Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
881 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
442
92
80
78
55
Contributors
228
168
138
43
37
Categories
20,440
11,814
5,871
5,145
4,864
881
Platforms
595
135
115
71
51
Products / Services
204
150
139
78
67
MITRE Techniques
314
263
221
214
207
CVEs
15
12
4
4
3
IDS Classtypes
20
13
10
8
3
IDS Protocols
24
14
12
1
This rule detects potential lateral movement activities using `wmic.exe`, `psexec.exe`, or `wmiprvse.exe`. It specifically looks for these executables being run with command-line arguments indicative of remote execution or specific PsExec usage (e.g., containing backslashes for paths, `/accepteula`, or `-s`). The rule then aggregates these events and flags instances where the same process command line is observed multiple times on a device, and there are distinct remote targets involved, suggesting coordinated lateral movement.
Detects attempts to hijack active remote sessions for lateral movement
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying a single user account attempting to log on to five or more distinct computers with at least ten logon attempts within a five-minute window. It specifically looks for successful logons (EventID 4624) with network, remote interactive, or remote desktop logon types (LogonType 3, 9, 10) and excludes machine accounts (TargetUserName not ending with '$'). This pattern can indicate an adversary attempting to spread across the network using compromised credentials.
This rule detects an account performing multiple interactive logons (LogonType 2) from at least 3 unique IP addresses within a 5-minute window. This behavior can indicate credential compromise or an adversary attempting to move laterally or access multiple systems using stolen credentials.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration or unauthorized copying of data from USB drives via an SSH SCP session. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 22 (SSH) within the home network, where the data flow is from the client to the server (upload). The rule triggers if the content of the SCP session includes both "/media/" and "/usb" (case-insensitive), indicating paths commonly associated with mounted USB devices on Linux systems, and the data size is greater than 1000 bytes. This suggests that contents from a USB drive are being copied off the system over SSH.
This rule detects direct SSH connections to cloud virtual machines (VMs) via a serial console interface. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic where the host header contains 'compute.googleapis.com' or 'cloudshell.googleapis.com' and the URI contains 'serialPort'. This indicates an attempt to establish an SSH session through the cloud provider's serial console service, which can be used for administrative access or lateral movement within a cloud environment.
This rule detects attempts to patch a Cisco IOS router image remotely via SSH. It specifically looks for the string "copy tftp flash" within TCP traffic destined for port 22 (SSH) on the home network, indicating a potential attempt to modify the router's operating system image from a TFTP server.
This rule detects a high volume of remote desktop session changes (logon/logoff) for a single user within a one-hour window. Event IDs 4778 and 4779 indicate a session reconnected or disconnected, respectively. A high count (>=10) could suggest suspicious activity such as session hijacking, rapid reconnections by an attacker, or automated tools interacting with remote sessions.
Detects the execution of Chrome Remote Desktop (remoting_host.exe) with daemon flags, which NightSpire ransomware operators use to establish persistence.
Detects VNC remote service access from external IP addresses
Identifies ScreenConnect client service execution initiated by trusted system processes (dfsvc.exe, services.exe) while referencing suspicious top-level domains (.top, .info, .site, .tk, .xyz, .pw, .ml, .club, .cf, ws) in the command line. This activity may indicate unauthorized remote access deployment or abuse of legitimate remote access tools.
This rule detects suspicious network connections originating from internal IP addresses to common service ports (DNS, SMB, RDP, WinRM) on remote, non-internal IP addresses. It flags instances where a single process on a device makes 10 or more such connections within an hour, which could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data exfiltration attempts.
This rule detects the use of SSH multiplexing, specifically the 'ControlMaster' feature, which can be leveraged for session hijacking. It triggers when the string 'ControlMaster' is observed in TCP traffic on port 22 (SSH) within the home network, indicating an attempt to establish or utilize an SSH multiplexing control channel. A threshold of 3 occurrences within 30 seconds from the same source IP is set to reduce false positives.
This rule detects network traffic where an HTTP request is made to 'ssm.amazonaws.com' with the URI containing 'StartSession'. This combination indicates the initiation of an AWS Systems Manager (SSM) Session Manager session, which can be used for legitimate remote administration but also for lateral movement by attackers.
This rule detects attempts to establish a VNC (Virtual Network Computing) remote desktop session to a host on the protected network. It specifically looks for TCP traffic destined for port 5900 (the default VNC port) and the presence of the 'RFB 00' string within the initial bytes of the connection, which is characteristic of the VNC RFB (Remote Framebuffer) protocol handshake.
This rule detects the use of TCP port 5938, which is commonly associated with the TeamViewer protocol. The rule is specifically looking for established connections to this port, indicating potential remote command and control (C2) activity. A threshold is set to trigger an alert if three such connections are observed from the same source within 60 seconds, aiming to reduce noise from legitimate, infrequent TeamViewer usage while still catching suspicious patterns.
Detects successful sign-ins to Microsoft Office applications using the device code flow (FOCI AppId d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c) that originate from an untrusted network location. This activity can indicate a device code phishing attack where an adversary has tricked a user into authenticating a malicious application.
This rule detects suspicious network connections originating from internal IP addresses to common service ports (DNS, SMB, RDP, WinRM) on remote, non-internal IP addresses. It flags instances where a single process on a device makes 10 or more such connections within an hour, which could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data exfiltration attempts.
This rule detects an attempt at RDP lateral movement by identifying multiple RDP connection attempts to a host within a short timeframe. It specifically looks for the RDP connection initiation sequence (hexadecimal content '|03 00 00|') on port 3389 (RDP default port) and triggers an alert if 5 such attempts are observed from the same source within 60 seconds. This behavior is indicative of an attacker trying to move laterally within a network using RDP.
This rule detects SSH connections to the internal network ($HOME_NET) on port 22. It specifically looks for the 'SSH-2.0' content in the TCP flow to the server. A threshold is set to trigger an alert if three such connections are observed from the same source within 60 seconds. The rule's message suggests it's intended to identify third-party SSH access potentially using a vendor key, implying an attempt to detect unauthorized or unusual SSH activity.
This rule detects SSH connections initiated by 'ssh.exe' that involve remote port forwarding ('-R' flag) or potential SSH tunneling (command line containing both '@' and ':'). This behavior can be indicative of adversaries establishing covert communication channels or maintaining persistence.
Page 32 of 42