 'amazon', 'paypal', 'bank', etc.
Detects the use of 'sshpass' with disabled host key checking ('StrictHostKeyChecking=no') to automate SSH connections. The rule specifically targets command lines referencing administrative accounts ('psoft', 'oracle', 'linuxadm'), a technique associated with ShinyHunters lateral movement activity.
Detects the execution of MeshCentral agent commands, specifically the 'RunCommand' feature, which is often used by adversaries for post-compromise remote command execution and payload staging. This rule monitors both endpoint process activity and system logs for command-line arguments involving meshctrl.js and RunCommand.
This rule detects potential session token replay attacks against Okta by identifying a single Okta session (externalSessionId) being used from multiple distinct origins. It specifically looks for divergence in device identity (dtHash), operating system (OS), or client country within the same session, rather than just multiple IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of a stolen post-MFA cookie being replayed by an attacker.
This rule detects successful SSH authentications using the GSSAPI-with-MIC mechanism. This can indicate legitimate user logins or, in some cases, an adversary using valid credentials to access a system via SSH.
This rule detects anomalous activities associated with RustDesk, such as spawning suspicious child processes, dropping files related to known session permission bypass proof-of-concepts, communicating with non-standard relay servers, or performing file write operations in sensitive system temporary directories, which indicates potential session hijacking or unauthorized remote access.
Detects the execution of Visual Studio Code (code.exe or code-tunnel) with command-line arguments indicative of remote access, tunneling, or server functionality. This behavior can be legitimate for developers or IT administrators but may also be abused by adversaries for command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects execution of Windows remote assistance tools like Quick Assist, msrdcw, or msra when spawned by unexpected parent processes, or when spawned by Microsoft Teams. This behavior may indicate an adversary abusing legitimate remote access software to maintain persistence, conduct lateral movement, or gain interactive access to a compromised system.
Detects the execution of known remote access and monitoring software (RMM/RAT) when launched as a child process of common web browsers or email clients. This behavioral pattern is frequently observed in phishing attacks where users are tricked into downloading and executing remote support tools, a technique often associated with the Luna Moth (Silent Ransom Group) campaign.
This rule detects the execution of RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) installers (Atera or SimpleHelp) via msiexec.exe or setup.exe when launched from directories commonly used for downloads (Temp/Downloads) and originating from web browsers or Microsoft Office applications. This behavior is indicative of a potential drive-by download or phishing attack aimed at installing unauthorized remote access software.
Detects Payouts King ransomware operator TTPs involving Microsoft Teams social engineering followed by Windows Quick Assist (msra.exe) abuse. The rule monitors for three primary indicators: Teams spawning Quick Assist, Quick Assist being launched with remote session-initiation flags, and Quick Assist spawning suspicious child processes (cmd, powershell, etc.) or network utilities (curl, certutil, bitsadmin) characteristic of post-exploitation payload delivery.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized or suspicious Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) activity by monitoring for instances of 'mstsc.exe' initiated with specific command-line arguments, or identifying child processes spawned by RDP-related binaries ('mstsc.exe', 'rdpclip.exe') that are not typically associated with standard RDP functionality.
Identifies ScreenConnect client service execution initiated by trusted system processes (dfsvc.exe, services.exe) while referencing suspicious top-level domains (.top, .info, .site, .tk, .xyz, .pw, .ml, .club, .cf, ws) in the command line. This activity may indicate unauthorized remote access deployment or abuse of legitimate remote access tools.
Detects named pipe activity with remote access enabled, initiated by JsonVMAccessExtension.exe running as SYSTEM. This may indicate abuse of the Azure VM Access Extension for unauthorized remote access.
Detects a high frequency of incoming TCP SYN packets targeting port 3389 (RDP) from a single source within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of a brute-force or credential-stuffing attack against Remote Desktop services.
Detects the execution of ScreenConnect (ConnectWise) remote support client processes with command line arguments indicative of a remote session initiation (e.g., Guest access connection). This pattern is often used by adversaries to establish persistence or remote control of compromised systems.
Detects the execution of known remote access and remote management tools (e.g., TeamViewer, AnyDesk) where the process was initiated by a web browser, suggesting potential drive-by downloads or social engineering attacks involving remote access software.
This rule detects a high volume (5 or more within an hour) of process creation events where the command line contains keywords associated with remote access protocols like DCOM, WMI, or RPC. This could indicate an adversary utilizing these protocols for lateral movement or remote execution.
Detects the specific ShinyHunters lateral movement pattern involving automated SSH credential spraying using 'sshpass' or rapid SSH connections to multiple hosts with PeopleSoft admin accounts, often after reading '/etc/hosts'. The rule identifies suspicious SSH activity by looking for 'sshpass' execution or multiple 'ssh' commands with specific PeopleSoft-related usernames, potentially preceded by commands to read '/etc/hosts'.
Detects the use of 'sshpass' to automate SSH authentication, often used for lateral movement. The rule monitors command lines for the 'sshpass' utility combined with 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no' and specific service accounts (psoft, oracle, linuxadm) often targeted by threat actors such as ShinyHunters.
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