Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule correlates the deployment of ScreenConnect components (identified by specific process names and image paths) with subsequent network communication to a known ScreenConnect C2 server (meeting.bulletmailer.net on port 8041). It aims to detect suspicious ScreenConnect activity, potentially indicating unauthorized remote access or control.
This query looks for any emails containing N8N webhooks linked to malicious Screen Connect installers
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2026-24061, a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in GNU telnetd. The rule identifies when the 'telnetd' process spawns '/usr/bin/login' with the '-f' flag, which skips authentication and grants the attacker remote access.
This rule detects the creation of a process where the parent process is 'node.exe' (associated with Node.js, often used by VS Code extensions) and the child process is either 'ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe' or has 'ScreenConnect' in its command line. This behavior could indicate a VS Code extension spawning a ScreenConnect remote access tool, which might be malicious.
This rule detects the XenoRAT info stealer and Remote Access Trojan (RAT) by identifying specific strings related to its functionalities. It looks for configuration parameters like 'HostName', 'PortNumber', 'UserName', and 'Password' which are typically supplied at runtime for C2 communication. The rule also identifies strings associated with browser data exfiltration ('Local Extension Settings', 'Sync Extension Settings', 'chromium_plugins', 'logins.json', 'profiles.ini', 'IndexedDB', 'chrome-extension_'), crypto wallet theft ('ChainingModeGCM'), file grabbing capabilities ('%DRIVE_FIXED%', '%DRIVE_REMOVABLE%', 'File Grabber'), and HVNC-style desktop control ('Chrome_WidgetWinOperaWindowClass', 'CreateDesktopA', 'OpenDesktopA'). Additionally, it includes specific hashes of known XenoRAT samples for direct identification.
This rule detects successful SSO logins on FortiGate devices using usernames and source IP addresses associated with a known malicious campaign exploiting a SAML SSO bypass. The rule specifically looks for successful SSO logins (logid == "0100032001", method == "sso", status == "success") from a predefined list of malicious usernames or source IP addresses.
This rule detects suspicious activity where an Azure CLI session, initially interactive, is followed by non-interactive access from a different IP address. This could indicate an attacker using a stolen token or session from a legitimate user's interactive login to perform automated actions. The rule specifically looks for a pivot from interactive to non-interactive access where the non-interactive access occurs after the interactive access and from a different IP address, within a 30-day lookback window.
Detects the silent installation and configuration of AnyDesk from the command line. This technique was observed being used by actors deploying DeadLock ransomware to establish persistence.
Extremely basic & rough KQL for the purpose of finding if these extension id's are in any folders across your estate.
Detects a pattern of behavior associated with VanHelsing ransomware's lateral movement, where an executable is written to a device over SMB and then executed shortly after. This is indicative of remote code execution techniques like those using PsExec.
This event is generated when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop.
Often, this event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network.
Often, this event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network.
ET INFO Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) Tool in DNS Lookup (gorelo-rmm .azurewebsites .net)
ET INFO Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) Tool in TLS SNI (gorelo-rmm .azurewebsites .net)
This rule detects attempts to exploit CVE-2021-20021, an unauthenticated arbitrary user creation vulnerability in SonicWall Email Security. The detection is based on HTTP GET requests to the '/createou' URI containing 'data=' in the request body, which is indicative of an exploitation attempt.
ET INFO Observed RMM Domain (meshcentral .com in TLS SNI)
ET INFO Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) Tool in TLS SNI (gorelo .tech)
Detects the creation of a set of four named pipes with a specific naming convention (`[random]_stdin_read`, `[random]_stdin_write`, etc.), a behavior consistent with the EndClient RAT used by Kimsuky to establish a remote shell.
This rule detects potential exploitation attempts targeting the Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) Remote Code Execution vulnerability, identified as CVE-2025-59287. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected WSUS server.
This rule detects uncommon outbound network connections on TCP port 88, which is the default port for Kerberos. Such activity, especially from processes other than expected system services like LSASS or common applications like web browsers and Tomcat, can indicate potential lateral movement or initial privilege escalation attempts through Kerberos delegation. Attackers often leverage Kerberos for authentication in Windows environments to move between systems or elevate privileges, for example, using tools like Rubeus for Kerberoasting or other Kerberos-based attacks.
Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary honeypot node has had a login attempt. This indicates an adversary attempting to gain unauthorized access to a system, likely through brute-force or credential stuffing attacks against the honeypot.
Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session initiated by a remote host. This rule specifically looks for the `TeamViewer_Desktop` process being launched by `TeamViewer_Service` with specific command-line arguments, indicating a remote connection. An investigator can verify connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
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