Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) session hijacking or suspicious automation activity. It monitors for the execution of tscon.exe, a system utility used to control remote desktop sessions, or the usage of mstsc.exe (Remote Desktop Connection) over the standard RDP port 3389, which can be indicative of lateral movement or unauthorized access.
This rule detects potentially compromised accounts by correlating risky Entra ID sign-ins to Citrix NetScaler with subsequent VPN session establishment followed by rapid, high-volume outbound connection activity from the source IP address. This pattern is indicative of a threat actor using compromised credentials to gain access via VPN and immediately perform internal network scanning or data staging.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events involving NetScaler ADC or Gateway appliances: anomalous account authentication, followed by the establishment of a VPN or remote access session, and subsequent unusual outbound network activity indicating potential lateral movement or C2 communication from the appliance.
Detects potential lateral movement by identifying NTLM authentication (Logon Type 3) to administrative network shares (ADMIN$, C$, IPC$) or high-frequency access to multiple hosts by the same user, which may indicate credential abuse or lateral movement attempts.
Detects anomalous NetScaler session activity potentially indicative of session hijacking or token forgery. This includes identifying session tokens reused across different source IP addresses or user-agents within a short timeframe, as well as detecting session tokens utilized in traffic without a preceding recorded authentication or logon event.
Detects configuration changes to AAA/TACACS+ settings or the creation of local administrative accounts on network devices executed over SSH or Telnet sessions. This behavior is associated with malicious activity by groups such as Salt Typhoon, involving the compromise of telecommunications infrastructure.
Detects the installation and execution of MeshAgent, a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool, by identifying specific command-line arguments, service names, and renamed binary execution. Adversaries often use RMM tools for persistent remote access and command and control.
This rule detects potentially compromised accounts by correlating risky Entra ID sign-ins to Citrix NetScaler with subsequent VPN session establishment followed by rapid, high-volume outbound connection activity from the source IP address. This pattern is indicative of a threat actor using compromised credentials to gain access via VPN and immediately perform internal network scanning or data staging.
Detects potential misuse of SSH credentials by identifying successful SSH logins from source IP addresses that have not been observed in the previous 14 days, or successful SSH logins occurring within one hour of an authorized_keys file modification on the same host. This combination of behaviors is indicative of an adversary establishing or using persistence via SSH key manipulation.
Detects the initialization of an AWS CloudShell environment or session. Attackers often abuse CloudShell as a managed, agentless environment within the provider's infrastructure to stage tools, perform reconnaissance using the AWS CLI, and exfiltrate data while bypassing standard endpoint-based detection.
Detects potential lateral movement by users who have recently been flagged for credential theft or infostealer activity. The rule correlates initial security alerts with subsequent Windows logon events (RDP, network/WinRM) or SMB share access, identifying users connecting to multiple distinct destinations within a 48-hour window.
This rule detects the installation or execution of common Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools (e.g., AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Atera, Splashtop, TeamViewer) on Windows endpoints within a 4-hour window of associated cloud identity risk activity (such as risky sign-ins, MFA changes, or privilege grants). It filters out legitimate activity initiated via standard software management pipelines (e.g., SCCM, Intune) to identify potential unauthorized use of remote access software by adversaries following account compromise.
This rule detects the execution of common Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) and remote access tools (e.g., ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, Atera, Splashtop, NinjaOne, Action1) when the command line includes silent install or installation flags. The detection correlates this activity with recent (within 72 hours) identity-related alerts (e.g., impossible travel, anomalous sign-in, credential compromise) for the same user, suggesting a potential high-risk scenario where an adversary is establishing remote access following a credential compromise.
Detects the execution of legitimate remote-access software commonly used in social engineering attacks, such as Quick Assist and AnyDesk. These tools are frequently abused as an initial access or persistence mechanism by threat actors following initial contact via methods like vishing or email-based social engineering.
Detects execution of MeshAgent binaries when initiated by common scripting or application processes (e.g., java, sh, bash, python) or when displaying suspicious command-line patterns indicative of unauthorized remote access or download activity, particularly in environments like WebLogic or PeopleSoft.
This rule detects the execution of common Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) and remote access tools when initiated from suspicious parent processes (such as browsers, office applications, or command-line interpreters), originating from common writeable directories (e.g., Temp, Downloads), or executed with command-line arguments indicative of silent/unattended installation. This behavior is often associated with initial access, persistence establishment, or unauthorized remote control of a system.
Detects the installation or execution of common Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools, including AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, and TeamViewer, by monitoring process creation events. This behavior is indicative of social-engineering-based intrusions by the Scattered Spider (UNC3944/Octo Tempest) threat actor, who often impersonates IT support staff to convince users to run these tools for unauthorized remote access.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a remote access tool (RAT) is installed on a device, followed by significantly elevated and anomalous database query activity performed by the same account over an extended period. The rule utilizes a baseline window to identify deviations from normal query volumes while excluding known service accounts and administrative ETL/BI tasks.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a remote access tool (RAT) is installed on a device, followed by significantly elevated and anomalous database query activity performed by the same account over an extended period. The rule utilizes a baseline window to identify deviations from normal query volumes while excluding known service accounts and administrative ETL/BI tasks.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a remote access tool (RAT) is installed on a device, followed by significantly elevated and anomalous database query activity performed by the same account over an extended period. The rule utilizes a baseline window to identify deviations from normal query volumes while excluding known service accounts and administrative ETL/BI tasks.
Detects autonomous behavior where AI-driven processes attempt multiple network connections (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM) to diverse targets following failed access attempts. The rule correlates initial failure activity with subsequent credential-related events and new lateral movement traffic from the same agent process within a short window, suggesting adaptive adversary pivoting.
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