Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a browser-downloaded installer spawning ScreenConnect or another remote management client without an established software deployment parent. This rule identifies suspicious process creation where a known installer executable, likely downloaded from a browser (indicated by paths like Downloads, Temp, or AppData), initiates a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool such as ScreenConnect or ConnectWiseControl. This behavior can indicate an adversary establishing remote access.
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools (e.g., AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Atera, Action1) from user-writable directories such as Temp, Downloads, or INetCache. Adversaries frequently utilize these legitimate remote access tools to establish persistence or command-and-control channels, often dropping them into temporary directories to avoid detection.
Detects the execution of Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software initiated by common Windows script interpreters. This pattern is indicative of unauthorized deployment of remote access tools, often used by adversaries to establish persistence and command-and-control channels following initial compromise.
Sshpass Lateral Movement
YARA-L
Detects sshpass automation usage by administrative accounts
Monitors for the use of 'sshpass' to automate SSH logins using specific accounts commonly associated with Oracle/PeopleSoft administration (psoft, oracle, linuxadm). This technique was observed in ShinyHunters attacks.
Detects the deployment and execution of the MeshCentral remote management agent on PeopleSoft servers, which is indicative of unauthorized access by the ShinyHunters threat group. The rule triggers on the execution of the meshctrl.js script using the RunCommand function with suspicious loopback WebSocket connections, or the direct execution of the meshagent binary from within the /opt/meshcentral/ directory.
This rule detects inbound Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections (ports 3389, 3390, 3391) that are initiated by common scripting engines such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe. This behavior can be indicative of post-exploitation activity where an attacker uses scripts to establish remote access.
Detects SSH network connections initiated by common administrative service accounts 'vmanage-admin' or 'troot' using the ssh or sshd process. This pattern may indicate unauthorized use of these service accounts or anomalous remote access behavior.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user initiates an outbound RDP connection using mstsc.exe on port 3389, followed shortly by the execution of a file named MicrosoftUpdateOneDrive.exe. This behavior is indicative of the Turla threat group deploying their STOCKSTAY.MARKETMAKER malware via an RDP-based phishing lure.
Detects session hijacking consistent with Browser-in-the-Middle (BitM) attacks like Bluekit PhaaS, where an attacker captures an authenticated session token. The rule identifies instances where a successful MFA-protected login event is immediately followed by a session reuse event from a different IP address or network location, which is indicative of the attacker utilizing the intercepted session.
This rule detects a high frequency of successful network connections from a single device to multiple unique destination IP addresses within a one-hour window. The targeted ports (445, 139, 3389, 22, 21) are commonly used for remote administrative access, file transfers, and remote shell services, which are frequently leveraged by adversaries for lateral movement. The threshold of 3 unique targets in an hour may indicate automated scanning or credential brute-forcing activity across the network.
This rule detects connection attempts to common administrative and remote access ports (RDP, SSH, SMB, RPC) from non-internal IP address ranges. Such activity may indicate an attempt to bypass Zero-Trust network policies or unauthorized remote access attempts from external or untrusted segments.
Detects network flows to RustDesk relay server ports (21115, 21116, 21117) characterized by anomalous connection patterns. The rule identifies hosts exhibiting rapid, repeated connection attempts or connections to multiple distinct relay IP addresses within a short timeframe. This behavior is consistent with the 'rustdesk-session-permission-pocs' technique, which may indicate an attacker attempting to establish a remote session while bypassing the standard permission handshake exchange required by the application.
This detection identifies when a Managed Identity (Service Principal) executes a 'RunCommand' on a virtual machine. This activity is a key indicator of lateral movement, where an attacker, having compromised a resource with a Managed Identity, uses that identity's permissions to execute code on another VM.
Detects MFA factor activation, device enrollment, and password resets originating from residential/commercial proxy infrastructure, often associated with threat groups like BlackFile/UNC6671/Cordial Spider.
Detects MFA factor activation, device enrollment, and password resets originating from residential/commercial proxy infrastructure, often associated with threat groups like BlackFile/UNC6671/Cordial Spider.
Detects a potential multi-stage attack sequence where a file (archive or browser-related) is executed, followed by a script interpreter (wscript/cscript), and finally followed by a remote connection to common remote access ports (RDP, FTP, SMB, SSH). The rule correlates these events within a specific timeframe per device to identify likely lateral movement or remote command and control initialization.
This rule detects when common document-handling applications (such as Microsoft Office suite or PDF readers) spawn known remote access and support tools. This behavior is highly indicative of vishing-based social engineering attacks, where a user is tricked into downloading and executing a remote management tool via a malicious document.
Detects the use of common archive utilities (tar, zip, 7z) by the Bomgar remote support service process (bomgar-rep.exe or bomgar-scc.exe). This pattern is often associated with post-exploitation data staging where an attacker compresses internal files prior to exfiltration.
This rule detects scenarios where a new local user account is created on a Windows system during off-hours (between 7 PM and 7 AM), followed by the execution of known remote access tools within a 30-minute window of that account creation. This combination is often indicative of unauthorized persistent access establishment.
Detects unusual internal SSH connections between private IP addresses that are not initiated by common, trusted administrative tools (like ssh.exe, putty.exe, etc.). The rule aggregates these connections by source and host to identify potential lateral movement.
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