Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects various post-exploitation activities associated with the Amadey loader, including the execution of its persistence mechanism (nudwee.exe), dropping and executing secondary payloads in temporary directories, using PowerShell download cradles, creating scheduled tasks for persistence, and silent MSI installations. This rule aims to identify the delivery of secondary payloads like StealC and Lumma Stealer.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks or command-line execution of task scheduling utilities (schtasks.exe, at.exe) that reference known SharkLoader persistence paths, file names, or task naming conventions.
Detects the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks associated with TrymeLocker ransomware. The rule monitors for tasks named 'RageGuard' or 'win_guard', as well as tasks registered with high privileges using non-standard file paths such as AppData, Temp, or ProgramData, triggered by system logon or startup.
This rule detects the creation and execution of scheduled tasks used by StrikeShark's SharkLoader, often associated with Cobalt Strike, for persistence. It identifies suspicious scheduled task names that mimic legitimate Microsoft services (e.g., OneDrive, MicrosoftUpdate) and the execution of 'SystemSettings.exe' from unusual 'AppData' subdirectories ('xwreg' or 'xgdf'). The rule has three branches: detecting 'schtasks.exe' command-line usage to create such tasks, detecting 'ScheduledTaskCreated' events with the suspicious names or command patterns, and detecting 'SystemSettings.exe' execution from the specific 'AppData' subdirectories.
This rule detects various techniques used by the Lambsys malware for persistence, watchdog monitoring, and cryptocurrency mining on Linux systems. It monitors for crontab modifications, the execution of hidden watchdog scripts in /var/tmp, the usage of pgrep to monitor the miner, and the detachment of processes via nohup.
Detects persistence mechanisms used by the lambsys/procq cryptominer. It identifies two specific behaviors: 1) Correlation of non-root process execution (isp.sh, lambsys, procq) followed within 120 seconds by modifications to cron configuration files (e.g., /etc/cron.d/, /var/spool/cron/crontabs/) containing suspicious command-line patterns or mining pool references. 2) Direct detection of crontab -e invocations using heredoc redirection (<<) to install persistence payloads that match known miner dropper patterns and mining pool endpoints.
Detects the multi-stage execution chain associated with the Gamaredon group's PteroEffigy loader. The rule monitors for PowerShell or scriptrunner instances originating from suspicious directories (AppData/Temp) that employ .NET reflection to load DLLs into memory. It then detects the subsequent creation of a scheduled task with a random alphanumeric name and the eventual execution of regsvr32 or rundll32 by that task to load the malicious DLL. Additionally, the rule identifies potential command-and-control activity by detecting specific Kazuar malware HTTP User-Agent strings.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with ModeloRAT, specifically monitoring for suspicious Registry Run key entries, scheduled tasks, and startup folder items that execute 'pythonw.exe' or 'WPy64-31401' based binaries.
This rule monitors for persistence mechanisms being established on Windows systems. Specifically, it tracks unauthorized modifications to the HKEY_CURRENT_USER Run registry key using 'reg.exe', the creation of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe', and suspicious process spawning patterns where 'MpExtMs.exe' executes 'reg.exe' or 'schtasks.exe' to facilitate persistence.
This rule identifies the Potemkin Loader establishing persistence by creating a scheduled task. The scheduled task is configured to execute a Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) payload upon user logon or system startup. Detection is based on `schtasks.exe` command-line arguments that include `/create`, `/tn` (task name), and `/tr` (task run) pointing to an executable within an `AppData` directory.
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks or 'at' jobs initiated by VBScript engines (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as persistence mechanisms established by malware or phishing attacks that leverage VBScript to schedule future execution.
Detects a specific persistence mechanism where a scheduled task named 'TPMProfiler' is used to run QEMU, establishing an SSH backdoor. This technique was identified by Huntress in post-exploitation activity related to SolarWinds WHD exploitation.
Detects potential persistence attempts on Windows systems where an unsigned executable, located in a user-writable directory (Temp, AppData, Downloads), is either configured for automatic startup via Registry run keys or registered as a scheduled task.
Malvertising loader delivering CastleStealer via malicious Google Ads
Infostealer distributed via fake open-source tool impersonation sites
Loader used in click-hijacking traffic distribution scheme
Infostealer-as-a-service targeting browser credentials and crypto wallets
IoT botnet malware family used for DDoS and proxy infrastructure
ClickFix style social engineering cluster delivering Mistic and ModeloRAT
Stealthy backdoor MLTBackdoor linked to KongTuke ClickFix and ModeloRAT campaigns
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